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THESIS

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THE NEW SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE
AND THE FUTURE OF THE MARITIME STRATEGY

by

William Bradley Walker

September 1988

Thesis Advisor:

Kerry M. Kartchner

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The New Soviet Military Doctrine
and the Future of the Maritime Strategy

by

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Lieutenant, United States Navy
B.S., Virginia Military Institute, 1982

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the continued applicability of the bastion concept as a basic assumption of the Maritime Strategy with respect to the new Soviet military doctrine. The methodology employed involves an examination of Soviet literature, naval hardware, and exercise/operating patterns to determine if there has been a shift in the Soviet emphasis upon protecting the SSBN force. The results show that even though the Soviets have made certain changes in the political aspects of their military doctrine, they will most likely continue to emphasize the protection of the SSBN as the primary mission of the Soviet Navy in the event of a war. In fact, as the numbers of strategic nuclear warheads are reduced by future arms control proposals, such as START, the Soviets will probably consider the protection of the SSBN force to be more important than in the past.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION -----	1
A.	STATEMENT OF THE THESIS -----	1
B.	AN ERA OF CHANGE -----	2
C.	STRATEGIC NECESSITIES -----	6
D.	U.S. MARITIME STRATEGY -----	8
E.	PRESENTATION OF THE PROBLEM -----	12
F.	METHODOLOGY -----	17
II.	DEVELOPMENT OF A STRATEGY -----	19
A.	MODERN INTELLECTUAL ROOTS -----	19
B.	DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE -----	30
C.	SEA PLAN 2000 -----	39
D.	REAGAN ADMINISTRATION -----	44
E.	OPPOSITION TO THE MARITIME STRATEGY -----	60
F.	APPLICABILITY OF THE CURRENT ARGUMENT -----	65
III.	FUNDAMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS -----	68
A.	THE BREAKDOWN OF A CONCEPT -----	68
B.	BASIC ASSUMPTIONS CONTAINED WITHIN THE BASTION CONCEPT -----	70
C.	SUMMATION -----	90
IV.	EVIDENCE OF BASTIONS -----	93
A.	A PROPER PERSPECTIVE -----	93
B.	GORSHKOV'S VIEW OF NAVAL STRATEGY -----	95
C.	SUMMATION -----	117

V.	WINDS OF CHANGE: GORBACHEV AND THE NEW SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE -----	124
A.	BREZHNEV ERA -----	124
B.	THE NEW SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE -----	133
C.	SUMMATION -----	184
VI.	FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS -----	188
A.	FINDINGS -----	188
B.	CONCLUSIONS -----	193
C.	SUMMARY -----	205
	LIST OF REFERENCES -----	207
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST -----	214

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I. INTRODUCTION

Geopolitically, the Soviet Union first and foremost is a landpower, and her political leaders and military establishment inevitably have the strategic culture of a landpower. The United States is a seapower, leads a maritime alliance that dwarfs in its total defense mobilization potential the assets of the Soviet imperium, and requires a national/maritime coalition strategy that both plays to Western strengths and copes adequately with Western vulnerabilities....A continental landpower cannot be defeated at sea, but a maritime alliance most certainly can be.¹

A. STATEMENT OF THE THESIS

This research will review the intellectual development and present applicability of the Maritime Strategy; specifically, the relevance of the bastion concept as a primary assumption and critical linkage between the Maritime Strategy and the new Soviet military doctrine. A careful review of the Soviet literature, hardware, and operations will be conducted to determine the primary motivations for the apparent changes in Soviet military doctrine to see if a change in the naval aspect of Soviet military strategy can be determined, and, if it is discovered that changes do in fact exist, what the implications might be for the present Maritime Strategy.

¹Colin S. Gray, "Keeping the Soviets Landlocked: Geostrategy for a Maritime America," The National Interest, No. 4, Summer 1986, p. 24.

B. AN ERA OF CHANGE

The U.S. Maritime Strategy was first formally introduced as a coherent plan by the Secretary of the Navy John Lehman in March, 1984. Secretary Lehman described the strategy as the maritime component of the National Military Strategy represented by National Security Decision Directive-32 (NSDD-32). The introduction of the strategy instigated a tremendous debate among such top defense intellectuals as Robert Komer and Colin Gray. The topics of this debate have covered the entire spectrum from the financial risks of the strategy to its strategic soundness. However, the basic principles which were argued so vigorously by both the proponents and critics of the Maritime Strategy were by no means unique and, in fact, have their modern intellectual roots firmly embedded in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

When Mikhail Gorbachev became the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union another twist was added to the debate. Gorbachev wasted no time in making it very clear that the policies of the Party were taking, by most Soviet standards, a radically different course from those of his predecessors. The sincerity and actual degree of the changes being introduced by Gorbachev are still under debate, and will continue to be for the indefinite future, but one thing is perfectly clear: the rhetoric of the General Secretary and other senior Party officials has

definitely altered, and seems to suggest, at the very least, an attempt by Gorbachev and his ideological colleagues to introduce some manifest and sweeping changes in the policies of the Soviet Union.

Some of Gorbachev's new policies, as represented by the "party's monopoly on interpretation...of today's two talismanic words" perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost (openness), appear to be largely social and economic in content.² However, it has become increasingly clear that the General Secretary also means for his new policies to have military implications. Richard Haver, the Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence, has noted,

Creating a vital Soviet civilian economy may come partially at the expense of the military. Thus, to help implement perestroika, the Soviet Union has developed a "defensive doctrine," and Secretary Gorbachev suggests that future force levels will be based on "reasonable sufficiency".³

The complete implications of Gorbachev's policies on Soviet military strategy remain to be seen. However, it is not simply idle conjecture to suggest that some changes in Soviet military strategy will be necessary and that, furthermore, are currently being manifested. The current (1988) downtrend in the Soviet Navy's operational tempo as well as the Soviet willingness to make drastic cuts in their

²George Will, "Gorbachev's Motives," The Monterey Herald, 15 May 1988, p. B-2.

³Richard Haver, "The Soviets Perspective," Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1988, p. 234.

nuclear and conventional arsenals may both be indications of such a change.

Even if such fundamental strategic decisions are currently being made by the Soviet leadership it could be several years before substantial evidence is available. The military historian and strategist Trevor Dupuy has suggested that

There have been three basic preconditions historically for assimilation of new...ideas:

1. An imaginative, knowledgeable leadership on military affairs, supported by extensive knowledge of, and competence in, the nature and background of the existing military system.
2. Effective coordination of the nation's economic, technological-scientific, and military resources.
3. Opportunity for battlefield experimentation as a basis for education and analysis.⁴

It is at best extremely difficult to determine if the present Gorbachev leadership possesses all three of these ingredients. There is no doubt that the Soviets have an extremely high knowledge of military affairs and spend a great deal of time in the pursuit of "scientific" military strategy. It is also apparent that Gorbachev, as well as his predecessors, have shown immense concern about the effective coordination of the Soviet Union's economic and scientific resources for military purposes. Nevertheless, even with these two pieces of the puzzle apparently in

⁴Trevor Dupuy, The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare, Indianapolis: Bob Merrill Co. Inc., 1980, p. 305.

place, there are still far more questions than answers. For example, many Sovietologists have serious doubts whether Gorbachev will manage to survive the decade of the 1980s as the political and ideological leader of the Soviet communist party, or if the powerful Soviet military will be willing to accept the cuts in spending that Gorbachev's policies seem to portend.

If all of the conditions cited by Dupuy are present, there is still a considerable delay: "When these conditions have been present, there has usually been a time lag of approximately 20 years, or one generation, between the initial experimental adoption of a new (idea)... and its full assimilation."⁵ Thus, although the Soviets are now spending a good deal of time discussing such ideas as "reasonable sufficiency" or "non-offensive defense," Dupuy's argument would suggest that the fundamental changes in Soviet military strategy being adopted by Gorbachev will not be fully implemented, and therefore fully evident to the West, until shortly after the turn of the century. This is assuming that Gorbachev is able to convince the opponents of his new ideas of their importance to the Soviet military, an important assumption at this point. Obviously, this by no means precludes the necessity of carefully studying the Soviet military in order to gain a glimpse, no matter how slight, of what these changes might mean. If Gorbachev is

⁵Dupuy, The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare, p. 305.

successful then it may be too late for the West to react 20 years down the line when the changes become more evident. It is important that we begin to study the possible significance of these changes now, so that there are no surprises later.

C. STRATEGIC NECESSITIES

Before a specific discussion of the Maritime Strategy can be reviewed, the general nature of military strategy and what makes a strategy a success or failure must be evaluated. Strategies in general help determine how to implement the proper amount and type of resources, at the proper moment, against the appropriate enemy. In order to meet these demands and still be successful and acceptable, a strategy must satisfy three criteria: affordability, flexibility, and applicability.

The issue of affordability is probably the most basic litmus test which can be applied to any potential strategy. Obviously, in the American political system any strategy which is exorbitantly expensive stands no chance of passing through the top military leadership which must sell the strategy to the Congress.

The Maritime Strategy proposed a 600 ship Navy with 15 aircraft carriers and 100 nuclear attack submarines. The affordability of such a Navy became one of the central arguments of the Maritime Strategy. Opponents insisted that this would pull vital resources away from both the Army and

the Air Force, especially in the critical NATO central front. Lehman and his backers countered by pointing out that the United States is an island continent with over 40 treaty relationships around the world. Since the Soviets have developed an offensively oriented blue water navy the top U.S. Navy planners believe that 600 ships is the absolute minimum necessary to meet these demanding obligations.⁶

Flexibility refers to the ability of a strategy to deal with a myriad of possible crises. Although such a criterion may seem to be rather self evident, the experiences of the French Army at the beginning of World War II provide an excellent example of what can happen if a strategy suffers from tunnel vision.

The architects of the Maritime Strategy attempted to make flexibility one of the cornerstones of the entire strategy. The strategy was specifically designed to deter "a continuum of violence that threatens our vital interests, running all the way from the terrorism we have seen so tragically in recent days at one end of the spectrum of violence, all the way to thermonuclear war."⁷

Any realistic strategy must be built around a basic set of assumptions about the strategy of potential enemies.

⁶The 600 Ship Navy and the Maritime Strategy, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986, p. 110.

⁷The 600 Ship Navy and the Maritime Strategy, p. 16.

These assumptions must be an accurate reflection of how the opponent's strategy is perceived. If these assumptions prove to be wrong, or if the enemy changes his strategy, then the present strategy becomes not only irrelevant but possibly dangerous.

It is ironic that the most critical of the three criteria applied to military strategy, applicability, is the least criticized aspect of the Maritime Strategy. This is perhaps due to the basic nature of determining an opponent's military strategy, especially when the primary opponent is a part of a very closed and obsessively secretive society such as the Soviet Union. In the simplest terms, this means that a certain amount of guess-work must take place in order to place the pieces of the puzzle together into a coherent whole. This is not to imply that the development of the Maritime Strategy was based upon a group of random estimates of the Soviet's intentions in case of a future war, but it does indicate that, considering the Soviet talent for strategic deception and the obtuse manner in which they explain themselves, strategic planning against the Soviets must be very carefully thought out and, more importantly, constantly examined and reexamined.

D. U.S. MARITIME STRATEGY

Despite an increase in global commitments, the United States Navy underwent a drastic reduction in its force structure in the decade after the Vietnam war. In terms of

actual numbers the U.S. Navy went from 960 ships in 1967 to 479 ships in 1980. There is no doubt that the drastic reduction was due to block obsolescence in the wake of the withdrawal of the United States from the war in Vietnam as well as the public distrust of the military that followed. Deserved or not, the 1970s proved to be a very difficult period not only for the U.S. Navy, but for the entire U.S. military in general.

By the end of the 1970s the fact that the U.S. Navy had shrunk to nearly half of its original size meant that national policies had to focus more and more on a defensive sea control strategy for the Navy, which emphasized protecting the sea lines of communication (SLOC) from enemy vessels. Many of the top ranking officers in the Navy realized that such a defensive strategy would be a distinct disadvantage in the case of a prolonged conventional war.

In reaction to the shrinking force levels a Naval force planning study called Sea Plan 2000 was produced in March 1978. As the chairman of the group that produced the study explained, "The current trend is to strengthen our convoy escort forces at the expense of our amphibious forces, battle groups, and attack submarines. What I am proposing is that this set of priorities be altered...."⁸ In order to emphasize the need for a more aggressive strategy, Sea Plan

⁸F.J. West, "A Fleet for the Year 2000: Future Force Structure," Naval Institute Proceedings, June 1980, p. 76.

2000 recommended a forward deterrence posture aided by 600 ships and 15 carriers, all of which would later be important aspects of the Maritime Strategy.

One of the more vocal and important proponents of a different naval strategy was the Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Thomas B. Hayward. In May 1979 Admiral Hayward stated, "Projecting power against the sources of Soviet naval strength may well be the most rapid and efficient way to gain control of the seas (as contrasted with the simplistic concept held by many that Sea Control simply means escorting convoys to Europe and little else)."⁹

The increase in military spending called for by the Reagan administration meant that the supporters of a different naval strategy could make themselves heard. As a result the newly appointed Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman, could call for the building of "a balanced mix of approximately thirty ships per year to achieve a truly capable fleet of about 600 ships and 15 battle groups" less than three months after taking office.¹⁰

The Maritime Strategy, as can be expected, has not been without its opponents and criticisms. The primary objections to the strategy can be broken down into two fundamental categories: conventional and nuclear.

⁹Thomas B. Haward, "The Future of Soviet Sea Power," Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1979, p. 68.

¹⁰John Lehman, Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, FY1982, part 4, p. 2267.

Conventional critics normally object to the Maritime Strategy as a war fighting strategy in a conventional war; nuclear opponents criticize it because they fear it will inevitably escalate to a nuclear war.

The conventional opponents of the strategy, led by strategic analysts and policy makers such as Robert Komer, have essentially objected to the strategy because "sweeping up the Soviet Navy would hardly suffice to prevent a great Eurasian heartland power like the USSR from dominating our chief allies."¹¹ This school of thought, sometimes called the Continental Strategy, believes that a future war will ultimately be determined on the ground (most Continentalists emphasize the NATO front in Central Europe), and therefore, the principal use of a Navy is to protect the SLOCs to ensure that critical supplies can reach the front.

The existence of the Continental Strategy only emphasizes that the basic conventional arguments for and against the Maritime Strategy are not new. The main argument of the Continental Strategy is essentially a recurrence of the ideas first outlined by the eminent geostrategist Halford Mackinder at the beginning of the twentieth century. In opposition to Mackinder's intellectual offspring, the maritime strategists are

¹¹Robert Komer, "Maritime Strategy vs. Coalition Defense," Foreign Affairs, Summer 1982, pp. 1133-34.

repeating many of the ideas proposed by the American naval strategist Alfred Mahan.

The nuclear opponents of the Maritime Strategy have a basic, simple, and recurring theme: the Maritime Strategy "contains the seeds of extremely rapid (nuclear) escalation."¹² These nuclear escalationists, led by Desmond Ball and Barry Posen, all give a variety of reasons why the implementation of the Maritime Strategy could lead to nuclear war. The reasons are not as important here as the implications: the U.S. Navy should rely on a more defensive SLOC control strategy (amazingly similar to the very strategic concepts the Maritime Strategy was employed to avoid) in order to eliminate, as much as possible, the possibility that a future war could escalate to nuclear annihilation.

E. PRESENTATION OF THE PROBLEM

1. Inherent Problems of Strategic Planning

As previously discussed, the design of a strategy, military or otherwise, requires basic assumptions about the potential enemy's perceived strategy or reaction to your strategy. It is important to realize that such assumptions must, by their very nature, be based to some extent upon the inferences of what the enemy will do. The reason is rather simple, but often forgotten: unless the enemy allows access

¹²Desmond Ball, "Nuclear War at Sea," International Security, Winter 1985-86, p. 23.

to his war plans then the assumptions must be based upon the small amount of empirical evidence that can be gathered. The problem is further complicated by the fact that we can never be certain that the enemy is not deliberately trying to deceive us. Furthermore, even if the basic assumptions do appear to be based on solid empirical evidence which is not the product of a strategic deception, it is always possible that the enemy will not act in war as he had planned during peace.

Despite these many problems it is the job of the strategic planner to use his surgeon's scalpel to make precise cuts between the reality of the enemy's plan and the wishful thinking which can all too often cloud our objectivity. The primary and commonly accepted manner for doing this, at least in the military arena, is to look at three traditional areas: what the enemy says, how the enemy practices what he says in exercises, and finally, how the enemy actually operates.

By using this methodology some assumptions about the enemy's military strategy can be pulled together. Some of these assumptions will be primary assumptions which are explicitly discussed in the context of the Maritime Strategy; others will be secondary assumptions and, in fact, are never specifically discussed or referred to when the Maritime Strategy is described.

2. Primary Assumption of the Maritime Strategy

The Maritime Strategy is a force planning strategy that was designed to counter a continuum of possible global contingencies with emphasis on a global conventional war. Since the strategy tends to emphasize the non-nuclear aspect of a future war, it required some basic assumptions of how the Soviets would fight a future conventional war.

The Soviets outlook on the nature of a future war has changed significantly over the previous 30 years. On 14 January 1960 Soviet General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev announced a new military doctrine for the Soviet Union. The new doctrine proclaimed that a future war would begin with "rocket strikes deep in the interior" of the warring nations.¹³ The implications were clear, the Soviets felt that a future war with the West "will inevitably take the form of a nuclear rocket war."¹⁴

By 1967, after the ouster of Khrushchev, the Soviets underwent yet another change in military doctrine. The new doctrine stressed that although the nuclear rocket is still the primary weapon of war, it is possible that a future war would be preceded by a conventional conflict, thus making the development of conventional weapons more important than they were under the previous doctrine. Many Western

¹³Harriet Scott and William Scott, The Armed Forces of the USSR, Boulder: Westview Press, 1984, p. 42.

¹⁴Scott, The Armed Forces of the USSR, p. 44.

theorists of the Soviet military attributed this shift in doctrine to NATO's formal adoption of the flexible response concept proposed in the United States a few years earlier.¹⁵

As a result of this doctrinal change, the Soviets developed a system that would enable a strategic strike to take place upon the United States from a submarine platform which was deployed in the comparative safety of home waters.¹⁶ The resulting system was the Delta class submarine with the 4200 nm SS-N-8 missile. The Delta class SSBN would thus be able to remain deployed in protected "bastions" or "sanctuaries" which would be closely guarded by the conventional Soviet fleet.

The idea that the Soviets would deploy their Delta class submarines in protected bastions became known as the "bastion concept." It was first developed by Western analysts of Soviet naval affairs in the early 1970s and accepted by the U.S. naval community by 1978.¹⁷ The bastion concept has become one of the most important and central assumptions of the Maritime Strategy.

¹⁵Scott, The Armed Forces of the USSR, pp. 54-55. See also Michael MccGwire, Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy, Brookings Institution, 1987, pp. 29-30. MccGwire refers specifically to the 1960 Central Committee Plenum.

¹⁶Michael MccGwire, Soviet Naval Policy: Objectives and Constraints, M. MccGwire, K. Booth, J. McDonnel, eds., Praeger Publishers, 1975, p. 516.

¹⁷Jan Breemer, "The Soviet Navy's SSBN Bastions: Evidence, Inference, and Alternative Scenarios," Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, March 1985, gives an excellent outline of the bastion concept and its evolution.

3. Purpose of this Research

In order to place the Maritime Strategy in the proper context it is necessary to trace its intellectual development from its Mahanian/Mackinderist roots to the present day. Once this has been accomplished then it will be shown that the maritimist arguments for and continentalist arguments against the Maritime Strategy are based largely on present assumptions about the Soviet Navy which were mostly developed in the early to mid 1970s.

The Maritime Strategy is obviously concerned primarily with the Soviet Navy and its role within Soviet military strategy. It is critical to show what the Navy's role in Soviet military strategy has been, and what it is today. If it becomes evident that there is an actual change, or the indications of a trend, then not only will the neo-Mahanians and neo-Mackinderists have to completely reevaluate their arguments, but the U.S. Navy will be forced to undertake a drastic reassessment of the Maritime Strategy itself. A strategy that is based upon erroneous assumptions is more dangerous than no strategy at all.

It is extremely crucial that the pertinence of the assumptions about the Soviet naval aspect of military strategy be reassessed to see if they closely reflect the political-military reality as the Soviets see it. If it is apparent that the Soviets are steadily moving away from a bastion concept and, for example, have every intention of

causing severe damage to NATO's SLOCs, then the present arguments for and against the Maritime Strategy, indeed the very Strategy itself, become increasingly irrelevant as the Soviets begin to develop the means to implement the new strategy.

F. METHODOLOGY

The primary purpose of this research is to determine if the bastion concept remains a valid assumption for the Maritime Strategy with respect to the new Soviet military doctrine. The bastion concept is really a very broad assumption that encompasses several other implicit assumptions, furthermore, it is not a concept that the Soviets explicitly address--bastions and sanctuaries refer to the Western interpretations. Therefore, the bastion concept will be broken down into six more basic assumptions which will be individually reviewed.

After discussing the development of the Maritime Strategy and the bastion concept, the role and missions of the Soviet Navy before Gorbachev will be reviewed with respect to the six basic assumptions. This will be accomplished primarily by evaluating the Soviet Navy through the eyes of the man who commanded it for nearly 30 years: Admiral Gorshkov.

Finally, there will be a thorough review of the changes that have occurred in the Soviet military since Gorbachev became General Secretary. The debate within the Soviet

Union about implementing perestroika and its role in the military is clearly still continuing. At this point, it appears that the issues of the debate are primarily divided between the military and the academicians. Since it is not at all clear who has the advantage at this time, both sides of the debate will be presented where applicable. Due to the wide variety of Soviet analysts involved in the debate, this is not meant to be a strictly formal content analysis. Instead, a review of the more recent Soviet literature since 1985 will be conducted in an attempt to pull together some of the more commonly recurring themes. By using this method, a more sound understanding of the primary concerns among the Soviet military and civilians can be obtained.

A review of the more recent Soviet literature on their new military doctrine is insufficient to uphold or reject the continuing validity of the six assumptions. Therefore, the literature review is followed by a critique of the Soviet arms control proposals as well as the trends in Soviet naval hardware development, operations and exercises. Drawing upon this body of evidence, the support, or lack of support, for the six basic assumptions will be shown and compared with the evidence of the pre-Gorbachev period. Using this method, any current or future trends in the Soviet military will hopefully become evident, and can certain inferences about the present and near future applicability of the bastion concept be drawn.

II. DEVELOPMENT OF A STRATEGY

Democracy refuses to think strategically unless and until it is compelled to do so for purposes of defense.¹

A. MODERN INTELLECTUAL ROOTS

The Maritime Strategy is not a strategy that is based upon fundamentally new or unique concepts. Like all strategies, the Maritime Strategy was evolved over a period of several years and is based upon the combined combat experience and strategic thought of many different people. It is also a strategy that has been based upon many important assumptions of how the Soviets will operate their Navy in a future war. However, before discussing the more important of these assumptions the development and current opposition to the Maritime Strategy will be reviewed. This must be done in order to place the Maritime Strategy in its proper context as a valid warfighting strategy.

Many of the current arguments concerning the Maritime Strategy can be traced back nearly 100 years. At the turn of the century two strategists, one American and the other British, were printing some of the very ideas which would become the centerpiece of the current argument. Therefore, a discussion of the development of the modern strategy, and

¹Halford J. Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1942, p. 23.

the principal arguments opposing it, must begin with a review of the original ideas of Alfred T. Mahan and Halford Mackinder.

1. Mahan and the Maritime Strategy

Alfred Thayer Mahan was a relatively undistinguished naval officer until he was invited by the first president of the newly created Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, Commodore Stephen B. Luce, to "...raise maritime war to the level of a science...."² By the time of his death in 1914, Mahan had published 20 books and 137 articles and was considered in many countries to be one of the preeminent naval historians and strategists in the world. It is a testament to the ideas of Mahan, which were not all entirely original but were rather timely, that they continue to influence the strategies and force structures of navies all over the world to this very day. In fact, many of his more important ideas were to be incorporated into the very Maritime Strategy which guides the U.S. Navy to this day.

Mahan's purpose in studying naval warfare was to discover the few "principles of land warfare applicable by analogy to war at sea."³ His most important works were lengthy studies of the British Navy and its effects upon

²Philip Crowl, "Alford Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian," Makers of Modern Strategy, Peter Paret ed., Princeton University Press, 1986, p. 449.

³Crowl, "Alford Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian," p. 450.

European events between 1660 and 1812. His basic message was rather simple: the sheer maritime predominance and sea control strategy employed by Britain during this period of history had a significant effect upon the outcomes of the many wars fought between England and France.

Mahan focused upon the economic effects of the British naval blockade of France during their decades of war. According to Mahan, the superior size and quality of the British fleet proved to be too much for the weaker French Navy and allowed the blockade to succeed, thus leading to the economic strangulation of France. However, Mahan did not feel that the main function of a Navy was to simply protect its commerce through a convoying system. A navy must prevent its own economic lifelines from being cut by aggressively attacking the enemy's, and this was best accomplished by first destroying the enemy fleet. "The one particular result which is the object of all naval action, is the destruction of the enemy's organized force, and the establishment of one's own control of the water."⁴

Mahan's proposed methods for destroying the enemy fleet was a decidedly aggressive and offensive naval strategy. Furthermore, Mahan's strategy called for a forward defense of the critical maritime regions. "The true stations for the British fleets...was before the hostile

⁴Alfred T. Mahan, Sea Power in Its Relation to the War of 1812, 2 vols., p. 51, as cited in Crowl, "Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian," p. 458.

ports and as close to them as might be."⁵ Once the fleet is stationed as far forward as possible, the enemy fleet must be engaged and destroyed, then control of the sea has been established and the slow economic strangulation of the enemy may commence.

As in all military campaigns, the front of operations of a powerful fleet should be pushed as far towards the enemy as is consistent with the mutual support of the various detachments, and with secure communications with their base. By so doing, not only are the great national interests placed more remote from the alarms of war, but the use of the region behind the front of operations, in this case the sea, is secured to the power that can afford to maintain its fighting line close to the enemy's position.⁶

Mahan was also aware of the deterrence value of a modern and well trained navy. Although Mahan is generally remembered for his emphasis on forcing an opposing fleet engagement, his belief in the benefit of a modern navy as a deterrent is not necessarily an inconsistency in his naval philosophy; Mahan knew that a war was better avoided if possible but "unless the position won is strategically decisive...the battle might as well, or better, never been fought."⁷ Furthermore, Mahan's view on deterrence was that it "implies not merely what shall be done to repel attack,

⁵Alfred T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon the Frech Revolution an Empire, 2 vols., Little Brown and Co., 1898, p. 84.

⁶Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon the Frech Revolution an Empire, p. 340.

⁷Mahan, Alfred T., Naval Administration and Warfare, Little Brown and Co., 1918, p. 136.

but what is necessary to do in order that attack not be attempted, or, if undertaken, may be resisted elsewhere than at the national frontier, be that land or sea."⁸

In summary, to simplify and condense the thrust of his major ideas, Admiral Mahan's naval strategy called for the use of the fleet as far forward away from home shores as possible. The fleet should be positioned to hopefully dissuade the enemy from ever engaging in a battle but, if that battle is pursued (for example, if war is declared), then the primary function of the fleet is to protect its own sea lines of communications by destroying the enemy's fleet and, therefore, establishing complete maritime superiority over the sea. Once this superiority is established then the navy can begin to aggressively attack the enemy's commerce and blockade his ports. By accomplishing these tasks the navy could hopefully then "drive the enemy into the battlefield of the Continental System, where his final ruin is certain."⁹

Many of Mahan's ideas had an important influence on the Maritime Strategy. For example, in the summer of 1981, Secretary of the Navy John Lehman was just beginning to express the ideas that would later comprise the Maritime Strategy. The legacy of Admiral Mahan's ideas were

⁸Mahan, Naval Administration and Warfare, p. 172 (my emphasis).

⁹Mahan, Naval Administration and Warfare, pp. 400-401.

acknowledged from the very beginning. Lehman noted that Mahan's concept of "command of the seas" was an extremely important concept "which is so relevant today."¹⁰ The development of the Maritime Strategy will be more fully discussed later in this chapter. However, in order to understand the influence of Mahan's ideas upon that strategy it is necessary to briefly summarize Lehman's view of the Maritime Strategy.

Lehman proclaimed that the primary function of that strategy is to deter war. If this objective proved to be a failure, then the purpose of the strategy was to then engage the enemy in his own backyard. The destruction of the enemy fleet in these forward areas would serve two basic functions: it would keep the enemy busy and therefore protect NATO's SLOCs; and it would hopefully lead to war termination on grounds acceptable to the NATO alliance. In case of a war with the Soviets, the U.S. Navy would

...stress forward deployments, including operations capable of war-fighting and winning in areas denoted as "high risk." Such an approach should force the Soviets, historically dominated by continental horizons, to concentrate more resources on homeland defense--and possibly less on interdiction of U.S. sealanes.¹¹

Lehman's statements concerning the Maritime Strategy could almost have been written by Mahan himself. The parallels between the two are unmistakable. Mahan's

¹⁰John F. Lehman, "Rebirth of a Naval Strategy," Strategic Review, Summer 1981, p. 11.

¹¹Lehman, "Rebirth of a Naval Strategy," p. 13.

principles of an aggressive forward strategy based as far from home waters as possible, in order to destroy the enemy fleet and protect vital supply lines are clearly evident in the Maritime Strategy. Thus, it is fair to say that although not all of Mahan's ideas are still relevant in today's modern high technology world of supercomputers and guided missiles, his concept of sea control is still alive and well in the U.S. Maritime Strategy.

2. Mackinder and the Continental Strategy

Halford Mackinder was a professor of geography at the University of London and Oxford. He was never as prolific as Mahan, but did manage to exert a tremendous influence on strategic thinking and, in fact, is considered to be the preeminent theoretician of geopolitics. Despite Mahan's tremendous popularity among the British, Mackinder managed to gather a significant following who felt that his ideas and influence were "at least equal to Mahan's on those who have power to shape the destiny of the world."¹²

Mackinder's ideas concerning the Heartland within the World Island were originally published in 1904. However, after World War I, when the allies were considering the formation of the League of Nations, Mackinder was compelled to publish his most important work, Democratic Ideals and Reality. Mackinder's primary concern was that

¹²Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, p. xxi of introduction.

the League of Nations would be dominated by well intentioned but idealistic principles that would render it ineffective in a rapidly changing world. He understood very well that rule by democracy meant "rule by consent of the average citizen" who had very little strategic vision beyond his own present and local concerns. Mackinder fervently believed that "we must base our proposed League on realities, if we would have it last....Democracy must reckon with Reality."¹³

It is not accurate to depict Mackinder's ideas in complete opposition to the ideas of Mahan. Mackinder understood the advantage of seapower, which is hardly surprising for a British strategist at the turn of the century. However, Mackinder feared that the immense success enjoyed by the British empire due to its maritime predominance would lead to a dangerous over-confidence among future strategic planners. Mahan's belief that a predominant seapower could dominate a war was precisely the attitude that Mackinder most feared. In what must have been a subtle warning to Admiral Mahan and his followers Mackinder wrote:

So impressive have been the results of British sea-power that there has perhaps been a tendency to neglect the warnings of history and to regard sea-power in general as inevitably having, because of the unity of the ocean, the last word in the rivalry with land-power.¹⁴

¹³Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, p. 208.

¹⁴Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, p. 59.

Mackinder believed, like Mahan, that his ideas formed a strategic concept whose time had come. Prior to the nineteenth century there was simply insufficient manpower in the world island to make world domination a possibility. The era when a powerful maritime nation could dominate the world was coming to an end. The great landpowers of the world were going to have ever increasing strategical opportunities against the traditional seapowers.

The principal landpower of concern, according to Mackinder, was any landpower who could dominate the Heartland within what he called the World Island. The World Island was comprised of the continents of Europe, Africa, and Asia and, not only did it contain the majority of the earth's land surface, at the time it contained seven-eighths of the world population. The Heartland was a specific region within the World Island which included the "Baltic Sea, the navigable Middle and Lower Danube, the Black Sea, Asia Minor, Armenia, Persia, Tibet, and Mongolia."¹⁵ Both Germany and Russia were contained within the Heartland and were the two principal powers vying for control.

Mackinder felt that any country that could manage to gain control of the world island would have three significant advantages over the traditional seapowers. The first advantage was the tremendous gains made in land mobility over the previous 50 years which immediately took away from

¹⁵Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, p. 110.

seapower one of its historically most unique and significant advantages. Mackinder believed that it was no longer a given that seapower had an inherent advantage in mobility over landpower. "Today armies have at their disposal not only the Transcontinental Railway, but also the motor-car.... In short, a great military power in possession of the Heartland...could take easy possession of the crossways of the world...."¹⁶

The second significant advantage of a Heartland power would be the access to a tremendous base upon which to build seapower. Seapower is dependent upon the productivity of the bases upon which it rests and, according to Mackinder, the vast majority of the Heartland was still an economically underdeveloped region with great potential. If the economic potential of the Heartland was ever properly developed then "East Europe and the Heartland would make a mighty sea-base."

The third advantage of the Heartland power is the most important advantage because it is often mentioned in conjunction with arguments against the Maritime Strategy. Any country in control of the Heartland would have the geographic advantage of being in a region which is "inaccessible" to sea power. This advantage was considered to be so important by Mackinder that he often used this explanation to define the Heartland. "The Heartland is the

¹⁶Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, p. 111.

region [to] which, under modern conditions, sea-power can be refused access."¹⁷ In sum, Mackinder believed that any country which had control of the Heartland and had the proper combinations of land mobility and economic productivity, while being protected from the reach of seapower, could rule the world.

What if the Great Continent, the whole World-Island or a large part of it, were at some future time to become a single and united base of sea-power? Would not the other insular bases be outbuilt as regards ships and outnumbered as regards seaman? Their fleets would no doubt fight with all the heroism begotten of their histories, but the end would be fated.¹⁸

Mackinder realized that the two powers vying for control of the Heartland were Germany and Russia. But in 1919 Germany had just lost World War I and had signed the Treaty of Versailles. Russia had also been defeated in the war, had undergone a revolution, and was still in the midst of a civil war. However, Mackinder knew that Russia would continue to be a menace due to her large population and influence in Eastern Europe. "Nature there offers all the prerequisites of ultimate dominance in the world...and the Russian peoples are Growing Concerns...with a powerful historical momentum."¹⁹

Mackinder's solution to the inevitable power struggle that would occur between Russia and Germany for

¹⁷Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, p. 110.

¹⁸Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, p. 70.

¹⁹Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, p. 170.

control of the Heartland was a group of independent countries placed between the two powers. Obviously, this group of countries would have to be the Eastern European countries but this was especially important because:

Who rules Eastern Europe commands the Heartland;

Who rules the Heartland commands the World Island;

Who rules the World Island commands the World.²⁰

Mackinder's Heartland thesis is perhaps more relevant in this day of mass transportation and global communications. However, many of the opponents of the Maritime Strategy tend to point to Mackinder's ideas as irrefutable proof of the futility of a maritime strategy against a heartland power like the Soviet Union. Such a point may be valid but it seems to miss an important point that the proponents of the Maritime Strategy often make: the U.S. Navy is not attempting to win the war through the Maritime Strategy, it is trying to prevent NATO from losing it.

B. DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE

The bastion concept is essentially the assumption that the Soviet Navy will maintain the majority of its SSBN force deployed safely within waters contiguous to the Soviet Union (the obvious exceptions would be the Yankee SSBNs that are deployed in the West Atlantic and the Golf Class SSBNs that

²⁰Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, p. 150.

are in the Baltic). In order to fully understand how this concept came to be viewed by the U.S. intelligence community it is necessary to give a brief description of how Soviet military doctrine has evolved over the last 30 years.

1. Development of Soviet Military Doctrine

The Soviet use of the word military doctrine, like most words the Soviets use to explain a concept, is very specific in meaning. Doctrine refers to the official communist party line and, once it has been decided, there is very little or no room to argue about doctrine once it is promulgated. On 14 January 1960, Nikita Khrushchev announced that the Soviet Union "has powerful rocketry. The present level of military technique being what it is, the Air Force and the Navy have lost their former importance.... Our armed forces have to a considerable degree been switched to rocket and nuclear weapons."²¹ Although Khrushchev provided no explanations about why the Soviet Union had switched to a nuclear dominated military this question was quickly answered by his minister of defense, Marshal R. Ya. Malinovskiy:

One of the important positions of this doctrine is that a world war, if it nevertheless is unleashed by the imperialist aggressors, will inevitably take the form of nuclear rocket war, that is, such a war where the main means of striking will be the nuclear weapon and the basic

²¹Harriet Scott and William Scott, eds., The Soviet Art of War, Boulder: Westview Press, 1982, p. 163.

means of delivering it to the target will be the rocket.²²

Soviet military thought was almost exclusively dominated by this nuclear doctrine for the next eight years. Almost all Soviet pronouncements concerning the nature of a future war were verbatim repetitions of Malinovskiy. Even Marshal V. D. Sokolovskiy's book Military Strategy, still one of the more authoritative works on military doctrine openly published by the Soviets, proved to be a careful observance of the official Soviet policy. In fact, the majority of Sokolovskiy's book dealt with nuclear war as a modern phenomenon which Soviet military strategy was adopting to its advantage.

In the period from 1966 to 1968 there was substantial evidence that a change in Soviet military doctrine had occurred. The change was not a radical change, but considering the glacial pace at which the Soviets seem to change their official doctrine it was a significant change. The official doctrine now claimed that a future war with the West would still be nuclear but acknowledged that it could be preceded by a phase in which conventional weapons would be used. This change had important implications. The Soviets now explained that more attention would once again have to be given to conventional weapons systems; the Strategic Rocket Forces may still be the most

²²Scott, The Soviet Act of War, p. 158.

important branch of the Soviet military but the Navy and Air Forces were no longer unimportant. In 1970 the Soviet Minister of Defense, Marshal A.A. Grechko announced that in a future war "classic types of armaments will also find use. In certain circumstances, the possibility is admitted of conducting combat actions with conventional weapons."²³

Although not all Western analysts of Soviet affairs agree upon the exact timing of this subtle shift in Soviet military doctrine, there is a consensus on the reasons the Soviets why picked this rough period of time to change their policies.²⁴ In 1967 NATO formally adopted the nuclear concept of "flexible response." The flexible response policy replaced the earlier massive retaliation concept which was perceived as allowing for no alternative but the massive onslaught of nuclear weapons in case of a war with the Soviet Union. Flexible response, as the name implies, called for a continuum of responses in proportion to the severity of the aggression.

2. Implications of Doctrinal Shift

The change in military doctrine from a world in which the next war would be a short, decisive, destructive,

²³Scott, The Soviet Act of War, p. 208.

²⁴Michael McGwire, in his book Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy, insists that the change that took place in December of 1966 before NATO formally adopted "Flexible Response." Most other analysts, such as the Scotts, feel the change was probable in early 1968, after NATO's decision.

and final nuclear clash between the Soviet Union and the West, to a world in which the next war may have a prolonged conventional phase, had profound implications for the Soviet force structure. Prior to the 1966-1968 doctrinal shift Soviet forces were largely built for one-time use. The Soviet naval attitude, as cynical as it may seem, was that there was no need to produce weapons systems which could remain at sea for prolonged periods of time with their magazines brimming with weapons because, once the war did start, all of these systems would be quickly annihilated. However, now that a future war would be preceded by a conventional phase, and who knew for certain just how long this could last, it was now important to build weapons systems with the ability to remain on line for longer periods of time--and survive. Furthermore, and more importantly, this required a nuclear weapons delivery system that was highly survivable. The Soviets were well aware of the attractiveness of their strategic delivery systems as targets in the conventional phase of a war, and knew that their sea-based systems, necessarily operating close to U.S. shores, such as the Golf SSB and the Yankee SSBN, were vulnerable to Western ASW forces.

In 1971 the Soviets produced the Delta class SSBN with the SS-N-8 missile. What was significant about this weapons system was not the submarine, but the nuclear missile it carried. The SS-N-8 had a range capability in

excess of 4000 nm. This meant that the Delta, unlike the Yankee or the Golf, could deploy in home waters such as the Barents sea and still reach targets in North America. Since the Delta was not a significantly quieter submarine than its predecessors, and it is probably fair to assume that the Soviets knew this, then the Soviets could work their way around this problem by deploying the Delta close to home waters where the conventional Soviet Navy could protect it.

In October 1973 Soviet naval analyst Michael MccGwire first proposed such a theory. MccGwire argued that the Soviets realized that their sea based strategic systems had "a poor record of evading U.S. detection systems." This problem, combined with the inherent vulnerability of a static land-based system, made the construction of a better system a vital strategic necessity. "It was therefore decided to develop an SLBM system with sufficient range to be able to strike at North America from the comparative safety of home fleet waters. This system (the 4200 nm SS-N-8) would be fitted in the D-class [submarine]...."²⁵

MccGwire's colleague, Bradford Dismukes, expanded upon MccGwire's idea and added that the range of the SS-N-8 also allows the Delta to be concentrated into an area so that other land and naval forces can protect them (such an operation is often called pro-SSBN). Dismukes concludes

²⁵MccGwire, Soviet Naval Policy: Objectives and Constraints, p. 516.

that, "At this time it would appear useful for analysts to add the pro-SSBN mission to the list of possible wartime tasks of the Soviet Navy."²⁶

3. Withholding and Bastions

Many analysts felt, and continue to feel, that the Soviets developed the Delta because its inherent survivability would allow it to be used as an "insurance force." By protecting the SSBN force in its home waters the Soviets could ensure that they could maintain a positive correlation of nuclear forces. The Soviets have placed great emphasis on maintaining a favorable correlation of forces which are defined "in general...as a way of determining which side will have the upper hand, broadly speaking, in the action being studied."²⁷ Therefore, according to many analysts, the Soviets would "withhold" the Deltas in the event of a nuclear exchange as leverage for bargaining a favorable war termination.

It is important to understand that there is a distinct difference between the concepts of "withholding" and "bastions." Withholding is usually given as the reason for placing the Soviet SSBN force within the bastions,

²⁶Bradford Dismukes, "The Soviet Navy General Purpose Forces: Roles and Missions in Wartime," Soviet Naval Policy: Objectives and Constraints, p. 583.

²⁷Ali Jalali, Goulham Wardak, and John Sloan, Discussions with Voroshilov and Frunze Academy Students: Correlation of Forces and Means, Science Applications International Corporation, 1986, p. 2.

although the two terms often seem to be freely interchanged. In 1974, at the third annual seminar of Soviet naval development held at Dalhousie University, James McConnell first linked the withholding strategy to the bastions. After reading Admiral of the Fleet Sergei Gorshkov's articles that had been published in the Soviet naval journal Morskoi Sbornik, McConnell concluded that:

Gorshkov appears to be rationalizing a political decision to withhold a substantial portion of Soviet SLBMs from the strikes of the initial period in order to carry out "deterrence" in war, conduct intrawar bargaining, and influence the peace talks at the end of the war.²⁸

4. U.S. Navy and the Bastion Concept

The U.S. Navy was much slower than the civilian community to adopt the bastion theory. At the hearings for the Department of Defense Appropriations for FY 1978 it was admitted that the Soviets were "aware of the potential threats to their SLBM force and are attempting to increase its survivability."²⁹ The annual Department of Defense report went one step further and claimed that: "Such deployments, relatively close to home ports, allow more time

²⁸J. McConnell, "The Gorshkov Articles, the New Gorshkov Book, and their Relation to Policy," Soviet Naval Influence: Domestic and Foreign Dimensions, M. McGwire and J. McDonnell, eds., Praeger Publishers, 1977, p. 377.

²⁹DoD Appropriations for FY 1978, U.S. Government Printing Office, p. 62.

on station...and provide a degree of sanctuary from anti-submarine warfare...forces."³⁰

At the Senate hearings for Department of Defense appropriations held in March 1982 the Director of Naval Intelligence, Rear Admiral Shapiro, first indicated that the U.S. intelligence community had adopted this interpretation of the bastion concept, at least in the Navy. It was to be a concept that would have profound implications for the fledgling Maritime Strategy.

It is interesting to note that the U.S. Navy began to first discuss the bastion concept at about the same time that it began to first discuss, at least publicly, the concepts which would later become the Maritime Strategy. In this respect, 1978 would appear to be a watershed year for the U.S. Navy. At a time of low budgets and public outcries for a defensive sea control/convoy protection policy, the leaders of the Navy realized that it was beginning to look more and more as if the Soviets were not going to come out and fight. In 1985, after the Maritime Strategy had been announced, Rear Admiral Shapiro's successor, Rear Admiral Butts, finally gave the U.S. Navy's full understanding of how the Soviets were going to fight the next war:

The Soviets believe a war with the West would be decisive, global in scope, and probably escalate to nuclear conflict. Therefore, while naval forces are structured to fight in any environment, initial wartime operations would

³⁰Breemer, "The Soviet Navy's SSBN Bastions: Evidence, Inference, and Alternative Scenarios," p. 22.

be conducted with a view towards escalation. Hence, the Soviet Navy is assigned two overarching, complementary missions to perform initially. The primary task is to deploy and protect the SSBN force. They believe that SLBMs, for the first time, give navies the capability to directly affect the course and even the outcome of a war. Because of the importance they ascribe to the SSBN force, the Soviets plan to support and protect it through an echeloned defense in depth....To accomplish these tasks, the Soviets would attempt to control all or large portions of the Norwegian and Greenland Seas and the waters to the north as well as the Seas of Japan and Okhotsk and the area off the Kamchatka Peninsula.³¹

C. SEA PLAN 2000

Throughout the 1970s, while the bastion concept was being integrated into the strategic assessment of Soviet military strategy, the U.S. Navy was undergoing drastic reductions in its force levels. By 1980 the Navy had only 479 ships compared with 960 ships in 1967 at the height of the Vietnam war. Meanwhile, there was a growing concern of the Soviet Navy and its ever increasing capabilities. Many analysts argued that U.S. naval superiority over the Soviet Navy in case of a future war could no longer be taken for granted.

The results of a shrinking navy with expanding global commitments facing a growing opponent were almost predictable. Many defense planners outside of the U.S. Navy were calling for a very anti-Mahanian naval strategy that would emphasize defensive sea control. Many of these planners and decision makers felt that the primary purpose for the Navy

³¹DoD Appropriations for FY 1986, U.S. Government Printing Office, pp. 4367-68.

in case of a future war with the Soviet Union would be to maintain the critical SLOCs leading to Europe. These strategists maintained a global view of the world that was primarily Eurocentric and was driven by the belief that if the central front in Europe was lost, then all was lost. There was even a call for a "swing strategy" in which naval forces in the Pacific would be pulled over to the Atlantic theater of operations to assist in the protection of the Atlantic SLOCs.

No self-respecting navy with strategic foresight wants to be used as a convoy escort service and little else; and the United States Navy was no exception. The naval leadership realized that the basic argument essentially was centered around the traditional capabilities-versus-commitments problem, and most people were pointing their fingers at the U.S. Navy's shrinking capabilities. The most obvious solution would be to point out the fact that the Navy had global commitments that were expanding everyday, and would probably continue to expand over the next quarter century.

In March 1978 an increasingly restless naval leadership responded with a naval force planning study called Sea Plan 2000. The study emphasized the advantages that can be offered by strong naval forces. Navies can contribute to deterrence by maintaining global stability, primarily through their deployment in forward areas and by defense of

the SLOCs.³² Even more importantly, from a political point of view, a strong navy provides the national policymakers and leadership with the flexibility required to respond to the many possible contingencies that can occur in different locations over the world.

The U.S. Navy, according to the study, was already being utilized to its maximum limits. In view of the growing Soviet threat it may not be long before the Navy would find itself forced into a situation where naval forces would have to be withdrawn from one critical region to respond to a crisis in another--leaving the vacated region for the Soviets. "The overall size of our naval fleet is threatening to decline below the threshold of critical mass necessary for the containment of serious crises and the retention of flexible options for the deterrence of major war." As a result U.S. "naval forward deployments are stretched taut. Should the U.S. draw down its forward deployments, this action could leave the USSR as the dominant naval power in the vacated region."³³

Sea Plan 2000 used the bastion concept as one of its central assumptions. The study explained that the Soviets would never release their submarines for SLOC interdiction

³²Summary of Sea Plan 2000 Naval Force Planning Study, U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1978.

³³Summary of Sea Plan 2000 Naval Force Planning Study, p. 3.

as long as they perceived that there was a threat to their homeland (and, as Sovietologists have noted, the Soviets always perceive a threat to their homeland). Therefore, the study considered forward deployments in the Soviet's home waters as the best means of defending against the Soviet threat because it kept the Soviets on the defensive.

According to the director of the study, F.J. West Jr., Sea Plan 2000 placed "special" emphasis on the continuing development of offensive oriented naval ships such as the attack submarine and carrier battle groups. Although the actual study was classified, the unclassified summary of the study indicated that three different growth options were reviewed. These options, shown in Table 1 along with the growth levels later recommended by John Lehman in order to execute the Maritime Strategy, show that the study recommended a maximum growth level of four percent real growth through the year 2000. However, in a later paper, West wrote that the study recommended a 600 ship Navy with 15 carrier battle groups, interestingly the exact number recommended by Lehman in 1981.³⁴

Sea Plan 2000 strongly recommended a growth rate of at least four percent if the Navy was to meet all of its global commitments through the year 2000. The study, by itself, did not have an immediate impact upon the force planning

³⁴F.J. West provided these figures in his article, "Maritime Strategy and NATO Deterrence," Naval War College Review, September-October 1985, p. 5.

TABLE 1

ILLUSTRATIVE OPTIONS FOR YEAR 2000 NAVY

Ships	Option 1 1% Real Growth	Option 2 2% Real Growth	Option 3 3% Real Growth	Lehman and Mar. Strat.
SSBN	25	25	25	40
CV	10	12	14	15
SSN	80	94	98	100
Aegis Ship	10	24	28	---
Surf Comb	210	252	272	---
Amphib	52	66	78	75
Other	52	64	70	---
Total	439	535	585	600

Sources: U.S. Navy, Sea Plan 2000: Naval Force Planning Study, (Unclassified Executive Summary), 28 March 1978; and Testimony of John Lehman before the House Armed Services Committee, The 600 Ship Navy and the Maritime Strategy, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986.

Note: A further breakdown of the 600 ship Navy is shown in Table 3.

levels within the Department of Defense. It is clear, however, that the study did provide some of the root concepts that would later be used in the justification of the Maritime Strategy and, more importantly, it provided the much needed momentum for the U.S. Navy to sell its new strategy to the Reagan administration.

D. REAGAN ADMINISTRATION

1. Early Development of the Maritime Strategy

As previously discussed, the Maritime Strategy is a strategy with roots traceable to the late 1970s. Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, the Chief of Naval Operations, continued to be one of the more outspoken advocates of the new strategy, but he was not alone. A host of other top naval leaders and military strategists, such as F.J. West and Thomas Moorer, were also advocating a more offensively oriented naval strategy.

In the process of promoting a more offensively oriented strategy, several principles began to emerge. These principles were never presented as a coherent whole but had to be selected from the various arguments for a new strategy. However, as will be shown, these principles were to form the core ideas of what would later be known as the Maritime Strategy. One important principle, sometimes referred to as "counterforce coercion," would later be added to the list.³⁵ However, although some of the principles have apparently fallen into temporary disfavor at various times, all of them remain very pertinent in any current argument concerning the Maritime Strategy as it stands today. These principles are reviewed below.

³⁵The term "coercive counterforce" is borrowed from John Mearshimer's article, "A Strategic Misstep: The Maritime Strategy and Deterrence in Europe," International Security, Fall 1986.

a. Future War

A future war, if it is against the Soviets, will certainly be a world wide affair and not just isolated to Europe. This argument was aimed primarily at the previously discussed Eurocentric view of the world that argued the war in Europe was critical, if Europe was lost then all was lost. The new naval strategy realized the increasing importance of the Pacific rim countries and the shifting trade balance to this region. As John Lehman would later argue: "Clearly, our increasing commercial interests and historic security ties in the Pacific impact on our naval planning for the area."³⁶

b. Conventional War

Since the next war will not necessarily start with nuclear weapons, then the U.S. Navy must be able to fight a prolonged conventional war. This principle was in response to the shift in the U.S. doctrine away from mutual assured destruction in the late 1960s and the Soviet shift in emphasis from a future war that would definitely be nuclear to the idea that a future war could be preceded by a lengthy conventional period.

This idea was not a radical shift from the then existing strategy. On the contrary, the U.S. military had long accepted the possibly conventional nature of a future

³⁶John Lehman, "The 600 Ship Navy," Naval Institute Proceedings, pp. 2-17. Supplement to January 1986 issue of Naval Institute Proceedings.

war before the late 1970s. However, it was being stressed again because the supporters of the new naval strategy felt it was not emphasized enough. A basic tenet of conventional versus nuclear war is that conventional wars require a much larger force structure. The naval leadership did not feel that the force structure of the U.S. Navy in the late 1970s indicated a proper appreciation of this tenet or, even worse, indicated that the United States was not willing to support a force structure that reflected a more conventional war fighting doctrine and, therefore, was ignoring one of the basic realities of modern military strategy.

c. Deterrence/War Termination

The primary function of the U.S. Navy must be the deterrence of war with the Soviets. If the deterrence posture proves to be a failure then the primary objective of the navy is to ensure war termination on grounds favorable to the U.S. The idea of using the Navy to deter a war with the Soviets was not a new one, in fact the very existence of the SSBNs and their role proves this point more than adequately. However, the idea that the Navy could have a role in precipitating war termination on terms that were to the advantage of the United States was not a part of the commonly accepted wisdom--particularly for a conventional war in Europe. This principle was meant to counter those strategists, especially the Continentalists, who continued to argue that the Navy could have very little, if any,

effect upon the course of a war in Europe by making "peripheral attacks" upon the Soviet land mass.

d. SLOC Protection

In a major war with the Soviets it will be critical to ensure that the SLOCs to Europe remain open and well protected. This principle was a reflection of the continuing concern for the dependence of the U.S. on maritime supply routes as well as the fact that the U.S. merchant marine was continuing to shrink. In the mid-1950s U.S. flag ships comprised 21 percent of the total tonnage and 31 percent of the total value of all maritime imports and exports. By 1984 these totals were less than five percent each.³⁷ Furthermore, studies indicated that since the Korean War there has been an increasing percentage of total cargo transported to theaters of war by seaborne traffic. The trend has towards fewer ships which carrying larger loads of cargo. (See Table 2)

By 1984 there were only 548 U.S.-flag ships of which 244 were general purpose dry cargo freighters. Most projections indicated that this number would be insufficient for a resupply to NATO in the event of a war with the Soviets. According to one report:

³⁷Harlan Ullman, Crisis or Opportunity? U.S. Maritime Industries and National Security, Georgetown University Press, 1984, p. 11.

TABLE 2

MARITIME SUPPORT OF PAST AND FUTURE WARS

War	Ships Used (Dry Cargo)	% of Total
Korea	400	17%
Vietnam	420	35%
Future Southwest Asian War	320-350	81%

Source: Harlan Ullman, Crisis or Opportunity? U.S. Maritime Industries and National Security, Center for Strategic and International Studies: Georgetown University, Washington D.C., p. 14.

NATO would require between one and two dozen convoys at sea at any one time, each composed of 50 to 70 merchant ships. In total, the alliance would need between 3,000 and 6,000 merchant ships...Moreover, no tested NATO-wide plan exists for securing all necessary ships in times of crisis. There is no system for locating each ship on short notice and no procedure exists for mobilizing it as part of a resupply effort.³⁸

There was no disagreement between the proponents of a more aggressive naval strategy and the supporters of a continental strategy about the critical importance of protecting the SLOCs. Their differences stemmed from the respective arguments about the best method to deal with this glaring weakness in our military strategy.

e. Forward Offensive/Horizontal Escalation

The primary difference between the strategy of the late 1970s, and the strategy being proposed by the Navy,

³⁸Ullman, Crisis or Opportunity? U.S. Maritime Industries and National Security, p. 15.

concentrated on the best method to protect the SLOCs. Instead of simply escorting the convoys to Europe or Asia, the new naval strategy called for a strategy which would exploit the geographic disadvantage of the Soviet Union. All four Soviet fleets, with the exception of a part of the Pacific fleet, must pass through natural choke points to gain access to the open ocean. Therefore, the best method of protecting the SLOCs must be to send U.S. naval forces directly into the Soviet home waters and fight them before they can pass through the choke points. This was in opposition to the view that the U.S. Navy should fight the Soviet Navy at the choke points. The difference between the two is not trivial. The U.S. Navy felt very strongly that fighting the Soviets at the choke points was an inherently defensive strategy that automatically put the defender at a disadvantage.

The new naval strategy did not stop at the concept of employing the Navy in an offensive manner. It was also determined that naval pressure must be placed upon the Soviet Union at the time and place of Western choosing. For example, if the Soviets were to launch an attack on Central Europe, the Navy could counter by making attacks in the Pacific theater to relieve some of the pressure on the Central Front. This concept, commonly referred to as "horizontal escalation," would presumably prevent the Soviets from diverting some of their Pacific assets to the

European front by essentially creating a two front war. "It is reasonable to argue that only by putting substantial pressure on the Soviet Union in the Pacific theater could the initial NATO conventional force deficiencies in central Europe be compensated for until the force could be reinforced and resupplied."³⁹

f. Required Force Structure

The force structure necessary to execute these principles must place a great emphasis on the nuclear attack submarine and the carrier battle group. Although not all of the more vocal supporters of the new naval strategy were in agreement on the exact numbers necessary for such a task, the numbers were all very close. It was virtually unanimous that "the twelve carrier battle groups represent the absolute minimum in capability to discharge our missions...." Many specifically recommended 600 ships and 15 carrier battle groups. The suggestions for using a large amount of small carriers (Admiral Stansfield Turner recommended 24 or more) with less sophisticated aircraft was not gaining much support within the U.S. Navy.⁴⁰ Many feared that the smaller carriers being proposed by Turner would reduce the offensive fire power capabilities of the

³⁹Alvin Cottrell and Thomas Moorer, "Sea Power and NATO Strategy," NATO: The Next Thirty Years, Kenneth Myers ed., Boulder: Westview Press, 1980, p. 224.

⁴⁰Thomas B. Hayward, "The Future of U.S. Sea Power," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1979, p. 68.

U.S. Navy and would make any arguments for forward operations academic. The implication was that the only carrier capable of operating in forward areas was the modern large-deck aircraft carrier.⁴¹

2. Lehman Presents a Goal

In March 1981, barely two months after assuming office as Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman unveiled his goal to Congress of attaining a 600 ship navy with 15 battle groups. It was not until the summer of the same year that Lehman began to specifically mention the need to develop a new doctrine "to permit the implementation of an effective strategy."⁴²

At this early point Lehman did not specifically mention a Maritime Strategy. However, he did make it clear that he had an important principle in mind for the new strategy: an offensively-oriented Navy whose main function would be to protect the SLOCs through forward deployments. Lehman felt that "such an approach (forward deployments) should force the Soviets, historically dominated by continental horizons, to concentrate more resources on homeland defense--and possibly less on interdiction of U.S. sealanes."⁴³

⁴¹Stansfield Turner, "Thinking About the Future of the Navy," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1979, p. 68.

⁴²DoD Appropriations for FY 1982, U.S. Government Printing Office, p. 2267.

⁴³Lehman, "Rebirth of a Naval Strategy," p. 13.

Throughout the first two years of the Reagan administration the Navy continued to push for the 600 ship navy but did not discuss a coherent strategy to make proper use of this force structure. Most requests for funding were based upon the increasing global commitments of the U.S. Navy as evidenced by the more than 40 treaties honored by the United States all over the world. Discussions of a naval strategy to help honor these commitments, or even to fight a global war, were vague and incomplete.

3. A Strategy Unveiled

a. A Sneak Preview

In February 1983 the Deputy Director of the Strategic Plans Division in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Commodore Dudley Carlson, made the first official presentation of the U.S. Maritime Strategy. In his brief discussion of the strategy, Carlson essentially reiterated many of the core principles had emerged from the 1970s.

Carlson explained that the primary purpose of the strategy was to ensure global forward deterrence and, if that failed, to ensure war termination on terms favorable to the United States. This goal would be accomplished by the use of amphibious forces to "carry the fight to the enemy, at a place and time of our choosing." The means of accomplishing favorable war termination are rather vaguely outlined but essentially centered around the offensive

pressure being brought against the Soviets, thus proving to them that there is nothing to gain, and by implication everything to lose, by continuing the war.

Finally, in this first presentation, the Navy made it clear that the only means of executing such a strategy was by having the force structure which is compatible with the goals of the Maritime Strategy. This clearly meant a force of 600 ships: "...our strategy review clearly indicates the need to attain the minimum force level...of a 600 ship Navy with 15 deployable CVBGs...and four Battleship SAGs as force multipliers...."⁴⁴

b. First Formal Presentation

It is now obvious that the Navy had been working at a rapid pace under Lehman to develop a coherent strategy that would justify the repeated calls for a 600 ship navy. The Navy had the core principles of the strategy since the previous decade, and had often discussed these principles in open literature, but had not been able to present it in a coherent rational manner to what must have been an increasingly dubious Congress and public. Finally that moment had arrived.

On 14 March 1984, Secretary Lehman gave the first full presentation of the Maritime Strategy. The presentation, before the Senate Armed Services Committee,

⁴⁴D. Carlson, House Armed Services Committee, FY 1984, Part 6, p. 51.

reaffirmed many of the very same principles that have previously been outlined. Lehman emphasized that the Maritime Strategy was a part of the national military strategy as set forth in National Security Decision Directive-32 signed by President Reagan on 20 May 1982.

The presentation of the Maritime Strategy by Lehman did not contain any new principles which had not already been discussed in great detail by previous naval leaders. The Soviets were still the primary threat; the next war would most likely be global; protection of the SLOCs was still critical; and the best strategy for the U.S. Navy in the next war was still a forward offensive which would pin the Soviet forces down in their home waters. However, when pressed on the issue Lehman vehemently denied that the Maritime Strategy called for U.S. carrier battle groups to make attacks on Soviet naval ports. "I have never said we were going to steam carriers up there to lob A-6's into the Kremlin's men's rooms."⁴⁵

It is important to note that the critical linkage between the Bastion concept and the Maritime Strategy was established from the very beginning. Admiral Watkins, then Chief of Naval Operations, made it very clear that it was of vital importance to keep the Soviets within their bastions. "We have to know how effective the SSN

⁴⁵DoD Appropriations for FY 1985, U.S. Government Printing Office, p. 3871.

surge would be against the Soviet bastion force around the SSBNs. It is very critical to force them back up there. That is going to be watched very critically."⁴⁶

c. Continued Refinement: 1984-1986

In the two years following the public announcement of the Maritime Strategy, the Navy continued to emphasize the basic core principles. The critical importance of maintaining the protection of the SLOCs was especially highlighted. Lehman stated that over 90 percent of the equipment and supplies necessary to sustain a defensive effort in Europe would have to be sealifted. There absolutely could not be success in the European theater if there was not success in the Atlantic, and success in the Atlantic could only be guaranteed by forward deployments.⁴⁷

The forward deployments were justified in terms of destroying the Soviet Navy. There was no discussion of counterforce coercion (destroying the Soviet SSBNs in order to alter the nuclear correlation of forces). The fact that SSBNs would be most likely destroyed was not discounted, but it would be as a result of the forward deployments and not because the SSBNs were being specifically targeted. Furthermore, favorable war termination was expected to occur because the Soviets would finally understand the futility of

⁴⁶DoD Appropriations for FY 1985, p. 3878.

⁴⁷The 600 Ship Navy and the Maritime Strategy, p. 107.

continuing the war without their navy and with the U.S. Navy sitting right on their front doorstep.

It is also of some importance to note that during this period the concept of horizontal escalation was seldom mentioned. In fact, Lehman specifically mentioned the need for the Navy to conduct sequential operations since they could not be everywhere at once.⁴⁸ This apparent shift in policy was probably because many critics felt the Maritime Strategy tended to deemphasize the NATO alliance and was leaning very strongly towards unilateralism.⁴⁹

During this period John Lehman also refined his arguments in support of the 600 ship Navy. Lehman stated that there were three primary considerations in picking 600 ships for the Maritime Strategy (as opposed to 500 or 700, a question Lehman was repeatedly asked). The first consideration was the geography of the United States--an island continent dependent upon the sea lanes for her survival. Second was the more than 40 treaty relationships the United States had around the globe (this fact was often repeated); finally there was the fact that the Soviets had developed an offensively oriented blue water navy that was "patently Mahanian in design." These considerations, especially the

⁴⁸This was first pointed out by John Mearshimer in his excellent article, "A Strategic Misstep: The Maritime Strategy and Deterrence in Europe" (fn. 35). Also see Senate Armed Services Committee, FY 1985, Part 8, p. 3854.

⁴⁹Mearhsimer, "A Strategic Misstep: The Maritime Strategy and Deterrence in Europe," p. 22.

last one, were bound to get the attention of the students of the Maritime school of offensive sea power. (Table 3 shows the actual breakdown of the 600 ship Navy).

TABLE 3
BREAKDOWN OF THE 600 SHIP NAVY

Ship Type	Recommended Number
Aircraft Carriers	15
Battleships	4
Surface Escorts for Carrier Battle Group	105
Underway Replenishment Ships	70
Escorts for Underway Replenishment Ships	40
DDGs	7
Frigates	63
Nuclear Attack Submarines	100
SSBNs (nominal)	40
Material Support Ships	27
Fleet Support Ships	33
PHMS	6
Mine Warfare Ships	31
Amphibious Warfare Ships	<u>75</u>
Total	616

Source: The 600 Ship Navy and the Maritime Strategy, House Armed Services Committee, U.S. Government Printing Office, p. 282.

d. Present Status

In January 1986, the United States Naval Institute Proceedings published a supplement that dealt exclusively with the Maritime Strategy. The purpose of the supplement was to provide "the most definitive and authoritative statements of the Maritime Strategy that are available in unclassified form." The document was billed as the equivalent of a British "White Paper," and was meant to clear the air of any misconceptions concerning the official Maritime Strategy. The articles were not only a turning point in that they finally provided a coherent public presentation of the Maritime Strategy, but it was a strategic watershed as well since, for the first time, counterforce coercion was elevated as the *raison d'etre* of the strategy.

In the opening article, by CNO Admiral Watkins, it was made very clear that SLOC interdiction is considered by the U.S. Navy to be a secondary mission of the Soviet Navy. The primary concern of the Soviet Navy, even during a conventional war, would be the maintenance of a nuclear correlation of forces that continued to favor the Soviets. In order to maintain this advantage the Soviets would have to protect their SSBN force. Therefore, "a critical Soviet Navy role in a future conflict would be to protect the Soviet homeland and their ballistic missile submarines,

which provide the Soviets with their ultimate strategic reserve."⁵⁰

In order to take advantage of the Soviet reliance upon the nuclear correlation of forces, the U.S. Navy will "continue to destroy...ballistic missile submarines, thus reducing the attractiveness of nuclear escalation by changing the nuclear balance in our favor."⁵¹ Not only does the destruction of Soviet SSBNs dampen the possibility of nuclear escalation, it also adds to the possibility of war termination on favorable terms, a primary objective.

Perhaps the greatest contribution of this article, with respect to this research, is that it shows that the bastion concept has been firmly established within the U.S. intelligence community. SLOC interdiction was not a primary function of the Soviet Navy and, in fact, they would "retreat into defensive bastions to protect their ballistic missile submarines."⁵² There could no longer be any doubt that the bastion concept had become the centerpiece assumption of the Maritime Strategy. The purpose here is to review the validity of that assumption.

⁵⁰James Watkins, "The Maritime Strategy," The Maritime Strategy, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, supplement to January 1986 issue, p. 7.

⁵¹Watkins, "The Maritime Strategy," p. 13.

⁵²Watkins, "The Maritime Strategy," p. 9.

E. OPPOSITION TO THE MARITIME STRATEGY

It is no great surprise that the Maritime Strategy has generated a fairly significant amount of controversy among the small community of military analysts. It had been many years since the U.S. Navy had stepped forward with a concrete plan that openly revealed its intentions for fighting the next war. At last, all of the "armchair strategists" (as Lehman is fond of calling the civilian analysts) had empirical evidence that they could point to when criticizing Navy policies, and no longer had to rely on rumors and innuendo that was gathered second-hand from questionable sources.

Numerous articles have been published that openly criticize the Maritime Strategy. The reasons for these criticisms, referred to briefly in Chapter I, are varied but there are essentially two major arguments. The first argument is that the Maritime Strategy is inherently escalatory and carries with it the seeds for a nuclear war. The second argument, already referred to many times, is that the Maritime Strategy is a waste of precious defense spending because it squanders resources on a Navy that will not be able to fatally damage a continental power like the Soviet Union.

1. Nuclear Opposition

Although many analysts have argued that the Maritime Strategy can lead to nuclear war, they have not all agreed

upon the mechanisms within the strategy that make it inherently escalatory. However, the most credible protest focuses on the counterforce coercion concept, which, as previously discussed, became one of the principal objectives of the Maritime Strategy in 1986. The critics of counterforce coercion point out that one of the primary assumptions is that the Soviets place great emphasis on their nuclear forces (this is an important point since Admiral Watkins explicitly mentions it in the 1986 Proceedings supplement). If the Soviets really do place that much emphasis on the nuclear correlation of forces, the critics explain, then they might be strongly tempted to use their strategic nuclear weapons through a counterforce strike rather than lose them in long term attrition warfare. In other words, the policy of counterforce coercion would cause precisely the opposite of the desired response and, instead of forcing the Soviets to sue for peace, would compel the Soviets to utilize the very weapon that the strategy was trying to neutralize in the first place.

There are only two possible solutions to this dilemma. The U.S. Navy must either learn to distinguish between Soviet SSBNs and attack submarines or it must abandon the strategy of forward deployment in Soviet SSBN-infested waters altogether. The first solution is untenable because the Navy has made it clear that it is virtually

impossible to "make a distinction in a combat environment--even prehostilities--with certainty to distinguish between SSBNs and attack submarines." Furthermore, this problem "is going to worsen in the future."⁵³ The second solution is unacceptable to the Navy because it undermines the entire concept of the Maritime Strategy. Thus the argument remains at an impasse.

It is perhaps one of the greatest ironies of the Maritime Strategy that so much attention has been focused on the question of nuclear escalation in light of the policy of the ground forces in Europe. As early as 1983 General Bernard Rogers, at the time the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, said "we can only sustain ourselves conventionally for a relatively short time. I will then be forced to ask for the authorization...to use nuclear weapons."⁵⁴

There is no historical precedent to determine if a nuclear war that started at sea would escalate to land, or vice versa. However, it is significant to note that at least one analyst who exhaustively researched Soviet literature concluded that there was "no literature evidence to support the view that release authority for tactical nuclear weapons is a navy matter nor that a nuclear war at

⁵³L. Bagget, DoD Appropriations for FY 1986, U.S. Government Printing Office, p. 4399.

⁵⁴Bernard Rogers, as cited in "Thinking About the Future of the Navy," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, August 1980, p. 34.

sea (alone) would be initiated by the Soviets...(however) once nuclear weapons are used ashore, they will be used at sea as well."⁵⁵ The question must be asked: if the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe fully expects to be pushed to his limits within the first few weeks of a war in central Europe; and if he fully expects to request authorization for the release of nuclear weapons (and it must be assumed that no commander would ask for such authorization unless he truly felt it was a last resort); and, furthermore, if the Soviets have indicated that a nuclear war that started on land would inevitably spread to the sea; then why is so much attention being focused on the escalatory nature of the Maritime Strategy when it is the declaratory policy of NATO forces in Europe to use nuclear weapons, if necessary, to slow the Soviet advance?

2. Conventional Opposition

There have been numerous arguments, on a conventional level, objecting to the war fighting strategy encompassed within the Maritime Strategy. Some of these arguments have been:

1. No naval commander would ever send a carrier battle group to attack the Soviet mainland without having complete control of the sea and air.
2. The concept of horizontal escalation is costly and, in the long term, will do no real damage to the Soviets. More than likely they will ignore it and

⁵⁵James Tritten, Soviet Naval Forces and Nuclear Warfare, Boulder: Westview Press, 1986, p. 34.

continue to commit most of their resources to the central front in Europe.

3. The force structure necessary to carry out the Maritime Strategy is simply too expensive and ignores other interests which are more important (such as reinforcing the ground forces in central Europe).

The main conventional criticism of the Maritime Strategy, however, has focused on the classic thesis first promulgated by Halford Mackinder. Many critics (Robert Komer is the most vocal) suggest that the Maritime Strategy was a wonderful strategy when the United States was facing another primarily maritime power such as Japan during World War II. However, the Soviet Union is not a traditional maritime power because it has not been necessary for the protection and expansion of the Soviet Union. The Soviets are in control of the "heartland" and are thus largely self sufficient. In fact, while many of the Maritime strategists sound remarkably similar to Mahan, reading some of the objections by the continental strategists, one would think he was reading straight from the passages of Mackinder:

The industrialization and democratization that has occurred over the past century and a half, especially the development of mass armies and of railroads to move them rapidly, has led to a significant shift in the relationship between land power and sea power in favor of the former. Insular powers like the United States can do little with independent naval forces to hurt a land power like the Soviet Union.⁵⁶

Due to the shift in advantage from the maritime powers to the continental powers, a "peripheral" strategy

⁵⁶Mearshimer, "A Strategic Misstep: The Maritime Strategy and Deterrence in Europe," pp. 33-34.

such as the Maritime Strategy could never prevent the Soviets from dominating the Eurasian landmass. Furthermore, if a strategy cannot prevent the Soviets from controlling Eurasia, especially Europe, then it should be reconsidered because, by implication, the protection of Europe should be the primary consideration in any U.S. military strategy.

Most defenders of the Maritime Strategy, notably John Lehman, have countered the Continental strategists by pointing out that the issue is not a fundamental question between a Maritime strategy and a Continental (or Coalition) strategy. Quite simply, if the United States cannot control the seas then vital supplies will not be able to reach Europe and any arguments for or against the type of strategy to be employed are swiftly overcome by events. According to Lehman, "No defense of NATO can be carried out without achieving control of the maritime theaters of NATO. Maritime superiority is a prerequisite of any strategy for the defense of Europe."⁵⁷

F. APPLICABILITY OF THE CURRENT ARGUMENT

Very few of the principal arguments against the Maritime Strategy have ever concentrated on the primary assumptions the strategy has made about the naval aspects of Soviet military strategy, especially the bastion concept. This is most likely due to the fact that the bastion concept has

⁵⁷Lehman, "The 600 Ship Navy," p. 107.

become firmly entrenched as a part of the commonly accepted wisdom.

However, recent events in the Soviet Union have necessitated a thorough review of essentially all of the basic assumptions the U.S. intelligence community has been making about the Soviet Navy. It is entirely possible that absolutely nothing has really changed, that the Soviets are only intersted in making us believe that changes are occuring (a possibility that is by no means inconsistent with past Soviet behavior). However, this possibility does not preclude the necessity of a reassessment of our basic assumptions.

The bastion concept must always be viewed in the context of its relationship with the Maritime Strategy. The two ideas, a forward offense to defeat the bastioned Soviet naval forces, are inseparable--one cannot be fully understood without accepting the other. If, for example, it becomes apparent that the Soviets are abandoning their bastion concepts then the Maritime Strategy becomes a non-strategy because it is based on irrelevant assumptions. As one U.S. naval officer described it,

In a broader vein, the strategy seeks to counter a specific Soviet strategy and a specific Soviet navy role within that strategy and thus might prove inappropriate to counter a different Soviet approach. If, for example, the Soviets were to deploy their entire submarine force to the open ocean before the outbreak of war, a very different U.S. approach to ASW might be required....While the strategy thus seeks to limit Soviet options, no one can be

certain that Soviet wartime strategy...will be what their prewar doctrine suggests.⁵⁸

Strategies are interactive and dynamic organisms, as one strategy grows and changes the other strategy must react in order to survive. Up to this point the organic development of the Maritime Strategy has been reviewed, what remains is a check to see if there has been a concomitant change in the naval aspects of Soviet military strategy.

⁵⁸Linton F. Brooks, "Naval Power and National Security: The Case for the Maritime Strategy," International Security, Fall 1988, p. 75.

III. FUNDAMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS

This linking of Soviet naval operations to the active defense of SSBNs is a key assumption in the U.S. Maritime Strategy, particularly as it has been articulated since 1981.¹

A. THE BREAKDOWN OF A CONCEPT

The development of any strategy which hopes to exploit a potential enemy's weaknesses requires fundamental assumptions about the enemy. These assumptions must include details of what the enemy feels to be important, how the enemy would position his forces in case of a future war, which forces the enemy considers to be more important, which forces the enemy is willing to risk, and what the enemy would hope to gain from a future war, should it occur. These are only a few of the many questions that must be answered before a responsible strategy can be developed. A realistic list would continue indefinitely in length and detail.

One of the primary assumptions of the Maritime Strategy is the bastion concept. As previously discussed, the bastion concept assumes that the primary mission of the Soviet Navy in case of a future war is the protection of the SSBN force; therefore, the SSBNs will deploy in well protected bastions or sanctuaries which will be guarded by

¹Stefanick, "America's Maritime Strategy: The Arms Control Implications," p. 17.

the conventional Soviet Navy. It is the purpose of this research to review the fundamental applicability of the bastion concept as a basic strategic assumption. However, before the applicability of the bastion concept can be properly scrutinized it must be further reduced into even more basic assumptions.

An assumption as broad and encompassing as the bastion concept will contain other implicit and explicit assumptions bounded within it. The methodology employed in this research, as discussed in Chapter I, consists of breaking the bastion concept down into these smaller assumptions that can be more easily verified, or not verified as the case may be.

Even a concept as seemingly basic as the bastion theory can be further broken down into an endless number of assumptions, some meaningful and others rather trivial. The method employed here was to break the bastion concept down into the most important assumptions that could be independently verified. A careful review of the open literature on the Maritime Strategy has indicated that there are six such assumptions. These assumptions are: (1) The Soviets intend to withhold their SSBN forces as a strategic reserve; (2) The Soviets believe the ballistic missile submarine can conduct strategic missions and, therefore, influence the course and the outcome of a war; (3) The Soviets do not view the interdiction of NATO's sea lines of communications as a

primary mission for their conventional navy--at least at the outset of a conventional war; (4) The Soviets will utilize the majority of their conventional navy to protect their SSBN force in home waters even if the U.S. Navy does not conduct a forward offensive; (5) The Soviets believe that the next war with the West will not necessarily be a nuclear war and, therefore, the critical part of the war will be the land war in Central Europe; and (6) The Soviets do not intend to escalate the war to a nuclear war if some (or perhaps all) of their SSBN force is destroyed, but instead will be more likely to sue for peace once they lose their positive correlation of nuclear forces.

B. BASIC ASSUMPTIONS CONTAINED WITHIN THE BASTION CONCEPT

1. The Role of the SSBN in the Soviet Navy as an Withholding/Deterrent System

The Soviet Union, like the United States, has based its strategic nuclear forces on three primary platforms, often referred to as the strategic triad. The three platforms are the land based ICBMs, long range bombers, and, of course, the sea based SLBMs. The Soviet emphasis on the correlation of forces, nuclear and conventional, has even led to the creation of an independent service for the ICBMs called the Strategic Rocket Forces.

The inherent survivability of the SSBN made it an ideal platform on which to base strategic weapons. Its

ability to survive longer than either the land-based or air-based systems naturally meant that the SSBN would become even more important to the Soviet war fighting strategy. It was this assumption that the Soviets naturally place a tremendous emphasis on the nuclear correlation of forces, and would therefore give the SSBN a very high priority, that led to the withholding strategy as a justification of the bastion concept. Withholding envisions the use of the SSBN force as a strategic reserve to be used for bargaining leverage during a war, or possibly for ensuring war termination on terms that were favorable to the Soviets (assuming the war was not going well for them). From this perspective, the function of the SSBN is to act as a deterrent against further vertical escalation, its primary advantage is derived through its simple presence and not through its actual use. Such a function has become traditional for strategic (and in some cases tactical) nuclear forces.

It is very clear from reviewing policy statements made by senior U.S. Navy officials that the concept of withholding the SSBNs as a strategic reserve is widely accepted. For example, former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral James Watkins stated that the Soviets "place a high priority on...the nuclear correlation of forces" and that "a critical Soviet Navy role in a future conflict would be to protect the Soviet homeland and their ballistic missile

submarines, which provide the Soviets with their ultimate strategic reserve."²

The ability of the SSBN force to survive a nuclear or conventional exchange, along with the Soviet emphasis on the nuclear correlation of forces, has therefore made the notion that the Soviets intend to withhold their SSBN forces as a strategic reserve one of the cornerstone assumptions of the bastion concept. Statements such as the one made by Admiral Watkins above, as well as many other official statements made in congressional testimony, have made it clear that the withholding/strategic reserve theory has been widely accepted in the U.S. intelligence community.

2. The Role of the SSBN in the Soviet Navy as a War Fighting System

The first assumption focused on the role of the SSBN as a deterrent; however, the Soviets also view the ballistic missile submarine as an extremely capable weapons system if it must actually be used in war. Before describing this function it is first necessary to review a few basic concepts concerning Soviet military strategy.

In their attempts to utilize the scientific method to study war, the Soviets have attached very specific meanings to certain words and phrases. To a Westerner not accustomed to such preciseness of meaning in the use of language, this can become very confusing and, under certain

²Watkins, "The Maritime Strategy," p. 7.

circumstances, can lead to more harm than good. If the Soviet literature is translated without an understanding of the literal meaning of certain words, then the original intent of the sentence, paragraph, or even article can be entirely lost.

The Soviets assert definite distinctions between the words war and armed struggle. War involves the struggle against an adversary on several levels: economic, political, diplomatic, ideological, as well as military. Armed struggle refers to the actual use of the armed forces in combat. Thus, armed struggle can be thought of as a subcategory of war, and war can exist without the firing of a shot.³ Therefore, the Soviets, unlike the West, consider themselves to be in a constant state of war with the imperialist forces of capitalism which will only be resolved through the historically inevitable victory of the progressive forces of socialism. Furthermore, such a victory does not necessarily have to be the result of a catastrophic clash of the armed forces between the opposing ideologies, the Soviets believe there may be a less violent way to achieve this victory--in other words, war is no longer "fatally inevitable."⁴

³Tritten, Soviet Naval Forces and Nuclear Warfare, p. 26.

⁴William T. Lee and Richard F. Staar, Soviet Military Policy Since World War II, Hoover Institution Press, 1986, p. 27.

In the Soviet methodology of war, armed struggle serves a specific purpose that is used to attain a specific goal, namely to "resolve strategic missions and attain strategic goals."⁵ Strategic missions are those missions which are used to achieve strategic goals, and strategic goals, by definition, affect the course and outcome of a war.⁶ The distinction made here is important. Strategic goals affect the war and not just the armed struggle, again indicating that armed struggle is only one part of the broad Soviet definition of war. As Figure 1 indicates, there is a certain mathematical preciseness in the linear logic of this particular aspect of the Soviet approach to military strategy.

armed struggle >> resolves strategic missions >>
to attain strategic goals >> which influence the
course and outcome of a war

Figure 1. Soviet Strategic Hierarchy

There is also a distinction between influencing the course of a war and its outcome. As the names imply, influencing the course of a war is a step beneath influencing its outcome, it is not as dramatic or complete

⁵Tritten, Soviet Naval Forces and Nuclear Warfare, p. 26.

⁶Tritten, Soviet Naval Forces and Nuclear Warfare, p. 32.

in its overall effect. Sometimes the Soviets will write about events (or systems) that can influence only the course of the war and at other times the course and the outcome. It is important to make this distinction because if a branch of the service, or a specific weapons system, is capable of conducting strategic missions then this means it must be able to influence the course and the outcome of a war. Three naval means of influencing the outcome of a war have been identified: (1) crushing an opponents military-economic potential; (2) participating in fleet versus shore operations; or (3) destroying major groupings of the enemy. In addition, there are two naval means of influencing the course of a war: (1) fleet operations against the enemy's nuclear potential at sea; and (2) using strategic missile submarines in operations against the shore.⁷

The second assumption implied by the acceptance of the bastion concept is that the Soviets believe the ballistic missile submarine can conduct strategic missions and, therefore, influence the course and the outcome of a war. This implies that the Soviets see a two-fold advantage in protecting their SSBN force in case of a war. First, as shown by the first assumption, because they want to maintain a positive correlation of nuclear forces. Second, because

⁷Tritten, Soviet Naval Force and Nuclear Warfare, p. 31. Tritten identified these after exhaustive research of the writings and speeches of Admiral Gorshkov and other top ranking Soviet officials.

they believe that if the SSBN must be used it can effect the course and the outcome of the war. These two goals are mutually exclusive because one refers to the advantage of the SSBN by its very existence and the other by its use.

Like the first assumption, the U.S. Navy's acceptance of the validity of the second assumption has been made quite clear. Admiral Butts, the former Chief of Naval Intelligence, has stated that, for the Soviets, "the primary task is to deploy and protect the SSBN force. They believe that SLBMs, for the first time, give navies the capability to directly affect the course and even the outcome of a war."⁸

3. Interdiction of the Sea Lines of Communications

The third assumption, unlike the previous two, has consistently been the most controversial. From the very beginning the presentation of the Maritime Strategy seemed to contain a contradiction. As early as 1981 Secretary Lehman was complaining that "it is unlikely that U.S. shipping--going it alone--is currently capable of supporting U.S. requirements in peacetime, much less in war. Our maritime situation is nothing less than a calamity." And yet, according to Lehman, a strategy which stressed forward deployment of naval forces would force the Soviets "to

⁸R. Butts, House Armed Services Committee, FY 1986, Part 8, p. 4367.

concentrate more resources on homeland defense--and possibly less on interdiction of U.S. sealanes."⁹

This concern about the importance of the SLOCs to any NATO strategy was later reiterated by Admiral Watkins in his publication of the Maritime Strategy. Watkins insisted that the increased emphasis that had been placed on military sealift by the Reagan administration had assured that the U.S. could supply a sufficient amount of military sealift to Europe but "we will neither be able to tolerate attrition typical of World War II nor provide adequate dedicated sealift to transport the strategic raw materials we will require."¹⁰ Nevertheless, Watkins, like Lehman five years before, declared that the Soviets looked upon the interdiction of NATO's SLOCs as a secondary mission.

It is important to note that this apparent contradiction is resolved when placed in the proper context. Lehman and Watkins, and presumably the rest of the strategic planners responsible for the Maritime Strategy, felt that the increased importance of NATO's SLOCs meant that the best means of protecting them was to emphasize forward deployments instead of waiting for the Soviets to deploy their forces into the Atlantic. The best solution for the protection of the SLOCs, it was decided, was to "operate our forces so as to keep the Soviets engaged in defending rather

⁹Lehman, "Rebirth of a Naval Strategy," pp. 13-14.

¹⁰Watkins, "The Maritime Strategy," p. 11.

than attacking. We want them to react to us--not the other way around."¹¹

This solution, however, did little to alleviate the burning question that was on the mind of those who remembered the Allied experience of World War II in the battle of the Atlantic: would the strategy be adequate to prevent the attrition typical of the U-boat campaign at the height of World War II? In a six month period in 1942, 14 German U-boats managed to sink 450 allied ships. Admittedly this was right after the entry of the United States into the war and the convoying and air patrol systems at this point were at best feeble. Such obvious statistics led many analysts to believe that this point could hardly go unnoticed by the Soviets. Therefore, the most reasonable strategy for the Soviets to employ would be unconditional submarine warfare on NATO's supply lines from the United States to the Central Front in Europe.

The maritime strategists, as they have carefully noted, did not ignore the lessons of World War II, but simply felt that the Soviets would not place the interdiction of NATO's SLOCs on a higher priority than the protection of their own SSBN force. In other words, for the Soviets, maintaining a positive correlation of nuclear forces was more important than severing NATO's supply lines. Thus the third assumption inherent in the bastion concept is

¹¹Bagget, House Armed Services Committee, p. 4387.

that the Soviets do not view the interdiction of NATO's sea lines of communications as a primary mission for their conventional navy--at least at the outset of a conventional war.

4. Primary Mission of the Soviet Conventional Navy

If, according to the third assumption, the Soviets do not view SLOC interdiction as a primary mission for their conventional navy, then what precisely is its primary mission? The bastion concept has two essential elements. First, the Soviet Navy will maintain their SSBNs in the relative safety of home waters in order to maintain a positive correlation of nuclear forces. Second, and more importantly from a conventional war fighting aspect, the Soviets will use the majority of their conventional navy to protect the SSBNs in these bastions. Such an assumption provides an important insight into the importance the Soviets attach to their SSBN force since it implies that the main purpose for building the remainder of their considerable navy, which includes attack submarines, destroyers, cruisers, and even air craft carriers, is to protect this SSBN force.

This assumption, that the Soviet conventional navy will be used primarily to protect their SSBN force, is most critical with respect to the relevance of the Maritime Strategy. The Maritime Strategy stresses forward deployments because that is where the Soviet naval forces

are expected to be found. If it did not stress forward deployment then any war fighting scenario would only envision an uneasy stand off between the opposing forces with no combat--an unacceptable strategy from the U.S. perspective. Thus, there are two subtle themes involved with the missions of the Soviet conventional navy in case of a future war. One of these themes suggests that the U.S. Navy will "force Soviet submarines to retreat into defensive bastions to protect their ballistic missile submarines."¹² The other says that "the Soviet Navy's role in overall Soviet strategy suggests that initially the bulk of Soviet naval forces will deploy in areas near the Soviet Union, with only a small fraction deployed forward."¹³

These two themes appear to be contradictory. Will the Soviets deploy their conventional navy in home waters because that is what they originally intended or because the forward deployment strategy of the U.S. Navy has forced them up there? The open literature does not provide an adequate answer to this question. However, it is clear that the U.S. Navy has assumed that the Soviets intend to utilize the majority of their naval forces near their home waters to protect their SSBN force--whether provoked or not. What is not clear is exactly how many of their conventional forces they will keep in their territorial waters if they are not

¹²Watkins, "The Maritime Strategy," p. 9.

¹³Watkins, "The Maritime Strategy," p. 7.

directly threatened. Therefore, the apparent discrepancy is cleared if it is assumed that the Maritime Strategy is attempting to play it conservatively by forcing the Soviets to keep as much of their forces in their home waters as possible by the forward deployment of U.S. naval forces. Thus, the fourth assumption inherent in the bastion concept is that the Soviets will utilize the majority of their conventional navy to protect their SSBN force in home waters even if the U.S. Navy does not conduct a forward offensive.

5. Land War/Conventional War in Europe

A fact which is very seldom mentioned in official Soviet literature is that the role played by its Navy in the "Great Patriotic War" and World War II (there is a distinction between the two for the Soviets) was relatively minor. The Soviet Union, and Russia before her, has traditionally been a landpower and there is little dispute in the Soviet Union (or in the West) that the Soviet Army had the major part to play in the defeat of Germany. The Soviet Navy did have the largest submarine force in the world at the start of the war, but other pressing economic situations, and the untimely Nazi invasion, prevented her from building a large surface fleet. Fortunately for the Soviets, the war would essentially be a land war to be determined on the European land mass. The major naval battles of the war would be fought by her allies, the British and the Americans.

When Admiral Gorshkov assumed control of the Soviet Navy in 1956 the Soviet Army still completely dominated the top positions of leadership in the Soviet military bureaucracy. The ideas being promulgated by the military establishment and being accepted as doctrine were largely army-dominated ideas. The main use of the navy was in coastal defense and to support the army. Gorshkov did manage to bring about a very gradual change in the Army-dominated military establishment and, by the beginning of the 1980s, the Soviet Navy had at least secured itself a reasonably firm position in Soviet military strategy (an in depth review of this change is beyond the scope of this research).¹⁴ However, even today, the top positions in the Soviet military establishment are manned by Army officers, and the Navy still appears to be fifth in the pecking order behind the Strategic Rocket forces, the Ground forces, the Air Defense forces, and the Air Force.

Any gains which Admiral Gorshkov was able to make for the Soviet Navy were due to the role of the SSBN. At last, Gorshkov had a weapon that could theoretically influence the course and outcome of a war. However, as previously discussed, the change in Soviet doctrine that occurred in the late 1960s to early 1970s stated that a future war would no longer necessarily be a nuclear war but

¹⁴For a good explanation see Tritten, Soviet Naval Force and Nuclear Warfare, pp. 69-91.

could be preceded by an extended conventional conflict. Furthermore, not only would the next war be initially conventional but the most critical TVD (teatr voennykh deystviy or theater of military operations) would be the Western TVD in Europe. The Soviets would prefer to fight a future war in a blitzkrieg style with the quickest possible victory, hopefully contained to only one theater. By this strategy, the Soviets hope to be able to win the war "at the lowest possible level of intensity" while maintaining firm control of escalation.¹⁵

The Soviet military strategy thus provides an ideal justification of the protection of the Soviet SSBN force within bastions. If the Soviets intend for the next war to be a quick conventional war (it is a simple truth of military strategies that no one plans for a long war, they simply happen), then it makes sense for them to keep their SSBN force well protected. It is quite likely that, according to the Soviet timetable, the Soviets do not even envision the need for the Navy to play a large role in the war. If they can overrun all of Europe in a matter of weeks then there is very little that either navy can really do.

This assumption about Soviet military strategy, like all of the previous assumptions, has been openly accepted by the U.S. Navy. Admiral Watkins has stated that the Soviets

¹⁵Philip Petersen and John Hines, "The Conventional Offensive in Soviet Theater Strategy," Orbis, Fall 1983, p. 695.

"would not use nuclear weapons lightly, preferring to achieve their goals with conventional means."¹⁶ But even in a conventional war the Soviets will pay close attention to the correlation of nuclear forces; thus, even though the war may not involve the use of nuclear weapons it is still a nuclear war because of the high priority placed on the nuclear correlation of forces. In any case, according to Admiral Watkins, "the probable centerpiece of Soviet strategy in global war would be a combined-arms assault against Europe, where they would seek a quick and decisive victory."¹⁷ Therefore, the fifth assumption inherent in the bastion concept is that the Soviets believe that the next war with the West will not necessarily be a nuclear war and, therefore, the critical part of the war will be the land war in Central Europe.

6. Nuclear Escalation/War Termination

It is perhaps one of the greatest ironies of the study of war that the ultimate weapon of destruction yet invented by man, the nuclear weapon, has forced a change in the objectives of war from victory to termination. The American tradition of war has dictated that an enemy is to be completely defeated, occupied, and forced to negotiate on the terms of the occupying powers. The classic example of this attitude was World War II in which both Germany and

¹⁶Watkins, "The Maritime Strategy," p. 73.

¹⁷Watkins, "The Maritime Strategy," p. 7.

Japan were warned in advance that the only possible conclusion to the war was their unconditional surrender. Although it may be argued that the only effect of this policy was to unnecessarily prolong the war, the important point to be made here is that with the advent of the nuclear weapon, particularly with its introduction to the United States and the Soviet Union, the policy of unconditional surrender between two powers that both had nuclear weapons was seen as extremely dangerous and, therefore, increasingly unrealistic.

The Maritime Strategy assumes that a future war with the Soviet Union cannot be won under the contingencies of unconditional surrender without a considerable risk of vertical escalation and massive destruction. In fact, at the very least, the most that can be hoped for in a future war with the Soviet Union is that it can be terminated with a minimal amount of damage to the United States and her allies. In this respect, the Maritime Strategy has attempted to be more realistic in its approach to the ultimate objective of a future war with the Soviet Union--but this has not always been the case.

The war termination aspect of the Maritime Strategy demonstrates that the strategy encompasses two different strategic levels: war deterrence and, failing that, war fighting. The strategy, as both a deterrent strategy and a war fighting strategy, proclaims that if deterrence should

fail then the goal of the strategy is to terminate the war on grounds favorable to the United States. However, the main problem associated with this concept is that although a considerable amount of time and thought has been spent on understanding deterrence, there is still a lack of sufficient in depth analysis on war termination in the nuclear age.

The concept of deterrence in the nuclear age has been responsible for a plethora of books and articles. In the United States during the 1950s and early 1960s, the concept of deterrence was contained within the principle of "mutual assured destruction." Unfortunately, mutual assured destruction was not a war termination strategy at all but simply a deterrent posture based on the fatalistic assumption that a future nuclear war will not be won by either side but will instead result in the wholesale destruction of the civilized world. This idea that a nuclear war cannot be won has managed to maintain some degree of popularity among strategic analysts, and has perhaps restricted a more complete analysis of fighting a nuclear war as a viable option.¹⁸

Perhaps the most important barrier to the complete analysis of nuclear war and war termination is the lack of

¹⁸For an excellent explanation of cultural peculiarities and their effect upon nuclear strategy see Colin Gray, Nuclear Strategy and National Style, Lanham Maryland: Hamilton Brothers, 1986. Especially see Chapter 2.

empirical data to back up any proposed hypotheses. The only nuclear war ever fought must be considered an exception to the rule, if indeed any rules can be established on this subject, because the United States had the nuclear weapon and the Japanese did not. Furthermore, in a future conflict there would probably be considerable hesitancy to use a nuclear weapon, even on a tactical scale and in the face of overwhelming enemy superiority and almost certain defeat. The major deterrent to the use of any nuclear weapon in a future war is that an extremely subtle but very important psychological barrier must be crossed before a nuclear weapon can be employed. Once that barrier is crossed and the weapon is actually used, no matter how unimportant the target or how limited the damage, an important precedent will have been set and it becomes impossible to predict how much further the conflict will escalate. The decision to use the nuclear weapon for the first time will be the hardest; as with most difficult decisions, it will become easier after that. The lack of sufficient analysis on war termination in the nuclear age is therefore more of an uneasy acknowledgement by most analysts that the initial decision to actually use the nuclear weapon in a war may open an entire Pandora's box of problems that simply cannot be foreseen or controlled--and are therefore best avoided completely.

When the Soviets gained strategic parity in the early 1970s it became obvious that Mutual Assured Destruction was not a viable strategy, and other options had to be considered. Thus, in the 1970s analysts began to introduce the concepts of limited strategic or limited nuclear options. Limited nuclear options, which entail the limited use of nuclear weapons for purely limited objectives, was considered to be the traditional linkage to a war termination strategy.¹⁹ However, the Maritime Strategy introduced a new linkage that specifically avoided the use of nuclear weapons by using U.S. naval forces to destroy Soviet strategic systems (the SSBN). Hopefully, this policy of counterforce coercion would achieve the same goals as the limited nuclear options without crossing the psychological barrier which naturally prohibits the use of nuclear weapons for fear of a rapid escalation with no control.

The Soviets are faced with several options if faced with a counterforce coercion strategy from NATO: (1) they can escalate vertically by using their strategic nuclear systems before the U.S. and NATO naval forces have a chance to destroy them (one of the primary arguments of the nuclear escalationists discussed in Chapter II); (2) they can simply

¹⁹James E. Dornam, Mark Earle, Stephen R. Gibert, Charles H. Morit, Arthur A. Zuehlke, War Termination Concepts and Political, Economic, and Military Targeting, paper prepared by the SRI International Strategic Studies Center for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, March 1978, p. 15.

ignore the loss of their SSBN force and continue fighting without escalating to a nuclear exchange; (3) they can conduct a quid pro quo campaign by destroying a U.S. or NATO strategic system on a one for one basis; or (4) they can decide it is pointless to continue the war if they no longer enjoy a superiority in the nuclear correlation of forces and therefore terminate the war as quickly as possible.

The Maritime Strategy explicitly accepts the fourth option as the most likely response. Escalation is dismissed outright because it "serves no useful purpose for the Soviets since their reserve forces would be degraded and the United States' retaliatory posture would be enhanced."²⁰ Instead, since the Soviets "place great weight on the nuclear correlation of forces, even during the time before nuclear weapons have been used" it is more likely that a strategy which focuses on shifting this nuclear correlation through the destruction of Soviet ballistic missile submarines would be more likely to "terminate the war on terms acceptable to us and to our allies."²¹ The Maritime Strategy acknowledges that escalation could occur but "aggressive use of maritime power can make escalation a less attractive option to the Soviets with the passing of every day."²²

²⁰Watkins, "The Maritime Strategy," p. 14.

²¹Watkins, "The Maritime Strategy," p. 14.

²²Watkins, "The Maritime Strategy," p. 14.

There is an apparent contradiction involved with this particular aspect of the Maritime Strategy. The strategy assumes that the Soviets believe the SSBN can affect the course and outcome of a war, a statement not used lightly by the Soviets, and yet the strategy expects the Soviets to allow the destruction of their SSBNs without escalation and, in fact, to terminate the war if a sufficient amount are destroyed. However, it must be understood that the very existence of a bastion concept indicates that the Soviets fully expect the SSBN to be a potential target in case of a future war. Furthermore, the Soviets would dearly love to be able to destroy U.S. SSBNs and have stated so on many occasions. It is reasonable to assume that the Soviets would like to avoid escalation of any conflict with the United States to the use of nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, these are questions that can never be answered adequately until an actual war occurs and real decisions have to be made. In either case, the sixth assumption inherent within the bastion concept is that the Soviets do not intend to escalate the war to a nuclear war if some (or perhaps all) of their SSBN force is destroyed, but instead will be more likely to sue for peace once they lose their positive correlation of nuclear forces.

C. SUMMATION

The purpose of this research is to determine if the bastion concept still provides a critical linkage between

the Maritime Strategy and the naval aspects of the new Soviet military doctrine. Since the bastion concept is a rather expansive theory, it is easier to develop this linkage if it is broken down into a set of more fundamental assumptions inherent within the ideas encompassed by the bastion concept. This was accomplished by conducting a thematic content analysis of official publications and open testimony given by senior naval officers and the Secretary of the Navy.

The six fundamental assumptions of the bastion concept are:

1. The Soviets intend to withhold their SSBN forces as a strategic reserve in case of a future war with the West.
2. The Soviets believe the ballistic missile submarine can conduct strategic missions and, therefore, influence the course and outcome of a war.
3. The Soviets do not view the interdiction of NATO's sea lines of communications as a primary mission for their conventional navy--at least at the outset of a conventional war.
4. The Soviets will utilize the majority of their conventional navy to protect their SSBN force in home waters even if the U.S. Navy does not conduct a forward offensive.
5. The Soviets believe that the next war with the West will not necessarily be a nuclear war and, therefore, the critical part of the war will be the land war in Central Europe.
6. The Soviets do not intend to escalate the war to a nuclear war if some (or perhaps all) of their SSBN force is destroyed, but instead will be more likely to sue for peace once they lose their positive correlation of nuclear forces.

The bastion concept by no means requires the support of all of these assumptions. For example, if the assumption about nuclear escalation and war termination (the sixth assumption) appears to be completely invalid, this does not mean that the bastion concept is also defective. It may mean that the Soviets are using the bastion for other reasons that are not so apparent. In any case, the first place to look must be in the major writings of the man who commanded the Soviet Navy for almost 30 years, Sergei Gorshkov.

IV. EVIDENCE OF BASTIONS

It is particularly important that submarines have become the main arm of the forces of modern navies. The new strategic orientation of the navies toward warfare against the shore has also played a great role. All of this has to a great degree increased the need for the all-around support of the operations of forces prosecuting strategic missions.¹

A. A PROPER PERSPECTIVE

The purpose of this research is not to conduct an exhaustive review of all aspects of the Soviet Navy for the previous 30 years in order to trace the development of the bastion concept. The development of the bastion concept was given in Chapter II. The very fact that most strategic analysts and intelligence experts in the United States military have adopted the bastion concept, and the fact that it has become a centerpiece assumption of the U.S. Naval Maritime Strategy is sufficient proof of its acceptance. The process of reviewing and supporting the existence (or non-existence) of the bastion concept at this point would be a redundant academic exercise. The bastion concept has become an accepted fact, albeit a still debated fact, in U.S. naval perspectives of its opponent's strategy.

It is now important to look closely at the changes that have occurred in the Soviet Union since Mikhail Gorbachev

¹S.G. Gorshkov, Sea Power of the State, 2nd ed., Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1979, p. 340.

came to power in March 1985. Specifically, it is important to review the changes that have taken place in the military to determine if the central assumption of the Maritime Strategy, the bastion concept, is still the critical linkage between the present Maritime Strategy and the "new" Soviet military doctrine.

However, before an examination of the new Soviet military doctrine is commenced it is first necessary to review the strategy of the Soviet Navy as seen through the eyes of Sergei Gorshkov, the man who led the Soviet Navy for almost 30 years and is largely responsible for its present shape. Gorshkov's effect upon the Soviet Navy and his influence on Soviet military strategy in the previous two decades, at least for a Naval officer in an Army-dominated hierarchy, cannot be over-emphasized. In order to understand the significance of the new ideas being promulgated about the Soviet military it is necessary to have at least an elementary understanding of Gorshkov's ideas as they applied to Soviet military strategy, and the part the Soviet Navy would play in that strategy in case of a future war with the West. Only then can Gorbachev's influence upon the Soviet military be placed in the proper perspective.

An exhaustive review of the writings and speeches given by Admiral Gorshkov and his replacement as head of the Soviet Navy, V.N. Chernavin, has been conducted by other

analysts.² This precludes the necessity of traveling over ground that has already been thoroughly researched. The point here is to condense some of Gorshkov's more important ideas as presented in his two major works, Red Star Rising at Sea and The Sea Power of the State, and to see to what extent Gorshkov's ideas support or refute the six basic assumptions of the bastion concept outlined in Chapter III.

B. GORSHKOV'S VIEW OF NAVAL STRATEGY

For better or for worse, Sergei G. Gorshkov is one of the most prominent naval figures of the twentieth century. The very fact that he was able to survive as head of the Soviet Navy from June 1956 until his retirement in December 1985 is in itself a remarkable testimony to his endurance and political savvy. Had he not published a single word Gorshkov would still have to be admired for this feat alone. However, though not considered an extremely prolific writer on naval affairs, Gorshkov did publish several works in the 1970s which dealt extensively and in some detail with the relationship between sea power and a state which desired to attain status as a truly global power, such as the Soviet Union.

²See Tritten, Soviet Naval Forces and Nuclear Warfare, and David A. Hildebrandt, The Soviet Trend Toward Conventional Warfare and the Soviet Navy: Still No Anti-Sloc?, Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, June 1988.

The first of these important works, Red Star Rising at Sea, was a series of articles which appeared in the Soviet naval journal Morskoi Sbornik in 1972 and 1973.³ The second, and much more important work, Sea Power of the State, was first published in 1976 with a second edition appearing in 1979. This book, unlike Red Star Rising at Sea, was a much more detailed book which went beyond an historical analysis of the Russian and Soviet Navy. In Sea Power of the State Gorshkov provided an interesting insight into the present (and to some extent future) significance of a navy and its importance to a nation that wishes to attain superpower status. It is difficult to say to what extent Gorshkov was arguing for his major points or simply repeating fully approved doctrine, this argument continues to this day. However, it is important to realize that the CPSU did allow these works to be published, and we can assume that everything the Soviets write, say, or do has been carefully thought out in advance with the realization that the West will be paying close attention.

1. Fleet vs. Fleet and Fleet vs. Shore

Before reviewing evidence of Admiral Gorshkov's support for the six basic assumptions, it is first necessary to review his approach to modern naval operations. Gorshkov

³Red Star Rising at Sea is the name given to the collected articles by the Naval Institute Press which published all of the articles in a book under this name in 1974. The articles in Morskoi Sbornik appeared under the title of "Navies in War and Peace" in 1972 and 1973.

breaks naval operations down into two distinct categories: fleet-against-fleet and fleet-against-shore. Fleet-against-fleet, as the name implies, involves the operations of naval forces against "enemy ships at sea and in bases and the battle for sea and ocean communications."⁴ Fleet-against-shore consists of "attacks by carrier aircraft against ground targets and grouping of forces and in the destruction of strategically and economically important land targets by submarine-launched nuclear-missile attacks."⁵

Fleet-against-fleet therefore deals with the more traditional aspects of naval warfare in which the fleet attempts to engage the enemy fleet or interdict his shipping on the sea lanes. However, according to Gorshkov, it is in the area of fleet-against-shore that modern navies have gained their most important significance. Modern naval vessels, specifically the SSBN, can crush the military-economic potential of an adversary by launching ballistic missiles against the enemy's most important military and industrial areas. The ability to crush the enemy's military-industrial potential is of special significance because this is defined as a strategic goal of a future conflict, and, as a strategic goal, it is capable of influencing the course and outcome of a war.⁶ Thus, in

⁴Gorshkov, Sea Power of the State, p. 315.

⁵Gorshkov, Sea Power of the State, p. 315.

⁶Gorshkov, Sea Power of the State, pp. 325-329.

Gorshkov's scheme of naval warfare, fleet-against-shore operations are more important than the traditional fleet-against-fleet and, most importantly from Gorshkov's perspective, have given the Soviet Navy an increased significance because, for the first time, it can directly influence the course and outcome of a war. This is the main point of his book.

2. Evidence of Basic Assumptions

a. SSBN as a Withholding Deterrent

Withholding, as discussed in Chapter III, refers to the inherent survivability of the SSBN as a strategic platform which allows it to be used as a "strategic reserve" in case of a future strategic nuclear war. Many Western analysts have insisted, and continue to insist, that withholding provides the Soviets with their primary justification for protecting their SSBNs in bastions. To continue this logic, the Soviets would have no need to provide such intensive support for their SSBN fleet if they intended to use the SSBN strategic missiles at the very onset of war. Therefore, the fact that they do provide conventional protection for their SSBNs can only mean one of two things: the Soviets either intend to withhold some of the SSBNs from the initial exchange in a nuclear conflict or they expect the next war to commence with a prolonged conventional phase that will eventually escalate to a global nuclear war. The first option could be implemented in order

to provide some bargaining leverage since the remaining SSBNs provide the ability to retaliate against any further nuclear escalation. The second option implies that nuclear weapons have not been used; their protection becomes even more important because it is essential that both sides have the ability to inflict unacceptable damage on the other if the war does manage to escalate to the nuclear stage.

Unfortunately, it is very difficult to support or refute the withholding assumption. The Soviets provide very little insight into the specific intentions for their SSBN fleet in the event of a future war with the West. Gorshkov, while often referring to the importance of the SSBN to the Soviet Navy, never says that the SSBN would be withheld from an initial nuclear exchange. It is of great interest to note, however, that Gorshkov does give a very precise explanation of withholding in Sea Power of the State, but insists that it is the U.S. strategy, and not the Soviet strategy, for a strategic nuclear war:

...considering the comparatively low vulnerability of missile-armed submarines and the complexity of detecting them before the first strike, one can assume that a considerable part of the nuclear-missile strength of the enemy (i.e., U.S.) will be wasted to no purpose, while the main part of the nuclear-missile strength of the U.S. strategic forces will be preserved.⁷

It is important to note that Gorshkov's reasoning for the withholding of the U.S. submarine strategic nuclear forces is almost identical to the reasoning applied

⁷Gorshkov, Sea Power of the State, p. 237.

by Western analysts to the Soviet Navy. Gorshkov makes it clear that the relative invulnerability of the SSBN makes it safe for one to assume that it would be an ideal platform for such a task, he never claims that it is U.S. declaratory policy. Not surprisingly the same can be said for the Soviet Navy. There is simply an insufficient amount of evidence to determine if the Soviets really do intend to withhold their SSBNs, or a portion of their SSBNs, from an initial nuclear strike. This was the same conclusion reached by James Tritten in his book Soviet Naval Forces and Nuclear Warfare. After conducting a content analysis of Soviet literature (mostly from Gorshkov, the Minister of Defense, and the Secretary General of the Communist Party), Tritten concluded that "there is no direct evidence in the literature alone to support a declaratory policy of withholding SSBNs from the initial nuclear strike...."⁸

The lack of evidence to support a withholding role for the Soviet SSBNs does not take away the justification for protecting them in bastions close to home waters. As previously mentioned, another option is that the Soviet's believe that a future war with the West would commence with a prolonged conventional phase. Assuming, for the time being, that this is true, the protection of the SSBN force could in fact become even more important because

⁸Tritten, Soviet Naval Forces and Nuclear Warfare, p. 74.

it ensures the ability to retaliate if the war does escalate to a nuclear strike. Simply having the ability to retaliate, even if the war happens to go poorly for the Soviets on the central front, can be extremely important, particularly in the later stages of the war.

b. The SSBN as a Warfighting System

In Sea Power of the State Gorshkov goes into great detail explaining the evolution of naval power, especially Soviet naval power, in the twentieth century. After the Civil War the Soviet Navy was essentially a coastal patrol navy whose primary function, should another war occur, was to launch "attacks from different directions upon the main enemy objective without breaking away from friendly bases...."⁹ This method of waging naval warfare, which Gorshkov made abundantly clear is not the preferred method, was thrust upon the Soviet Navy when it had limited strength and had to face a more powerful enemy. The implication was clear: a navy that was only powerful enough to protect its own shores by remaining within its home waters is a sign of weakness. A more powerful navy, befitting a true global power, should be carrying the fight to the shores of the enemy.

Gorshkov also explained that in a war between two powers that are separated by the ocean expanses, the navies will play a more important role than they would if

⁹Gorshkov, Sea Power of the State, p. 186.

the nations are both contiguous land powers. In both World War I and World War II the primary Soviet enemy was Germany, another land power. Appropriately, Gorshkov does not deny that the Soviet victory in World War II was mainly due to the efforts of the Soviet Army. However, he also points out that in the war in the Pacific between Japan and the United States both countries were "separated by ocean expanses, and that in itself predetermined the special and decisive role of the navies."¹⁰ Again Gorshkov seemed to be warning the Soviet military leadership, especially the Army, that all of the previous Soviet wars have been against other land powers. A future war may be against the United States, a country that is separated from the Soviet Union by the sea.¹¹

With the advent of the nuclear powered submarine capable of launching ballistic missiles, the Soviet Navy now had a weapon that could both carry the fight to the shores of the enemy and play a decisive role, even if the enemy happened to be across the ocean. The ballistic missile submarine was a qualitatively new weapon that was capable of carrying out a qualitatively new mission, "the crushing of the military-economic potential of the enemy through direct

¹⁰Gorshkov, Sea Power of the State, p. 156.

¹¹Of course the Soviets did enter the war against Japan in August 1945, but even this war was essentially a land war since the Soviets attacked the Japanese forces in Manchuria. There was no real need for the Navy to get involved.

military action from the sea against his vitally important centers."¹²

Gorshkov felt that the impact of the ballistic missile submarine on war and armed conflict could not be emphasized enough. The Soviet Navy was no longer condemned to a role of total subservience to the whims of the Soviet Army. Here was a weapon that could not be ignored, a weapon that was extremely difficult to locate, able to remain on station for very long periods of time, and, most importantly of all, a weapon that could effect the course and outcome of a war by conducting the strategic mission of crushing the military-economic potential of the enemy.

Gorshkov actually defined two separate strategic missions for the Soviet Navy: crushing the military-economic potential of the enemy and destroying the ballistic missile submarines of the enemy.¹³ However, by far the most emphasis is placed on the former and, as it later became more obvious to the Soviets that they were going to have an extremely difficult time locating U.S. SSBNs on patrol, the anti-SSBN mission seems to have been dropped as a strategic mission--at least for the time being.¹⁴

¹²Gorshkov, Sea Power of the State, p. vi of introduction.

¹³Gorshkov, Sea Power of the State, p. 292.

¹⁴Hildebrandt, The Soviet Trend Towards Conventional Warfare and the Soviet Navy: Still No Anti-Sloc?, p. 147.

Strategic missions, according to Gorshkov, have become "the determining factor in the development" of modern navies.¹⁵ This implies that the SSBN, as the weapons system (at the time) capable of conducting strategic missions, has virtually become the *raison d'etre* of modern global navies. Gorshkov makes it very clear in several passages of Sea Power of the State that "a navy operating against the shore possesses the capability...of directly affecting the course and even the outcome of a war."¹⁶ Therefore, there is a substantial amount of manifest evidence to indicate that the Soviet Navy under Gorshkov believed it had the ability to conduct strategic missions, and affect the course and outcome of a war.

c. SLOC Interdiction

In Red Star Rising at Sea, Admiral Gorshkov spends a considerable amount of time discussing the role of SLOC interdiction in both World War I and World War II. In World War I Gorshkov claims that the German blockade of Britain had a "considerable effect on the overall course of the war."¹⁷ The wording here is important because Gorshkov does not say it had a decisive effect, and he does not mention what its effect on the outcome of the war was. He

¹⁵Gorshkov, Sea Power of the State, p. 242.

¹⁶Gorshkov, Sea Power of the State, p. 325.

¹⁷Gorshkov, Red Star Rising at Sea, Annapolis: United States Naval Institute Press, 1974, p. 45.

draws very similar conclusions from World War II when he states that the German blockade had a "serious effect on the military-economic potential of England" and that overall, the submarine campaigns against enemy shipping during World War II had a "definite influence on the course of military operations."¹⁸ Gorshkov is even more straightforward in Sea Power of the State when he explains that, with respect to World War I, "the battle in sea and ocean theaters had a profound effect on the course of operations and campaigns in the ground theaters. Moreover, this influence was strategic in nature."¹⁹

In spite of all the attention Gorshkov gives to the role of the submarine, especially the German U-boats, in both World Wars, he reserves some especially harsh criticism for the manner in which the Germans operated their U-boats throughout the war. Gorshkov repeatedly reprimands the Germans for waiting too long in the war before they deployed their submarines on a massive scale and, after they did deploy a considerable number of submarines in the Atlantic, for failing to ensure proper support for their submarines. The remainder of the German Navy, and any part of the German Air Force that could have been spared, should have been used to protect and support the German submarines as they went on

¹⁸Gorshkov, Red Star Rising at Sea, pp. 79, 103.

¹⁹Gorshkov, Sea Power of the State, p. 143. (Emphasis added.)

patrol. Instead, by sending their U-boats into combat totally unsupported by other branches of the armed forces, the Germans doomed the U-boats to a slow but inevitable death.

...in the final period of the war the effectiveness of the submarine blockade was reduced because the German command, after charging the U-boats with accomplishing the main mission, had failed to employ other naval forces to ensure their successful operation. The German fleets and air units did not materially even engage the enemy antisubmarine forces. The U-boats were left to their own resources. To the thousands of ships and other means of waging antisubmarine warfare, Germany merely responded with a few new submarines. Imperialist Germany, whose military machine was approaching a catastrophic end, delayed too long before beginning to employ her submarine forces on a broad scale, and she did not draw upon her total naval strength to support their operations.²⁰

It is apparent that Gorshkov felt the German submarine force, if it had been properly supported by the Navy and Air Force, could have had even a more decisive effect on the course, and possibly even the outcome, of the wars. Gorshkov never explicitly says this, but the number of times he repeats the German mistakes in both books, and the fact that he calls it "the biggest mistake of the German fascist leaders" indicates that he felt the submarine's role could have been much more decisive.²¹ The latter statement is even more startling when it is considered that it is coming from a Soviet military leader who actually fought against the Germans in the Great Patriotic War. Most Soviet

²⁰Gorshkov, Sea Power of the State, p. 140. (Emphasis added.)

²¹Gorshkov, Sea Power of the State, p. 162.

military leaders, and many Western analysts, feel the biggest mistake of the war made by Germany was in choosing to attack the Soviet Union in the first place. The fact that Gorshkov, a veteran of that war, stated otherwise makes his argument even more poignant.

Gorshkov does not deemphasize the importance of ocean transport or the role of the submarine in attacking ocean shipping after World War II. In fact, Gorshkov explains that the role of the submarine in attacking enemy shipping is "even more important in today's context."²² However, in Sea Power of the State Gorshkov states that fleet-against-shore operations could be considered a part of SLOC interdiction. The SSBN has the ability to launch ballistic missiles against ports, dry docks, shipyards, and other repair facilities. This, according to Gorshkov, also constitutes a means of disrupting enemy shipping, and is even more decisive since it is directed "against the source of the military strength of the enemy."²³ Furthermore, "the role and position of ocean transport in the economies of many states in their day also determined the importance of oceans, an importance which is growing continuously."²⁴

Admiral Gorshkov never claimed that the interdiction of the enemy's sea lines of communication was a

²²Gorshkov, Red Star Rising at Sea, p. 102.

²³Gorshkov, Sea Power of the State, p. 326.

²⁴Gorshkov, Sea Power of the State, p. 14.

strategic mission or that it was capable of affecting or influencing the course and outcome of a war. He did make it clear, however, that a properly supported SLOC interdiction campaign could be a very important part of damaging the enemy's military-economic potential, especially if the interdiction took the form of nuclear strikes against enemy ports. There is no manifest evidence that indicates Admiral Gorshkov considered SLOC interdiction as one of the primary missions of the Soviet Navy--at least at the outset of a future conventional war. However, it is apparent that the Soviet Navy under Admiral Gorshkov did still believe SLOC interdiction was a very important mission.

d. Soviet Conventional Navy

The second essential element of the bastion concept involves the use of the conventional Soviet Navy to provide protection for the ballistic missile submarines. In this context, the conventional navy refers to all of the naval combatants except for the SSBNs, minesweepers, transport ships, troop carriers, and other naval auxiliaries; specifically it refers to the torpedo attack submarines, guided-missile submarines, aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, and frigates. This aspect of the bastion concept is important to the Maritime Strategy because it gives a very important indication of where the Soviet fleet can be found, and what operational and tactical methods will have to be used to confront it.

Gorshkov was extremely critical of the German Navy in both World Wars for not providing sufficient combat support for their submarines. However, the German U-boats were mainly involved in the interdiction of the Allied shipping. Now, according to Gorshkov, there was a qualitatively new mission that navies were capable of performing: the destruction of the military-economic potential of the enemy by the use of ballistic missile attacks upon his most important centers of industrial and military strength. This qualitative change would seem to indicate that there was a fundamentally different mission for the conventional navy as well.

Gorshkov repeatedly emphasized that the submarine simply could not "fully assure its own invulnerability."²⁵ The primary role of the submarine may have changed from attacking enemy shipping on the open seas to delivering strikes upon enemy shores but the submarine was still "the main attack force of the Navy."²⁶ This quantum increase in the importance of the submarine meant that the role of the conventional navy in protecting the submarine, specifically the ballistic missile submarine, was equally more important. The conventional navy could not be wasted unnecessarily on general engagements against the enemy fleet. Such engagements "not only have lost their

²⁵Gorshkov, Sea Power of the State, p. 279.

²⁶Gorshkov, Sea Power of the State, p. 279.

significance, but have also actually become impractical."²⁷ Instead, the conventional navy had to be used to ensure the combat security of the ballistic missile submarines by preventing enemy naval forces from surprising them. Once the combat security of the SSBNs was ensured, they could then carry out their strategic missions.

The primary mission of the conventional navy, the protection of the ballistic missile submarines, required that they establish "control of the sea." Control of the sea was a very important concept for Gorshkov which should not be confused with the Western or Mahanian concept of "command of the sea." In fact, Gorshkov criticized the traditional Western concept of controlling the sea as "the banner of the militant circles of British and American imperialism."²⁸ For Gorshkov, control of the sea was not an absolute principle but very much dependent upon time and place. Specifically it was defined as:

...a favorable operational situation gained to conduct an operation or battle in a certain area of a sea-theater for the period of time necessary to reliably ensure success and to guarantee that the enemy will not interrupt the preparation and conduct of the battle.²⁹

The time dependence of control of the sea was particularly important for Gorshkov. The Western command of the sea concept, according to the eminent British maritime

²⁷Gorshkov, Sea Power of the State, p. 319.

²⁸Gorshkov, Sea Power of the State, p. 336.

²⁹Gorshkov, Sea Power of the State, p. 339.

strategist Sir Julian Corbett, meant "nothing but the control of maritime communications, whether for commercial or military purposes."³⁰ In other words, it was not dependent upon time but was considered to be important for the duration of the war. Gorshkov, however, insisted that "the time frame within which one can maintain control of the sea has been considerably reduced as the speed of ships and other naval forces have increased and as communications and intelligence have improved."³¹

The conventional navy, therefore, had to ensure that the ballistic missile submarines had a sufficient amount of time to carry out their strategic missions--no more and no less. This required the establishing of sea control in a specific place for a specific amount of time. "The achievement of sea control is the factor ensuring the success of the operations of forces prosecuting the primary missions."³² Therefore, without sea control the strategic mission could not be executed and the navy's ability to influence the course and outcome of the war would be severely limited. This indicates the importance, from Gorshkov's perspective, of ensuring that the conventional

³⁰Julian Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, Annapolis: United States Naval Institute Press, 1988, p. 94.

³¹Gorshkov, Sea Power of the State, p. 340.

³²Gorshkov, Sea Power of the State, p. 341.

navy is capable of properly establishing sea control, without it everything else becomes impossible.

Gorshkov's primary role for the conventional navy is thus clear. It must be able to ensure "the all-around support of the operations of forces prosecuting strategic missions."³³ There is therefore ample evidence to support the assumption that the conventional navy, under Gorshkov, had the primary function of protecting the SSBN force. This leaves little doubt that Gorshkov realized the importance of SLOC interdiction, but only after the adequate protection of the SSBNs has been secured.

e. Land War/Conventional War in Europe

When discussing the significance of a possible future war in Europe one must keep in mind Gorshkov's perspective. Gorshkov was trying to argue for the necessity of a strong Navy if a nation is to have ambitions as a true global superpower. He would be damaging his argument if he emphasized the importance of the land war in Central Europe. The Soviets have long recognized the importance of Central Europe and have kept a great quantity of motor-rifle divisions and armor in this area for this very reason. The land war in Central Europe, and its importance, was already an accepted fact among the Soviet military and political hierarchy.

³³Gorshkov, Sea Power of the State, p. 340.

However, Gorshkov does not seem to feel that the next war with the West necessarily would be a prolonged conventional war. He did discuss the importance of interdicting the enemy's SLOCs on the one hand (what would appear to be a thoroughly conventional mission), but he further implies that this could best be accomplished by using fleet-against-shore operations: nuclear strikes against port facilities. Again, this could be due to the fact that Gorshkov is trying to argue for the importance of the Soviet Navy, specifically the SSBN force, and not because he is confident that the next war would be nuclear.

Gorshkov also emphasized the decreasing amount of time that was available for the fleet to conduct its strategic mission. In fact, according to Gorshkov, "the time needed by the Navy to accomplish strategic missions after the outbreak to military hostilities is becoming of the same order as the time which is needed to accomplish tactical missions."³⁴ In addition, the short time available to conduct strategic missions also dictates a strong requirement to "maintain naval forces in readiness to immediately deliver attacks on the enemy and the need for comprehensive control of these forces."³⁵ Since the SSBN is specifically equipped with the ability to execute strategic

³⁴Gorshkov, Sea Power of the State, p. 335.

³⁵Gorshkov, Sea Power of the State, p. 335. (Emphasis added.)

missions, this strongly suggests that Gorshkov foresees the possibility of requiring the immediate use of the SSBN force and the ability to maintain comprehensive control of these forces. It only requires a slight extrapolation from this point to conclude that Gorshkov felt it is best to keep the SSBN force close to home waters, well protected and in a high state of readiness so that they can immediately carry out their assigned missions: strategic nuclear strikes on NATO and the American homeland.

In summary, although Gorshkov does recognize that "the goals of war have been achieved primarily by occupying enemy territory," he never specifically mentions the critical importance of the central front in Europe, unless he is giving his respects to the efforts of the Russian and Soviet armies in the two World Wars. Furthermore, he does not specifically say that the next war would definitely be a nuclear war but does insist that there is a need to ensure the precise tactical control of the sea-based strategic nuclear forces for their immediate use. This is perhaps the strongest argument Gorshkov could give for maintaining the Soviet SSBN force in well protected bastions.

f. Nuclear Escalation/War Termination

War termination is not a subject that is discussed by Gorshkov. In fact, the very idea of war termination seems to be more of a Western than a Soviet

concept. Gorshkov discusses the use of nuclear weapons to destroy important land targets and to crush the military-economic potential of the enemy so that the Navy can alter the course and outcome of a war. Such language hardly sounds like simple war termination, it sounds much more like a war victory. The point may be obvious but it provides an important insight into the fundamental approach to war used by the Soviet Navy under Gorshkov.

It is significant to note that Gorshkov does mention the destruction of enemy SSBNs as a strategic mission. Although, as previously mentioned, this is not emphasized to the extent that fleet-against-shore operations using the ballistic missile submarine are stressed, the very fact that Gorshkov would elevate anti-SSBN operations to the level of a strategic mission indicates that the Soviets placed great importance on having the capability to destroy the enemy's sea-based strategic arm. If the Soviets really felt that the destruction of the SSBN force would itself lead to nuclear escalation it seems unlikely that Gorshkov would give it this amount of emphasis.

The problem of understanding the nuclear correlation of forces is even more difficult because of the difference in correlating nuclear and conventional forces. According to the definition used for correlation of forces in the 1970s, "correlations in general are used as a way of determining which side will have the upper hand, broadly

speaking, in the action being studied." However, an important distinction is made for nuclear weapons. "For nuclear weapons it is much more important to preempt than to have a higher value in a static correlation...therefore, nuclear correlations do not tell as much as conventional correlations."³⁶

Based on this definition, it is overly simplistic to assume that the Soviets would escalate a war to the nuclear level if they lost their positive correlation of nuclear forces because, since this correlation is not based on static correlations, it is difficult to understand precisely what the correlation is and, perhaps even more importantly, the Soviets place more emphasis on preempting than counting the nuclear correlation. It must also be acknowledged that it is perhaps too simplistic to assume that the Maritime Strategy is pushing for war termination based solely on what is perceived to be the Soviet's emphasis on the nuclear correlation of forces. The Maritime Strategy is also meant to show the Soviets that the United States Navy is quite serious about carrying the fight to their home waters and will not hesitate to horizontally escalate the war if necessary. The Soviet SSBN force is not the recipient of the entire focus of the Maritime Strategy. However, it is clear that it remains a very important focus.

³⁶Jalali, Discussions with Voroshilov and Frunze Academy Students: Correlation of Forces and Means, p. 2.

Two general conclusions about potential nuclear escalation and war termination can be drawn from the evidence. The first conclusion is that there is sufficient evidence to support the assumption that the Soviets did not intend to escalate a war to the nuclear level just because they lost SSBNs in the conventional conflict. However, this does not mean that, at least in the 1970s, the Soviets would not have chosen to preempt before the question of escalation even became a problem. The second conclusion is that there is no evidence that the Soviets would have terminated the war if they lost their positive correlation of nuclear forces.

C. SUMMATION

1. The Naval Aspect of Soviet Military Doctrine

This summation is meant to give a general and condensed version of the naval aspect of Soviet military doctrine under Admiral Gorshkov, and to summarize the amount of evidence that could be found to support the six basic assumptions of the bastion concept outlined in Chapter III. The purpose of this review is to determine if there really was a sufficient amount of evidence to support the assumption that the Soviet Navy would keep their SSBN force in home waters and protect it with the greater portion of their conventional navy in case of a future war with the West. The next chapter will discuss the changes in Soviet military doctrine and operations that have occurred under

General Secretary Gorbachev since his accession to power in 1985 to determine if perhaps there has been a fundamental change from the Gorshkov line.

Based on what Gorshkov said about sea power in his two major works, and on the pattern of Soviet naval exercises, hardware, and operations, throughout the 1970s and into the first half of the 1980s certain conclusions can be drawn. It is clear that Gorshkov felt the Soviet SSBN force was capable of conducting strategic missions. These missions could be carried out by use of ballistic missile strikes on the enemy's more important communications, military, and industrial centers--or what would generally be considered soft targets. Such a task could lead to the destruction of the military-economic potential of the enemy and, therefore, could influence the course and outcome of the war. It is perhaps important to note that Gorshkov said the navy is capable of altering the course and outcome of armed conflict but, in the second edition of Sea Power of the State, this was changed to altering the course and influencing its outcome. Thus, it would appear that the SSBN's primary role and benefit lies outside the realm of armed conflict per se, but is still very important in the total context of war.

Since the SSBN is of such great importance to the Soviet military, ensuring its protection and survival is of great importance. Interestingly, Gorshkov does not discuss

the possibility of a future war having a prolonged conventional phase but instead emphasizes the critical need of supporting the SSBN so that it can immediately carry out its primary mission. It would appear that Gorshkov is not completely convinced the next war would actually begin with a prolonged conventional phase and that preemption should not be ruled out as a possibility. The fact that the Soviets teach their officers that the ability to preempt is more important than the nuclear correlation of forces would seem to reinforce Gorshkov's point. However, it is important to note that Soviet naval exercises throughout the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s did not begin with massive nuclear launches but instead seemed to increasingly emphasize the ability to conduct conventional warfare at sea.³⁷

The best possible explanation to this apparent contradiction is that the Soviets still believe a future war would begin with a conventional phase, but still feel it is critical to be prepared for all contingencies. Nuclear preemption remained a possibility, albeit a diminishing possibility as the Gorbachev era was to indicate.

Gorshkov emphasized the fact that in a war between two powers separated by ocean expanses, the Navy's role is more important. Such a claim could very well be aimed at

³⁷"Soviet Naval Exercises: 1960-1984," NATO Review. Reprint compiled by staff at Headquarters of Allied Command Atlantic, Norfolk, Virginia.

the all-powerful Soviet Army which continued to emphasized the land war in Central Europe. In any case, Gorshkov is making the point that the Soviet Navy can be useful for missions besides nuclear strikes on the enemy's homeland.

SLOC interdiction remained an important priority. However, it should not take the traditional form of a lone submarine or wolfpack operating independently in search of commerce. Gorshkov repeatedly criticized the Germans for using such a tactic and stressed that the submarine must be supported by other surface and air units.

The remainder of the Soviet Navy would not have attempted to seek general fleet engagements but instead would have attempted to establish sea control. Sea control does not have to be established indefinitely over a body of water to ensure that the sea lanes are safe for commercial maritime shipping. Instead, sea control is established in a certain region of the sea for a sufficient amount of time to ensure that the SSBN can conduct its primary mission. Again, Gorshkov stressed that the amount of time necessary to conduct strategic missions has, due to hardware developments, become roughly equal to the time needed for tactical missions. This meant that the SSBNs must be well protected and ready to launch at a moment's notice. Unnecessary delays could be fatal.

Based upon this review of Gorshkov there is little evidence to support a withholding mission for the Soviet

SSBN force. Withholding was certainly understood by Gorshkov but he never directly attributes it to the Soviet Navy. Hardware and exercise patterns are not of much use because it is difficult to verify whether the Soviets will not launch some of their submarine based ballistic missiles until the need arises. However, as previously discussed, Gorshkov did appreciate the value of the SSBN as a warfighting system. The Soviet habit of establishing a defense perimeter around the Soviet Union in their naval exercises could indicate their appreciation for the SSBN, however, there are probably other reasons as well, such as protecting the Army's flank or establishing a buffer zone between the Soviet shore and NATO naval forces.

2. Support of the Six Basic Assumptions

Table 4 gives a summary of the amount of evidence, based on this review, that was found relating to the six basic assumptions. As indicated by the table, no evidence could be found to support the withholding concept or the assumption that the Soviets will terminate the war if they lose the positive correlation of nuclear forces. There was, however, strong evidence to support the Soviet's belief in the capability of the SSBN as a warfighting system and the use of the conventional navy to protect it. There is a substantial amount of evidence to support the assumption that SLOC interdiction is not a primary mission of the Soviet Navy, but it is not entirely clear just how important

TABLE 4

SUPPORT FOR SIX BASIC ASSUMPTIONS OF BASTION
CONCEPT UNDER ADMIRAL GORSHKOV: 1971-1985

<u>Assumptions</u>	<u>Evidence</u>
SSBN Withholding	None
SSBN Warfighting	Strong
SLOC Interdiction	Moderate
Soviet Conventional Navy	Strong
Land War/Conventional War in Europe	Moderate
Nuclear Escalation/War Termination	None

it really is. To classify it as a secondary mission can be misleading. Based on Gorshkov's publications and Soviet naval exercises in the 1970s through the first half of the 1980s, SLOC interdiction became increasingly more important to the Soviets as long as they could ensure the adequate protection of the SSBN force and their coastline.

There is only a moderate amount of evidence to support the assumption that the next war would be a conventional war fought in Central Europe. Gorshkov did admit that only troops can occupy territory but he does not specify that it must be Europe. Furthermore, Gorshkov continuously emphasized the strategic nuclear strike and never said the next war would be a conventional war. However, again it must be stated that it was not Gorshkov's purpose to discuss the war in Europe and he felt the

importance of the SSBN must be emphasized because it alone was capable of influencing the course and outcome of a war.

Based on the evidence covered in this review, there is every reason to support the bastion concept. Although not all of the assumptions were fully supported, there is still more than sufficient evidence to indicate that the Soviet Navy, at least from approximately 1971 to 1985, had every intention of providing protection and support for their SSBN force in case of a future war with the West.

V. WINDS OF CHANGE: GORBACHEV AND THE NEW
SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE

Ensuring security more and more becomes a political task and can only be solved by political means.¹

A. BREZHNEV ERA

1. A Shift in Emphasis

It is now clear that since Gorbachev's ascent to power in 1985 important changes have taken place in the Soviet military. Perhaps the most important of these changes is the "new" Soviet military doctrine adopted in May 1987. Whether the new doctrine will lead to substantive changes in the Soviet military's force structure remains to be seen. However, it is apparent that there were three important factors that forced the Soviets to reevaluate their current military doctrine to determine its applicability for the remainder of this century. These factors, the faltering Soviet economy, the changing nature of the Soviet perception of a future war, and the impact of advanced conventional weaponry on the modern battlefield, were all potential problems before Gorbachev came to power. They were to play an important role in Gorbachev's decision to halt a troublesome trend in Soviet decision making and

¹S. Gorbachev, addressed to 27th Party Congress, February 1986, as cited in Raymond Garthoff, "New Thinking in Soviet Military Doctrine," The Washington Quarterly, Summer 1988, p. 131.

thereby emphasize political instead of military solutions in the future.

With respect to the Soviet military, and virtually all of Soviet society, the year 1985 was to prove to be a watershed. In March of 1985 Mikhail Gorbachev assumed power as the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. For a General Secretary Gorbachev was a relatively young and unknown factor. He had spent a majority of his career as a provincial party chief in Stravpol and, once he came to Moscow in 1978, was placed in charge of agricultural matters.² It is fair to say that Gorbachev had relatively little experience in dealing with the military, perhaps a factor that would work to his advantage. However, before reviewing the Gorbachev era and some of the changes that have occurred in the military under his aegis, it is first necessary to recall the general atmosphere that prevailed in the Soviet military at the end of Leonid Brezhnev's reign as General Secretary.

The first ten years of the Brezhnev era were good ones for the Soviet military. From 1965 to 1975 the Soviets increased their defense spending by four to five percent.³ At the 24th party congress Brezhnev stated:

Everything that the people have created must be reliably protected. It is imperative to strengthen the Soviet

²F. Stephen Larrabee, "Gorbachev and the Soviet Military," Foreign Affairs, summer 1988, p. 1005.

³Larrabee, "Gorbachev and the Soviet Military," p. 1003.

state--this means strengthening its Armed Forces, and increasing the defensive capability of our Motherland in every way. And so long as we live in an unsettled world, this task will remain one of the most primary tasks.⁴

The general attitude towards defense spending that prevailed under Brezhnev thus appears to be rather clear. As long as the United States and NATO remained a threat to the Soviet Union then the military would be provided with whatever it needed. Since according to Marxist-Leninist theory the two opposing social systems of communism and capitalism can never indefinitely coexist on peaceful terms, then Brezhnev was implying that he believed that until the historically inevitable victory of socialism over capitalism this trend of increasing military spending would have to continue.

However, a definite shift in emphasis was evident towards the latter half of the Brezhnev era. The change was apparently instigated by the obvious decline in Soviet economic growth that became apparent in the later stages of the 1970s. Economic growth, which had been as high as four percent in the 1960s dropped to slightly more than two percent in the late 1970s.⁵ According to Paul Kennedy, industrial output dropped "from double digit increases to a

⁴L.I. Brezhnev, "Summary Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 24th Congress of the CPSU," p. 100, as cited in Gorshkov, Red Star Rising at Sea, pp. 134-135.

⁵Larrabee, "Gorbachev and the Soviet Military," p. 1003.

lower and lower figure, so that by the late 1970s it was down to 3-4 percent a year and still falling."⁶

Although the economic decline of the Soviet Union that occurred throughout the 1970s was not catastrophic, it was of a sufficient degree to require the Brezhnev regime to reallocate resources. Subsequently, military spending "dropped to two percent from 1977-1983, with investment devoted to the procurement of new weapons showing no growth at all during the same period."⁷ It is quite possible that the general decline in Soviet military spending caused strains in the relationship between the more prominent civilian members of the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) and the senior Soviet military officers, particularly with the increase in defense spending in the United States that occurred when Ronald Reagan became president in 1981.

2. Marshal Ogarkov and a Call to Arms

The unprecedented peacetime military build-up that occurred in the United States beginning in 1981, combined with the much more severe rhetoric of President Ronald Reagan caused a great deal of concern in the Soviet Union, particularly among the military. An atmosphere that seemed

⁶Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers, New York: Random House, 1988, p. 430.

⁷Robert Gates, Deputy Director for Intelligence, CIA, "Testimony Before the Subcommittee on International Trade, Finance, and Security Economics," Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China: 1984, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984, as cited in Larabee, "Gorbachev and the Soviet Military," p. 1003.

to border on hysteria seemed to envelop the Soviet military. Perhaps the most outspoken, and therefore the best example of the tremendous apprehension among the more senior Soviet officers, was the chief of the Soviet General Staff, Marshal Nikolay Ogarkov.

In January 1982, almost exactly one year after President Reagan assumed office, Ogarkov published Always in Readiness to Defend the Homeland. The book probably best exemplifies the attitude prevalent among the Soviet military at this time. It is quite clearly a warning to the Soviet people that the rapid deterioration of Soviet-U.S. relations may have very significant consequences. In fact, the general tone and mood of the book is so severe that it is tantamount to a call to arms. In essence, the essay is a warning to the Soviet people that a slackness in attitudes on patriotism cannot be tolerated, it is a call for a further strengthening of the Soviet military and homeland in the face of imperialism. Finally, it is a warning that these changes must occur now--before it is too late.

The very first chapter of the book, "Imperialism: The Source of Military Danger," is a blistering attack upon the United States and its policies towards the Soviet Union. Ogarkov insists that the most important aspect of imperialism is its aggressive nature while repeatedly emphasizing the peaceful attitude of the Soviet Union which "has never threatened anybody and never attacked anybody,"

(an incredible statement considering this was written after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan).⁸ The United States, on the other hand, had established a "dangerous reactionary policy" which had the purpose of,

...dull(ing) the vigilance of the peoples of the world, to teach them to accept the idea that 'limited' nuclear war is realistic and 'acceptable,' and to suppress in them any resistance to an unchecked arms race and the military preparations being conducted by the forces of imperialism.⁹

Ogarkov then discussed the post-World War II era as a period in which the Soviet Union was simply reacting to the military initiatives of the United States (a strictly revisionist point of view). He explained how the Cold War and the arms race following World War II were entirely the fault of the U.S. The Soviet Union, according to Ogarkov, "has been forced to take the necessary measures to strengthen its defense" in response to American aggression.¹⁰ Ogarkov's attack upon the U.S. continued relentlessly as he described aggression after aggression allegedly committed by the United States. He accused the United States of "brazen interference," "outright intervention," provocation, sabotage, threats, and of inventing "barbaric means of waging war." He described the present American doctrine of

⁸N.V. Ogarkov, Always in Readiness to Defend the Homeland, Voenizdat, 1982, p. 11.

⁹Ogarkov, Always in Readiness to Defend the Homeland, p. 11.

¹⁰Ogarkov, Always in Readiness to Defend the Homeland, p. 13.

fighting a future war by conventional means as a "verbal shell" and insisted that the U.S., under the leadership of Reagan, had essentially come full circle back to the doctrine of "massive retaliation."¹¹

The third chapter of the book, "Defense of the Socialist Homeland--the Concern of all the People." is by far the most important. The general message of the chapter, and indeed the book, is best summarized by the very first sentence: "Defense of the socialist homeland is an objective historical necessity and a most important condition of building communism."

In this final chapter Ogarkov very carefully criticized the complacency of some of the Soviet people toward defense of the fatherland. He criticized the lackadaisical attitudes of the workers, the lack of physical conditioning of Russia's youth, and the general lack of concern among Soviet people to stemming the tide of capitalism and seeing to the ultimate victory of socialism. He emphasized the importance of morale and the necessity of ensuring that all people, not just the young people, should be prepared for war.

It is essential to convey to Soviet citizens more thoroughly and in a well-reasoned manner the truth about the steadily increasing aggressiveness of imperialism and the threat of war which imperialism presents...the full

¹¹Ogarkov, Always in Readiness to Defend the Homeland, p. 13.

seriousness of the international situation should definitely be shown.¹²

Ogarkov's essay should not be criticized as another batch of meaningless propaganda to be cast aside and forgotten. Although it is unlikely that Ogarkov's opinions represented the views of all of the Soviet leadership, there is good reason to believe that it did reflect the opinions of the more conservative right wing of the CPSU as well as the Soviet military. He made it very clear that he felt a future war was very possible and that, although the war would probably start as a conventional war, it would eventually become a nuclear war. The publication of this book, in 1982, reflected a very serious concern of the Soviet political-military leadership with the poor relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union and the collapse of detente. The tone of the book depicts just how concerned they were, and the book virtually served as a warning to the Soviet people to prepare for war.

Ogarkov's influence went beyond the publication of a very conservative book. There were reports that he openly demanded that the Party leadership increase funding on new weapons systems and for greater defense spending in general.¹³ In 1982 General Secretary Brezhnev had to defend

¹²Ogarkov, Always in Readiness to Defend the Homeland, p. 48.

¹³C.N. Donnelly, "The Soviet Military Under Gorbachev," December 1986, unpublished paper, p. 2.

the cutbacks in military spending in an unusual meeting in the Kremlin with the Minister of Defense and other top military leaders. "Brezhnev's speech had a strongly defensive tone. It seems to have been designed to impress upon the military leaders the need for spending constraints while at the same time reassuring them that their interests would not be neglected."¹⁴ After Brezhnev's death there were also reports of Ogarkov openly disagreeing with General Secretary Chernenko in Defense Council meetings.¹⁵

Ogarkov's continued outspoken opposition to the Party's reluctance to drastically increase military spending apparently was one of the major reasons that he was fired from his position as chief of the Soviet General Staff in September 1984. However, unlike many of his predecessors who dared to speak openly against Party policy, Ogarkov was not sentenced to a political exile or retired in disgrace but, according to most reports, was instead placed in charge of the Western TVD, and is still a member of the Central Committee.¹⁶ The fact that Ogarkov was not exiled but instead was placed in charge of the most important TVD in the Soviet military is in itself an indication that Ogarkov and his opinions were still considered to be extremely

¹⁴Larabee, "Gorbachev and the Soviet Military," p. 1003.

¹⁵Donnelly, "The Soviet Military Under Gorbachev," p. 2.

¹⁶For more on what apparently became of Ogarkov, see John Hines and Philip Petersen, "Ogarkov's Role," Signal, December 1986, p. 108.

important to the Soviet political leadership and, perhaps, it is also an indication of the tremendous influence enjoyed by the Soviet military in the last years of the Brezhnev regime.

B. THE NEW SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE

It is typical of the strict hierarchical Soviet system that any fundamental long term changes that occur will start from the top. The changes being instituted at the present were all originally promulgated by Gorbachev, a process that began almost as soon as he became General Secretary of the Communist Party and continues today. This is why it is necessary to examine what Gorbachev and senior Soviet military officers, mostly Army officers, and various academicians are saying about the "new" Soviet military doctrine and its many manifestations--such as arms control.

It is clear that the changes and their exact implications for the Soviet military are still in the process of debate and, unfortunately, all that can be done at present is to look at both sides of the debate in order to try to understand what these changes may mean for the Soviet Navy in terms of operations, reductions in the force structure, or changes in the naval aspects of the Soviet military strategy. It is quite possible that there is no one in the Soviet Union today, including the top Soviet Naval staff, who is certain at this time what the changes will mean for the Soviet Navy. It cannot be discounted that

there may not even be any substantial changes, but this seems unlikely. If changes do indeed occur, they still hold great significance for the U.S. Maritime Strategy, particularly if there is a change in the Soviet's warfighting strategy. That is the primary concern of this research.

For its part, no member of the Soviet Navy has commented extensively on the new thinking in the Soviet military. This explains the necessary reliance upon the publications of mostly politicians, Army officers, and academicians. Undoubtedly, in a few years there will be more than a sufficient amount of discussion from everybody, including the Soviet Navy. But by then matters will probably have been largely settled and it may be too late for NATO to react. The point here is to try to understand, to the full extent possible, a priori what these changes are and, more important to the context of this research, what the changes may mean for the current U.S. Maritime Strategy.

1. Gorbachev and the Military Crises

There is no doubt that when Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in March 1985 the Soviet Union had more than its share of problems. Domestically, the long term economic decline combined with widespread alcoholism and worker apathy were immediate concerns that required Gorbachev's attention. Meanwhile, the Reagan administration had

instigated a military build-up in the United States that clearly worried the Soviet leadership, particularly the Soviet military. The general atmosphere, as previously discussed, was one of growing concern that the U.S. would soon catch up or surpass the Soviet military in its capabilities, after the Soviets had spent so much time, effort, and money doing the same to the U.S. throughout the latter half of the 1960s and into the 1970s. The most obvious response to the U.S. military build up would be to commence a build-up of their own in order to prove to the Reagan administration and NATO that the Soviet Union will not be surpassed in its military might. This is what Ogarkov and other senior military leaders were apparently urging.

In view of the growing economic concerns facing Gorbachev, a compromise would clearly have to be drawn. An increase in military spending would only have further adverse effects upon the economy and would hamper his program of perestroika. A solution had to be found to break this vicious cycle without compromising the security of the Soviet Union.

The track record of the Soviet military immediately prior to and after Gorbachev's ascension to power did nothing to make the decision any easier. The deployment of the SS-20 turned out to be a serious miscalculation since it led to NATO's counter-deployment of the Pershing 2 and

ground launched cruise missile.¹⁷ Instead of enhancing Soviet security it actually declined, and required a long and involved arms control negotiation which would not be completed until 1988. The Korean airliner tragedy of September 1983 forced some critics within the Soviet Union to accuse the Soviet military of "frequently not knowing what it is doing."¹⁸ The Mathias Rust incident in which a young West German managed to land his small aircraft in Red Square was "highly injurious to our prestige" and led to the dismissal of the Minister of Defense and the head of the Soviet Air Defense Forces.¹⁹

Without a doubt, the most serious miscalculation of the Soviet military was the invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. The final decision to invade Afghanistan might not have been a military decision but, like the U.S. military in Vietnam, when it appeared that the conflict would not be over soon and continued to drag on year after year, it was inevitable that the military would be blamed. According to at least one Soviet source, certain "liberal" sectors of Soviet society (which brings up the interesting question of exactly how the Soviets define a liberal)

¹⁷Larrabee, "Gorbachev and the Soviet Military," p. 1005.

¹⁸Alexander Prokhonov, "Defense Consciousness and New Thinking," Literaturnaya Rossiya, 6 May 1988, p. 4.

¹⁹Prokhonov, "Defense Consciousness and New Thinking," p. 4.

"criticize the Army for the very fact that it went into Afghanistan, considers this an inadmissible, erroneous, and harmful step, and charges the Army with a host of transgressions in this regard."²⁰ The entire situation in Afghanistan became not only a source of embarrassment for the Soviet military but also was a blow to Soviet international prestige, particularly in the Third World. The situation was so bad that it prompted one Soviet writer to admit that the military,

...because of its inflexible, conservative, closed nature...(the Soviet military) is the source of all that is stagnant and conservative, of everything that rejects the new thinking, perestroika, and experimental models of behavior of the nation and the state. That is, the Army (or military) is coming to be identified with the opponents of modernization.²¹

Soviet military doctrine has two distinctly different areas of emphasis: the military-technical and the political. The military-technical determines "the strategic nature of a future war...what sort of war and against what enemy one must be prepared to fight...what the methods could be for carrying out strategic and operational-tactical missions in a future war...."²² In essence, the military

²⁰Prokhonov, "Defense Consciousness and New Thinking," p. 4.

²¹Prokhonov, "Defense Consciousness and New Thinking," p. 4.

²²Makmhut A. Gerayev, M.V. Frunze: Military Theorist, Voenizdat, 1985, p. 326.

and technical aspect of Soviet military doctrine is clearly the primary responsibility of the military itself.

The political aspect of Soviet military doctrine determines the "sociopolitical essence of modern wars, the nature of the political goals and strategic missions of a state in a war, the basic requirements on strengthening the national defense...."²³ Gorbachev immediately established the predominance of the political aspects of Soviet military doctrine over the military-technical. He claimed that ensuring the security of the Soviet Union is increasingly becoming a political task that can only be solved by political means. Gorbachev seemed to be underscoring the danger that can occur if the military-technical aspect of military doctrine is allowed to wander too far from the control of the political aspect. It was a trend that he intended to reverse.

In order to emphasize the return of the dominance of the political aspects of Soviet military doctrine over the military-technical features, Gorbachev immediately began to replace large numbers of the senior Soviet military infrastructure. It is difficult to say exactly what method Gorbachev used to determine who should go and who should remain but it is obvious that he meant to leave a lasting impression upon the Soviet military hierarchy. He replaced Gorshkov in December 1985 along with General Yepishev, the

²³Gerayev, M.V. Frunze: Military Theorist, p. 326.

head of the Main Political Administration. He later replaced Vasili Petrov, the Senior First deputy minister of defense as well as Generals Govorov and Altunin, deputy defense ministers. After the Rust incident he replaced Minister of Defense Sokolov and the head of the Soviet Air Defense Forces, Marshal Koldunov. In effect, Gorbachev

...has carried out a major reshuffling of the top leadership of the armed forces, including ten out of 16 deputy defense ministers. In addition he has replaced the chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces, the heads of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, Poland and Hungary, as well as the commanders of the Moscow and Byelorussian military districts.²⁴

It is difficult to assess the complete effects of such large replacements of senior military personnel within the Soviet system within a relatively short period of time. The changes become especially significant in a system, such as the Soviet's, in which it is possible for senior officers to remain in power for extremely long periods of time. The Soviet military system has been able to maintain such a great deal of continuity and "corporate memory" precisely because a select few of their more elite officers, such as Gorshkov, were able to remain in power in some cases for almost 30 years. The fact that Gorbachev replaced so many in such a short period would seem to indicate that he is quite serious about carrying his restructuring program over into the military.

²⁴Larrabee, "Gorbachev and the Soviet Military," p. 1008.

2. The Essence of the New Soviet Military Doctrine

a. Motivations

It is only to be expected that some Western analysts will be extremely skeptical of the Soviet motivations for changing their military doctrine. There are indeed many possibilities for Gorbachev's emphasis on the changes that he claims are taking place within the Soviet and Warsaw Pact militaries. Some of the possibilities undoubtedly go beyond what Gorbachev and the more senior military officers have claimed. It is presumed by some that the Soviets are after the hearts and minds of the public, especially in Western Europe and the United States. That "the only battle that really matters for the Soviet Union is the battle for public opinion...more than ever, Moscow seeks to advance its anti-Western cause by portraying itself as an unparalleled champion of peace."²⁵ There is also a considerable body of opinion that Gorbachev is trying to break up the NATO alliance or that he is attempting to reduce the number of options available to the U.S. and NATO should another war break out in Europe.²⁶

Such accusations should not be dismissed as the expected reaction of the extreme right-wing conservatives of

²⁵Jean Quatras, "New Thinking is Not Good News," The Washington Quarterly, summer 1988, p. 178.

²⁶See, for example, Andrew Goldberg, "The Present Turbulence in Soviet Military Doctrine," The Washington Quarterly, summer 1988.

Western Europe and the United States. There is a distinct possibility that some of these opinions are at least partly accurate. The Soviets have made it clear that they view NATO as a threat to their security. They have repeatedly proven themselves to be shrewd and bold politicians when it comes to persuading world public opinion to their cause. According to a recent State Department report:

The Soviet effort to manipulate the opinions and perceptions of leaders and publics throughout the world is highly orchestrated and effective. It has resulted in the widespread, unjustified belief throughout the world that the United States is engaged in such nefarious activities as the creation and purposeful dissemination of the AIDS virus, use of chemical weapons, and assassination of leaders.²⁷

However, as will be shown, the Soviet shift in military doctrine is clearly not just a line of meaningless propaganda, but is a classic example of making a virtue out of a necessity. Top party leaders, military officers and academicians have all repeated the same basic concerns, with varying emphasis, that have motivated the changes. It is based upon economic, military, and technological issues that have made change more than just a luxury, but a necessity. This is not to imply, however, that there will not be a healthy amount of propaganda mixed in with the truth. It is highly unlikely that the Soviets would pass up a chance to propagandize a subject which, although an economic,

²⁷Soviet Influence Activities: A Report on Active Measures and Propaganda: 1986-1987, Washington, D.C., U.S. Department of State Publications, 1987, p. 87.

military, and technological necessity to them, will be highly popular among the world public.

(1) Economic Necessities. The idea that the primary motivation behind Gorbachev's new policies is the fact "the USSR faces economic or social stagnation or, at worst, collapse," has become very popular among Western analysts--and for good reason.²⁸ According to Minister of Defense Yazov,

A decision was adopted at the 27th CPSU Congress to create an economic potential roughly equal to that accumulated over 70 years of Soviet power by the year 2000: that is, in the space of 15 years....This is why we need restructuring in all spheres of our life. This is why we need peace, and peace alone.²⁹

It is very difficult to ignore the fact that the Soviets, including General Secretary Gorbachev, have placed very important significance on the restructuring of the Soviet economy. It is of interest to note that, within the Soviet Union, the amount of emphasis that is placed on the necessity of restructuring the economy varies between the academicians and the military. Not surprisingly, the academicians tend to stress the recovery of the economy as one of the primary reasons for cutting back on military spending.

According to several Soviet academicians "the arms race, which absorbs colossal financial, material

²⁸Donnelly, "The Soviet Military Under Gorbachev," p. 6.

²⁹R.T. Yazov, "USSR Defense Minister's Press Conference," Krasnaya Zvezda, 18 March 1988, p. 1.

and intellectual resources, is already causing enormous harm...to the economies of individual states...."³⁰ The high levels of defense spending have acted as a "parasitical" part of the economy and diverted vital resources that "could be used for the implementation of social programs and an improvement of the well-being of the people."³¹ Military spending adds nothing to the economic development of an industrial nation and is in fact "one major reason for the growing economic difficulties."³² Many Soviet writers have even compared the material losses caused by the arms race to the losses suffered in both World War I and World War II.³³

When viewed as a whole, many of the statements made concerning the effects of defense spending on the Soviet economy are quite remarkable. Although most writers are very careful not to specifically point the finger at the Soviet Union (they generally criticize the defense spending of the United States and NATO), their intent cannot be missed. Soviet writers have even admitted

³⁰A.D. Nikonov, The Arms Race: Causes, Trends, Ways to Stop It, Moscow: Mezhdunarduyye Oshosheniya Publishing House, February 1986, p. 181.

³¹R. Formazayon, "Global Problems of the Present Day: Economics and Disarmament," Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta, January 1988, p. 17.

³²Nikonov, The Arms Race: Causes, Trends, Ways to Stop It, p. 195.

³³See, for example, Formazayon, "Global Problems of the Present Day: Economics and Disarmament," p. 16.

that examining military spending as a percentage of gross national product (GNP) is misleading because it "fails to provide a true picture of the strong effect of militarist preparations on the economy (such as) a very high degree of use of intellectual resources (and) a massive diversion of scientists and engineers into the military sphere...."³⁴

The precise levels spent by the Soviets on their military sector is unclear and has been a subject of constant debate over the years. The official CIA estimates place the levels at 14 to 16 percent in 1980, and 15 to 17 percent in 1987.³⁵ Other analysts insist the levels are considerably higher, up to twice the CIA level. The Soviets have claimed that their military spending consumes roughly 16 percent of their GNP, a figure which seems to fall almost too neatly within the range of the CIA estimates. The Soviets generally do not discuss exact spending levels or, if they do, it is not discussed with respect to its impact on the economy. However, in one particularly interesting book, The Arms Race: Causes, Trends, Ways to Stop It, A.D. Nikonov notes:

Even if we disengage ourselves from qualitative aspects and take a level of military spending equal to, say, 5 percent to 6 percent of GNP, as was the case for a number of Western countries during the seventies, this is ultimately the equivalent every 15 years to 20 years of

³⁴Nikonov, The Arms Race: Causes, Trends, Ways to Stop It, p. 195.

³⁵Soviet Military Power: An Assessment of the Threat 1988, 7th ed., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988, p. 32.

the destruction of a whole year's volume of goods and services produced.³⁶

It is difficult not to notice that Nikonov has picked a number roughly equivalent to the levels expended by the United States. It leaves one wondering what would be the effects of the Soviet levels which are up to three times higher with respect to the percentage of GNP. Such a point could hardly be lost on the senior Party and military leadership.

The military approach to economic restructuring is, not surprisingly, from a different perspective. Frederick Engels claimed that "nothing depends so much on economic conditions as the Army and the Navy. Armament, personnel, organization, tactics and strategy depend primarily on the level of production achieved at a given moment."³⁷ However, the days when everything the military required would be provided were clearly over. Therefore, instead of emphasizing the importance of economic restructuring in its social context, the military points to the increased security which can be gained in the future through the use of wise fiscal policies today.

An increase in the tempo and scale of social production; a qualitative increase in economic capability; a decisive turn towards intensive economic methods; acceleration of scientific and technical progress...create qualitatively

³⁶Nikonov, The Arms Race: Causes, Trends, Ways to Stop It, p. 195.

³⁷K. Marx and F. Engels, Sochineniya, 2nd ed., Vol. 20, p. 171, as cited in Gorshkov, Sea Power of the State, p. 259.

new capabilities as well for improving the material and technological base of the defense capability of the country and its Armed Forces."³⁸

The Soviet military tends to view the arms race as an attempt by the United States and NATO to "stimulate their economy and undermine the economy of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries."³⁹ The process of ensuring the proper security of the Soviet Union in the future will require a fundamentally new approach, in which economic restructuring will play an important part. This is not to imply that the Soviet military has agreed that economic restructuring should take the form of massive cutbacks in military spending. On the contrary, the relative lack of attention paid to economic necessities by the military as a primary justification for the restructuring of the Soviet military indicates that, for the present, the military is cautiously going along with these policies with a wary eye towards the future.

(2) Military Necessities. As discussed in Chapter I, by 1967 the Soviet leadership had concluded that a future war with the West would not necessarily commence with nuclear strikes on the homelands of the United States and the Soviet Union. The Soviets concluded that a future

³⁸P. Skorodenko, "Military Parity and the Principle of Reasonable Sufficiency," Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, No. 10, May 1987, p. 21.

³⁹M.A. Gareyev, "Defense of the Homeland: Soviet Military Sciences," Defense of the Homeland, No. 11, 1987, p. 2.

war may begin with a brief conventional period that would inevitably, and probably swiftly, escalate to a nuclear war. The precise amount of time at which a future war would remain conventional is not specified but it was generally acknowledged to be brief.

Gorshkov, as well as other influential officers such as Sokolovskiy in the 1960s, assumed that the next war would inevitably be nuclear. As discussed in Chapter Four, Gorshkov repeatedly emphasized the role of the SSBN in influencing the course and outcome of a war and felt that the amount of time allotted of the SSBN to conduct its strategic mission was roughly equivalent to the amount of time necessary to conduct tactical missions. Such an opinion seems to indicate that Gorshkov foresaw a future war reaching the nuclear level very early, if not almost immediately. Again it must be emphasized that it is not completely clear whether Gorshkov was arguing for political purposes or simply repeating accepted doctrine, but the fact that he was able to publish a book which envisions a battle for the first salvo indicates that his theories were acceptable to some.

One of the first indications that Gorshkov's assessment of the nature of a future war was no longer acceptable appeared in a book by the Deputy to the Chief of the Soviet General Staff Colonel General Makmhut Gareyev. Gareyev is an extremely prolific writer on

subjects such as military doctrine, strategy, and operational art. In 1985 he published M.V. Frunze: Military Theorist in which he claimed:

In the 1960s and 1970s the author's of this (Sokolovskiy's Military Strategy) and many other books proceeded primarily from a view that a war, under all circumstances, would be waged employing nuclear weapons and military operations employing solely conventional weapons are viewed as a brief episode at the start of the war. However, the improvement and stockpiling of nuclear missile weapons have reached such limits where the massed employment of these weapons in a war can entail catastrophic consequences for both sides. At the same time in the armies of the NATO countries there has been a rapid process of modernizing conventional types of weapons....Under these conditions, as is assumed in the West, there will be a greater opportunity for conducting a comparatively long war employing conventional weapons and primarily new types of high precision weapons.⁴⁰

Gareyev did not deny that a future war could eventually become a nuclear war, and in fact stated that, as military operations are expanded, a nuclear war probably will occur. The main point was that a future war would not likely be a quick blitzkrieg type of war, but would be protracted. Furthermore, the war would not initially start off as a nuclear war but, after a "protracted, stubborn and fierce armed struggle," nuclear escalation was probably inevitable.⁴¹ In addition, at a conference held in England in July 1988 on Naval Strategy and Arms Control, the Soviets, in an unusually forthright

⁴⁰Gareyev, M.V. Frunze: Military Theorist, pp. 183-184.

⁴¹Gareyev, M.V. Frunze: Military Theorist, p. 184.

admission, stated that Gorshkov's ideas on the "battle of the first salvo" were simply wrong.⁴²

There were other apparent changes in the Soviet assessment of the nature of the future war besides the fact that it would now be protracted and, much later, nuclear. In the Warsaw Pact military doctrine adopted in May 1987 it was stated quite clearly that "there can be no victors in a nuclear war."⁴³ This was a rather extraordinary change in emphasis for the Soviets. They had maintained that a future nuclear war would definitely have devastating effects on both sides but, with proper preparation and training, it was possible for one side to crawl from the rubble and continue the fight.

Many analysts have pointed out the apparent discrepancy between the Soviet's claim that a nuclear war cannot be won and the tremendous amount of time and money they have expended, and continue to expend, on civil defense. For approximately 40 years the Soviets have been working on the construction of deep underground facilities which are, "in some cases, hundreds of meters deep and can accommodate thousands of people."⁴⁴ These facilities are not meant to protect the general public or even all of the

⁴²Roger W. Barnett, "Memorandum for the Record," National Security Research Inc., 2 August 1988, p. 4.

⁴³"On the Military Doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty Member States," Pravda, 30 May 1987, p. 2.

⁴⁴Soviet Military Power 1988, p. 59.

military, but are only designed to ensure the safety of the senior Soviet leadership in case of a nuclear war. However, by themselves, these facilities do not necessarily indicate that the Soviets truly believe that victory is possible in a future nuclear war. It is entirely possible that the underground facilities reflect a natural desire on the part of the Party elite to simply survive a nuclear war--at any cost. In any case, these shelters must be viewed with respect to other Soviet activities and not as an isolated entity.

Traditional Marxism-Leninism has taught that the two opposing social systems, communism and capitalism, can not indefinitely coexist on peaceful terms. Eventually, the capitalist forces would begin to lose the battle for world domination and, in their dying throes, would lash out at the forces of socialism in a final war which would mean the end of capitalist countries. This view that war between socialism and capitalism was fatally inevitable changed in the 1970s when it was acknowledged that there are other means of ensuring the victory of socialism. However, by the early 1980s when the fear of war seemed to be recurring due to the arms build up and rhetoric of the Reagan administration, Ogarkov warned that "the absence of a fatal inevitability of war, however, by no means signifies elimination of the possibility of a war occurring in the contemporary era, the principal conflict of

which is the conflict between socialism and capitalism."⁴⁵ However, after Secretary Gorbachev took office the Soviets again began to stress that war is not fatally inevitable and can be avoided. Therefore, although the possibility of war remains as long as imperialism is in existence, it can be controlled; Ogarkov's warning, the Soviets seem to be saying, is a bit premature.

In conclusion, the military necessities that led the Soviets to the adoption of a new military strategy were essentially a combination of new ideas with old ones. The belief that a future war would not be a quick blitzkrieg type of strike but would instead be a protracted, difficult and fierce struggle appears to be relatively new. Although a future war was not considered inevitable, if it did occur, it would certainly eventually reach a nuclear level which neither side could win.

If a future war would not be quick and decisive but long and expensive and, much more importantly, would inevitably escalate to the nuclear level which neither side could possibly win, then a fundamental reassessment of the approach to war would have to be made. The bottom line, following this line of reasoning, is that a future war could not be won under the present circumstances, no matter how well trained and well equipped the military was. This made

⁴⁵Ogarkov, Always in Readiness to Defend the Homeland, p. 32.

it clear to Gorbachev that a change would have to be made in the Soviet military doctrine which would be aimed at the prevention of war--a thoroughly different goal than the previous doctrines.

(3) Technological Necessities. Since the early 1960s, a new type of weapon has been developed which has literally revolutionized the tactics to be used on the battlefield by opposing armies. These highly accurate weapons are often referred to as precision guided munitions (PGMs), and they have reached a level in their development where they can be devastatingly lethal in their effect. PGMs are not only highly accurate but also extremely mobile; they can be carried by the individual infantryman or serviced by a small crew. This means that the individual soldier or a small group of soldiers can very effectively and ruthlessly threaten aircraft, tanks, or other armored vehicles.

The Soviet Army is an army which has invested very heavily in a large number of tanks and armor. The tremendous success of the German Panzer armies in their blitzkrieg operations against the Soviet Army in the summer and fall of 1941 left a deep impression on the Soviet Army, a lesson that they would not soon forget. As a result, the Soviet Army has since been trained to conduct blitzkrieg type of operations. However, PGMs may have inexorably neutralized the blitzkrieg as a valid form of land warfare.

The Soviets have admitted since at least 1985 that PGMs will be extensively used on future battlefields. According to the dialectical law of transition from quantitative to qualitative changes, one of the most important of the dialectical laws of Soviet military science, a qualitative transition takes place when a new weapon is introduced in sufficient numbers. However, "as long as new weapons and combat equipment are employed in limited quantity, most frequently they are merely adapted to existing modes of combat or at best introduce only certain partial amendments."⁴⁶

It is clear that the Soviets are convinced that the PGM has made this transition. The Soviets now insist that PGMs represent a "qualitative leap forward, in the development of conventional armed forces and weapons...."⁴⁷ The primary question then becomes: what are the implications of large numbers of these weapons on the central front in Europe? This has undoubtedly been a crucial question for the Soviets since it became apparent that PGMs were a force to be reckoned with. At least one Western analyst has concluded that "the recent developments in precision guidance have significantly enhanced the

⁴⁶Ogarkov, Always in Readiness to Defend the Homeland, p. 32.

⁴⁷A. Kokoshin, "The Development of Military Affairs and Reduction of Armed Forces and Conventional Arms," Mironaya Ekonomika I Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya, No. 1, January 1988, p. 17.

capability of a defense to thwart an offensive based on the blitzkrieg."⁴⁸

It would appear that the Soviets tend to agree with this assessment of the effectiveness of PGMs. They are now claiming that PGMs are "comparable in their effectiveness with weapons of mass destruction."⁴⁹ Since PGMs have reached a level of effectiveness which can be compared to the nuclear weapon, two conclusions have apparently been drawn by the Soviets. The first is that the nuclear weapon has lost a great deal of its usefulness since it is capable of unpredictable and uncontrollable damage. It is of no value because its use will inevitably lead to further escalation (the Soviets absolutely do not accept the concept of limited nuclear war) in which case neither side can possibly win. Furthermore, the main mission of the nuclear weapon is swiftly being replaced by the new and accurate conventional weapons, or PGMs. The second conclusion is that PGMs give an advantage to the defender in a conventional war, and have essentially forced the blitzkrieg concept to be seriously questioned for the first time since World War II. While the blitzkrieg has not yet been completely rejected by the Soviets, it is clear that

⁴⁸John J. Mearshimer, Conventional Deterrence, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983, p. 190.

⁴⁹Kokoshin, "The Development of Military Affairs and Reduction of Armed Forces and Conventional Arms," p. 17.

they are seriously reassessing its value on the modern battlefield with precision weapons.

The effect of the Stinger ground-to-air missile in Afghanistan on the Soviets should not be understated. It is clear that this weapon, in the hands of the Afghan rebels, forced the Soviets to drastically alter their tactics. It may be an exaggeration to say that the Stinger played a major role in the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. But the Stinger missile, and other PGMs, deployed on a much greater scale in Central Europe would theoretically be equally effective. This may be a lesson that the Soviets learned cheaply.

(4) Summary. There is no doubt that all three of the problems mentioned, the faltering Soviet economy, the changing nature of a future war, and the impact of advanced conventional weaponry on the modern battlefield, have all played a part in forcing the Soviets to reexamine their current military doctrine. At this point, it is extremely difficult to determine which of the three had the greater effect. The civilian lobby (comprised mainly of academic experts from the USSR Academy of Sciences) has tended to emphasize primarily the need to restructure the economy. This emphasis seems to be a fundamental acknowledgement by certain sectors of the Soviet Union that if the Soviets are to maintain their current position as a global superpower into the 21st century then the economy absolutely must be

strengthened. It is here where all agreement between the Soviet civilians and military seems to stop. Is the economy best strengthened by making important reductions in the military sector or by other possible methods?

The military has tended to stress that the restructuring of the economy is important because future weapons development is dependent upon the economy. Even more important, from the military's perspective, is the fact that modern conventional weapons have called into question the traditional wisdom of the blitzkrieg and, to make matters worse, these weapons seem to be improving and proliferating all of the time. Their effectiveness is being compared to nuclear weapons. Even the most poorly trained soldier in the poorest of Third World countries has proven that these weapons can be used with extreme effectiveness, even against a superiorly equipped and trained modern army. There has been no indication that the Soviet Army does not still continue to dominate the Soviet military's hierarchical structure. Therefore, if the Soviet Army is concerned about the future of a land war in Central Europe then, ipso facto, it is a problem for the Soviet Navy. If the Soviet Army decides that the problem has become of such significance that Soviet military doctrine must be changed then the Navy has little choice but to adapt to new realities.

Finally, there is the problem of nuclear war. Even if the Soviet economy were very strong, even if

the precision guided munitions had not yet been invented, there still remains the fundamental fact that the Soviets have determined that a nuclear war would be catastrophic for both sides--and that continuing to rely on traditional deterrence or the threatened use of these weapons is becoming increasingly imprudent. If a nuclear war cannot be won, then a nuclear war must be avoided. If a conventional war will inevitable escalate to a nuclear war, then a conventional war must also be avoided. Thus, all war must be avoided. This seems to be the most important change in the new Soviet military doctrine, the culmination of three interplaying forces that could not be ignored any longer. Doctrine must now concentrate on methods to prevent war if at all possible.

b. Results

The changes that have been occurring in the Soviet military in the previous three years culminated in the drafting of the new "Military Doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty Member States" in May 1987. However, the new doctrine does not explain everything by itself. It has become increasingly clear that the debate on the actual meaning of the new doctrine is still underway. Eventually, a decision will be made and the arguments that are now so evident will be over, publicly at least. Until then, a very interesting, provocative and, for the Soviets, open debate seems to be continuing.

Perhaps one of the primary differences between the current debate and previous ones is the diversity of the people involved. Gorbachev has apparently asked the social scientists, primarily from the USSR Academy of Sciences, to join in--and they have done so enthusiastically.

The fact that the debate is still continuing means that no definite conclusions can be drawn yet about the effects of these changes on the Soviet Navy and the bastion concept, if any. But, there are some definite indications, such as the more recent round of naval arms control proposals, that may provide some insight into where the current debate is going to lead the Soviet Navy.

(1) Nature of the Doctrine. As previously discussed, perhaps the most repeated and fundamental changes in Soviet military doctrine concerns its basic goals. As recently as 1985, Colonel General Gareyev explained military doctrine as a

System of scientifically sound guiding views which are officially adopted in one or another state and concerns the essence, goals and nature of a war, the preparation of the nation and the armed forces for it and the methods of waging it.⁵⁰

However, by 1988, not quite two and one-half years later, Colonel General Gareyev explained that

...the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact is based on views directed not toward the preparation and

⁵⁰Gareyev, M.V. Frunze: Military Theorist, p. 325.

unleashing of a war but rather toward the prevention of war....⁵¹

Thus, prior to the official adoption of the new military doctrine in 1988, Soviet doctrine emphasized the goal of waging a war (and presumably winning it), the new doctrine, on the other hand, claims to be based on preventing it. Two goals that, at least at face value, would require a completely different force structure.

The primary means of ensuring that war is prevented, according to the new doctrine, is to guarantee "that neither side, while assuring its defense, has the forces or means enabling it to mount offensive operations."⁵² At first glance this does not seem to be a change in Soviet military doctrine at all. The Soviets have emphasized for years that their doctrine is defensive in nature. However, the new doctrine emphasized that there can be no possibility of offensive operations-the so-called non-offensive defense. The Soviets define non-offensive defense as the forces necessary to ensure that the defensive capabilities of the Warsaw Pact exceed the offensive capabilities of NATO and vice versa.⁵³ The blitzkrieg

⁵¹Gareyev, "Defense of the Homeland: Soviet Military Science," p. 5.

⁵²R.T. Yazov, "The Military Doctrine of the Warsaw Pact, A Doctrine of the Defense of Peace and Socialism," as cited in Garthoff, "New Thinking in Soviet Military Doctrine," p. 146.

⁵³Yazov, "The Military Doctrine of the Warsaw Pact, A Doctrine of the Defense of Peace and Socialism," p. 146.

operation is explicitly ruled out as a blatantly offensive concept.⁵⁴

The new doctrine also emphasizes that ensuring the proper security of the Soviet Union has become more of a political task than it has been in the past, and "can only be solved by political means."⁵⁵ Gorbachev stated this from the very first days he was in office, and it is a theme which is often repeated, mostly by the Soviet civilian analysts. One civilian analyst explained it as the "abrupt and profound politicization of traditionally military questions...(which) has occurred before our very eyes."⁵⁶ Gareyev, however, has acknowledged that the recent changes in the world, such as military, economic, and technological necessities previously discussed, have forced "a completely new approach to the problems of war and peace and a fundamental change in the thinking on these questions." This means an increased reliance on the "political arsenal" (an interesting choice of words) to "resolve international problems without resorting to armed violence."⁵⁷

⁵⁴S. Karagonov and A. Kostunov, "Reasonable Sufficiency--Or How to Break the Vicious Circle," Moscow New Times, No. 40, 12 October 1987, p. 14.

⁵⁵Gorbachev, Speech to 27th Party Congress as cited in Garthoff, "New Thinking in Soviet Military Doctrine," p. 131.

⁵⁶Kokoshin, "The Development of Military Affairs and Reduction of Armed Forces and Conventional Arms," p. 12.

⁵⁷Gareyev, "Defense of the Homeland: Soviet Military Science," pp. 1-2.

According to the Soviet military, the doctrine of non-offensive defense does not discount the possibility of countering Western military aggression as decisively as possible. This is another major area where there is obvious disagreement with the academicians. The actual wording of the new Warsaw Pact military doctrine states that "in the event of an attack they (the Warsaw Pact forces) will give a devastating rebuff to the aggressor."⁵⁸ It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to align the policy of non-offensive defense in which there is no possibility of offensive operations with devastating rebuffs--a choice of words that hardly connotes defensive operations. Furthermore, it is not only one or two Soviet military officers who emphasize this point, but several. It is also described as a crushing blow by Colonel General Gareyev, and Minister of Defense Yazov even goes so far as to say that the act of repelling the aggression,

...must be reliable and firm, stubborn and active, calculated to stop the aggressor's offensive, bleeding him, not permitting loss of territory, defeating the invading hostile forces. Defense alone, however, cannot defeat the aggressor. Therefore, after repulsing the attack, troops and fleets must be capable of waging a decisive offensive.⁵⁹

⁵⁸"On the Military Doctrine of the Warsaw Pact Member Staes," Pravda, 31 May 1987, p. 1.

⁵⁹R.T. Yazov, In Defense of Socialism and Peace, Moscow: Voenizdat, 1987, pp. 32-33, as cited in Garthoff, "New Thinking in Soviet Military Doctrine," p. 147.

It is quite clear from the preceding argument that the Soviet Union has not yet resolved precisely to what degree the military-technical aspect of doctrine will be subjugated to the political aspect, or precisely what is meant by non-offensive defense. It is clear that the civilian academicians do tend to stress the importance of political vice military solutions to solve world problems, while the military insists that it must maintain the capability to counter-attack and decisively defeat NATO forces should a war occur. The precise force levels needed to carry out these tasks is not yet clear, however, it is based upon the concept of "reasonable sufficiency," a concept which is so important in its relationship to the new Soviet military doctrine that it must be discussed separately.

(2) Reasonable Sufficiency. The concept of "reasonable sufficiency" has become the standard phrase used by most Soviet writers when explaining the basis of the new Soviet military doctrine. It is a phrase which obviously has not been officially defined, and therefore has different meaning for different parts of the Soviet leadership. The military's apparent definition is conspicuously different from the academicians'. The argument over the exact meaning of reasonable sufficiency, and how it is to be implemented in the Soviet Union, is important because it is a microcosm

of the larger debate that is presently taking place between the military and the academicians within Soviet society.

The concept of sufficiency is not a new one for the Soviets. It was used by the United States in the early 1970s as a justification for making reductions in strategic nuclear weapons. In Sea Power of the State, Admiral Gorshkov gave a very nice definition of sufficiency which he attributed to Western strategists. It is a definition that is surprisingly similar to the present definition used by the Soviets:

The concept of sufficiency...means the assured possibility of destruction of the military potential, human resources, and economic potential of the enemy even in the event of a retaliatory nuclear attack which is unfavorable to the United States, and also the ability to maintain her ability to fight in any situation.⁶⁰

Gorbachev has obviously been at the forefront of the campaign to limit the levels of weapons to reasonable sufficiency. At the 27th Congress of the CPSU Gorbachev stressed the importance of "limiting military potentials to reasonable sufficiency."⁶¹ According to Gorbachev's explanation, it is clear that sufficiency is being closely tied to the hardware reductions which

⁶⁰Gorshkov, Sea Power of the State, p. 235.

⁶¹M.S. Gorbachev, Political Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Moscow: Ploitzdat, 1986, as cited in Garthoff, "New Thinking in Soviet Military Doctrine," p. 131.

Gorbachev and the Soviet leadership have called for since 1986.

The Soviets make an important distinction between the two levels of sufficiency: conventional and strategic. Strategic sufficiency, it is repeatedly emphasized, is "determined by the necessity of not permitting a nuclear attack without retribution under any, even the most unfavorable circumstances."⁶² Presumably, the most unfavorable circumstances would be a situation in which the United States launched a surprise nuclear strike that caught the Soviets totally unprepared. The ability to retaliate, according to this definition, is still of the utmost importance, especially in an era of arms reductions.

The ability to retaliate and inflict unacceptable damage upon the enemy is a very important part of the Soviet idea of strategic stability at the nuclear level. However, at the conventional level "it is impossible to materially and practically implement a similar threat."⁶³ This means that conventional sufficiency cannot be tied to the concept of retaliation as easily as strategic sufficiency. At the conventional level, strategic stability can only be guaranteed by ensuring that the defensive capabilities of one side exceed the offensive capabilities

⁶²Yazov, "The Military Doctrine of the Warsaw Pact, A Doctrine of the Defense of Peace and Socialism," p. 140.

⁶³Kokoshin, "The Development of Military Affairs and Reduction of Armed Forces and Conventional Arms," p. 18.

of the other, and vice versa. This is why the concept of non-offensive defense is so important, it ensures strategic stability at the conventional level.

The practical problems of ensuring that each side has stronger defensive capabilities than the offensive capabilities of the other are numerous. It is difficult to discern the precise constitution of a strictly defensive weapon and, even if such an agreement could be reached, it would obviously require a massive change in the force structure of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In any case, this would require that reductions of some type be initiated before reasonable sufficiency could become a reality. Perhaps this is why the Soviets also repeatedly emphasize that the levels of conventional sufficiency are dependent upon the actions of the United States and NATO. Securing the ability to retaliate with nuclear weapons is not a bilateral problem (as long as the Strategic Defense Initiative is not deployed), but developing proportionally stronger defensive forces most certainly is. Until the U.S. and NATO agree to also make some force reductions conventional sufficiency will not be realized. Of course this is the primary argument of the Soviet military which is understandably hesitant to make unilateral reductions.

The Soviet military draws very close parallels between the concept of reasonable sufficiency and strategic military parity. This becomes an important

distinction because having the ability to retaliate and inflict unacceptable damage upon the enemy does not necessarily require strategic nuclear parity, and yet the Soviet military continues to insist that "the bounds of reasonable sufficiency of military capabilities are closely associated with...maintaining strategic military parity between the USSR and the U.S."⁶⁴

The academicians, in sharp contrast to the military, do not emphasize the need to equate reasonable sufficiency with strategic parity. In fact, one academic from the Institute of U.S.A. and Canadian Studies even suggested that, on an absolute scale, true reasonable sufficiency can mean armed forces at levels that are even less than the enemy's.⁶⁵ There has also been the suggestion from the civilian sector that the Soviet military reevaluate its basic premise for its force levels. For years the Soviets have stressed that their armed strength must be capable of dealing with all potential enemies--a requirement that would help to partly explain the large size of the Soviet military. However, now such a policy is being criticized as "totally unrealistic."⁶⁶ Instead, reasonable

⁶⁴Skorodenko, "Military Parity and the Principle of Reasonable Sufficiency," p. 20.

⁶⁵L. Semeiko, "Academic Roundtable on Meaning of Reasonable Sufficiency," XX Century and Peace, December 1987, p. 17.

⁶⁶Karagonov, "Reasonable Sufficiency--Or How to Break the Vicious Circle," p. 14.

sufficiency should only be at a level sufficient to ensure that the enemy "not be able to count on either a 'local blitzkrieg' or on escalating such a conflict with impunity."⁶⁷

Not surprisingly, the civilian Soviet analysts also tend to emphasize that the concept of reasonable sufficiency is primarily a political idea: "The basic premise of this concept is that security is primarily a political problem....The dominant role in this complex is played by political factors."⁶⁸ As a political concept it implies that the problems of security must be solved by means other than armed conflict, because armed conflict leads to war which will inevitably become nuclear, a situation in which no one wins and the fundamental security of the Soviet Union has not been maintained.

Thus, there is no clear definition of reasonable sufficiency at this time. It is obvious that it is meant to reduce both the qualitative and the quantitative levels of weapons while ensuring that both sides reduce their offensive capabilities to such a level that offensive blitzkrieg operations become impossible. It is a concept which is meant to promote the Soviet idea of strategic stability which to the military means rough nuclear parity.

⁶⁷Karagonov, "Reasonable Sufficiency--Or How to Break the Vicious Circle," p. 14.

⁶⁸Karagonov, "Reasonable Sufficiency--Or How to Break the Vicious Circle," p. 13.

In fact, from the military's perspective if the word "parity" was substituted for "sufficiency" in most of their publications no essential meaning would be lost. It is apparent that the concept of parity, which the Soviet military feels it had to fight so hard to gain, a policy which, in the attitude of many Soviet leaders, forced the United States to the negotiating table for the first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, will only be relinquished grudgingly, and probably not without a fight. This is an attitude that is probably shared by the more conservative members of the CPSU, and may be an indication of just how much difficulty Gorbachev is going to have actually implementing his new policies--especially in the beloved Soviet military.

(3) Arms Control Proposals. What does the Soviet Navy have to do with the new Soviet military doctrine? This is an extremely relevant question since the doctrine tends to be full of very general, philosophical, and rather vague concepts which say nothing specifically about the Soviet Navy or its future role as an important part of the Soviet military structure. Reasonable sufficiency, non-offensive defense, or strategic stability are only ideas, not force structuring guides or war planning documents. It is possible that these ideas could reflect a change in the building rate or pattern of the Soviet Navy,

but this may not become apparent until the next Five-Year Plan is implemented in 1991.

It is for these reasons that it is imperative to take a very close look at the Soviet arms control proposals, especially in the naval arms arena. The Soviets have repeatedly stated that their arms control proposals are a reflection of the "new thinking" on military doctrine. Therefore, at best these proposals are a specific and concrete example of what the Soviets are attempting to convey by their new military doctrine. At worst, and probably more likely, these proposals are a reflection of real Soviet concerns combined with a proper amount of propaganda to confuse the Western negotiators and keep the Western analysts guessing about the true Soviet intentions.

The Soviets have made several different proposals with respect to navies, such as verifying the presence of nuclear weapons on board ships or establishing nuclear-free zones, which will not be discussed here. Only the more relevant proposals that deal with the operational nature of navies will be reviewed.⁶⁹

Since Gorbachev came into power, the Soviets have increasingly criticized the idea that the primary risk of war is on land. With the build-up of naval forces in certain oceanic regions, especially the Greenland,

⁶⁹See, for example, C.A.H. Trost, "The Soviet Naval Arms Control Offensive," Vital Speeches, Vol. LIV, No. 14, 1 May 1988.

Norway, Northern, and Baltic Seas, it has become more and more probable that a future war would begin on the sea.⁷⁰ Accordingly, Gorbachev made one of his first concrete proposals for reducing this "tension" in his speech delivered in Vladivostok in July 1986. In this speech Gorbachev made three important proposals for naval arms control. First, Gorbachev suggested that the activity of ships equipped with nuclear arms be limited; secondly, that a limitation should be established on the competition and sphere of ASW weapons; thirdly, that ASW activity should be banned from "certain zones" of the Pacific as a confidence building measure.⁷¹ None of these proposals was very specific, but they did indicate that Gorbachev was quite ready to bring naval forces into the arms control arena.

The Vladivostok speech was followed by several other speeches over the next year in which naval arms control proposals were again repeated. Gorbachev emphasized that naval arms control was a regional issue, and subsequently provided one important speech in each of the major regions of concern such as Murmansk and Belgrade. In other speeches Gorbachev also mentioned the need to limit ASW activity within certain unnamed and unspecified zones. From these speeches it is apparent that Gorbachev is

⁷⁰see, for example, Nikolay Chervov, Moscow Television Service, 1800 GMT, 22 January 1988, FBIS-SOV-88-015, p. 9.

⁷¹S. Gorbachev, 28 July 1986 speech in Vladivostok, Moscow Television Service, 1986, FBIS-SOV-86-145, p. 1.

primarily concerned with two operational aspects of NATO's navies: ASW warfare and the sea launched cruise missile.

The attempts by Gorbachev to create ASW-free zones does not reflect a new and unique idea. As early as 1973 a book was published in the United States that specifically addressed the issue of SSBN sanctuaries and ASW-free zones.⁷² In 1981, Leonid Brezhnev, addressing the 26th Congress of the CPSU, recommended "limiting the deployment of new (SSBN) submarines" within certain sanctuaries.⁷³ The thrust of Brezhnev's proposals continued to be carried by Admiral Gorshkov who more specifically claimed that the goal was the "withdrawal of the two sides' missile-carrying submarines from vast regions of their present patrolling and on the reduction of their movement to mutually agreed limits."⁷⁴ The proposals to limit SSBN operating areas to predesignated sanctuaries continued and seemed to reach their peak in 1983. The U.S. negotiators refused to discuss any limitations on SSBN operations and the proposals eventually died.

Gorbachev's proposals have specifically been for the limitation of ASW activity, and not the

⁷²K. Tsipis, A. Cahn, and B. Feld, The Future of the Sea-Based Deterrent, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1973. See especially chapters six and seven.

⁷³L.I. Brezhnev, Speech at 26th Congress of the CPSU, Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1981, p. 39.

⁷⁴S. Gorshkov, "Great Victory: Its Importance, Its Lessons," APN Daily Review, 29 April 1982, p. 5.

establishment of SSBN sanctuaries. However, Gorshkov's successor, Admiral Chernavin, did mention on at least one occasion the failure of the U.S. to agree to the withdrawal of SSBNs from the ocean expanses into agreed sanctuaries.⁷⁵ In addition, the Soviet Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies published an article in which it recommended the establishment of SSBN sanctuaries away from areas where pre-emptive strikes could be made against certain early warning, command, control and communications systems.⁷⁶ In any event, ASW-free zones and SSBN sanctuaries would both achieve the same goal for the Soviets: helping to ensure the protection of the SSBN and therefore enabling it to successfully complete its assigned missions. Therefore, these current proposals of Gorbachev's are by no means new but are simply using a different means to achieve the same end.

Gorbachev has made no specific proposal to limit the operating areas of the SSBN. The only proposal made by Gorbachev in which he mentioned placing limitations on the operating areas of ships carrying nuclear weapons was in an interview with the Indonesian newspaper Merdeka. In this interview Gorbachev said,

⁷⁵N. Chernavin, "Oceangoing, Missile Carrying. Today is USSR Navy Day," Moskovskaya Pravda, 26 July 1987, p. 3.

⁷⁶A.G. Arbatov, A.A. Vasilev, and A.A. Kokoshin, "Nuclear Weapons and Strategic Stability," SSHA: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiya, No. 9, September 1987, p. 5.

It would be possible to agree to limit the area of navigation by ships carrying nuclear weapons in such a way that they could not approach the coast of any side to within the range of operations of their on-board nuclear systems.⁷⁷

It is clear from the above explanation that Gorbachev is making a reference to sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) and not SLBMs.

The SLCM is obviously of great concern for the Soviets and in fact was called "an integral part of the historic program for eliminating nuclear weapons by the year 2000."⁷⁸ The SLCM represents a PGM which is capable of carrying a nuclear warhead. The Soviets fear that any progress made in reducing strategic nuclear weapons or restricting naval activity would be meaningless if the SLCM cannot also be eliminated.

The Soviets have not made it clear if the proposal for establishing an ASW-free zone is meant to be only a peacetime proposal or if it is intended to also be valid during war. There is no precedent for an agreement restricting the operations of a weapons platform in wartime that was not violated. The agreement banning chemical warfare was followed by most (but not all) countries during World War II but that was clearly in the best interest of

⁷⁷B.M. Diah, "Answers by M.S. Gorbachev to Questions from the Indonesian Newspaper Merdeka," Pravda, 23 July 1987, p. 1.

⁷⁸V. Kalugin, "On the Sea and Oceans: The Naval Aspect of International Security," Pravda, 28 April 1988, p. 1.

both the Axis and Allied powers. It is not so apparent that an agreement limiting ASW activity from certain zones during a war would be so mutually advantageous. However, the very fact that the Soviets have again started to mention establishing ASW-free zones or SSBN sanctuaries is significant. An ASW-free zone or SSBN sanctuary literally amounts to a legalized bastion. It indicates that, at least for the present time, the Soviets are still concerned about the protection of their SSBN force. The reason for this increased concern will be made clear later.

(4) Hardware. From a hardware analysis perspective, which would naturally include the Soviet ship construction program, there is little that can currently be used to indicate that the Soviets are truly following their reasonable sufficiency policy: reducing force structures to increasingly lower levels. As pointed out in Chapter I, there can be as much as a 20 year lag between the adoption of an idea and its full assimilation. Therefore, significant hardware changes may not become evident until after the turn of the century.

At present, the Soviets are still building the Typhoon, Delta IV, Akula, Sierra, Victor III, several classes of surface warships, and of course, their new aircraft carrier. As previously mentioned, it is hardly surprising that the Soviets have not reduced their building rate because they would naturally be hesitant to do so

unless the West, particularly the United States, agreed to do so as well. Furthermore, even if the Soviets do adopt the policy of reducing their naval construction rate it is possible that this would not become evident until the next five year plan is implemented in 1991.

Meanwhile, despite the rhetoric, the Soviet Navy's shipbuilding program has been moving along at a healthy pace in the current five year program (1986-1990). The growth in defense spending assured by the current five year plan has been used to develop fewer ships in absolute numbers. However, the ships that are being built are of a higher quality, and in some cases a very significant increase in quality, over previous classes.⁷⁹

Among the construction programs for surface warships the new Soviet aircraft carrier has attracted by far the most attention among Western analysts. There are currently two of these carriers under construction with the first, now called Tblisi instead of Brezhnev "for political reasons," expected to commence sea trials late in 1989.⁸⁰ At a recent conference, the Soviets claimed that the new carrier is only slightly larger than the Kiev class and, in fact, was nothing more than a continuation of this class (an incredible assertion considering that the Kiev displaces about 40,000 tons and Western estimates of the new carrier

⁷⁹Soviet Military Power 1988, pp. 35-38.

⁸⁰Barnett, "Memorandum for the Record," p. 4.

have put it at 60,000-70,000 tons). It is not yet clear if the Soviets intend to operate conventional take off and landing (CTOL) aircraft from the new carrier but there have been reports of testing of the associated systems.⁸¹

It is difficult to understand the significance of the new aircraft carrier at this time. Only two are currently being built and the first is still not operational. At such a rate it could be well into the next century before the new aircraft carriers are built in sufficient numbers to have any appreciable effect on the naval balance.

The Kirov class, the largest non-aircraft carrier warships built in the world since World War Two, currently has three operational units with a fourth under construction. Incredibly, the Soviets recently complained that the Kirov was a wasted effort because it has no use except for Third World operations which are of less interest than before.⁸² In addition to the Kirov the Soviets are also currently constructing at least one Slava class cruiser, as well as one Sovremenny and three Udaloy class destroyers.

⁸¹William O. Studeman, Director of Naval Intelligence, Statement before the Sea Power and Strategic and Critical Materials Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on Intelligence Issues, 1 March 1988, pp. 34-35.

⁸²Barnett, "Memorandum for the Record," p. 4.

The Soviets have also continued to make significant improvements in their nuclear powered attack submarine force. The Victor III and follow-on submarines have made considerable advances in sound quieting. The Akula is a particularly quiet platform which has caused some concern among Western Naval officers, especially in light of the illegal transfer of milling machines and sophisticated software to the Soviets by Kongsberg Vaapenfabrikk and Toshiba Machine Ltd. With the traditional three to one disadvantage in submarines, the United States Navy had been able to assume that its advantage in submarine acoustic performance would make up for this numerical superiority on the part of the Soviets. However, the advances in sound quieting that the Soviets have accomplished in their latest generation of submarines, combined with their "ongoing/dynamic noise control and reduction programs," will inevitably require a change in submarine warfare tactics.⁸³ Tactically, submarine warfare may be reduced to an old West gunfighter story--he who shoots first wins. In either case, "a simple reality of acoustic parity is this: US subs are going to get jumped by Soviet subs, and probably more often than the force cares to admit."⁸⁴

⁸³Studeman, Statement before House Armed Services Committee on Intelligence Issues, p. 30.

⁸⁴Kevin, Peppe, "Acoustic Showdown for the SSBNs," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, July 1987, p. 35.

However, the Soviet SSN force is not without its problems and, depending on one's perspective, these problems could prove to be quite serious in the near future. There are currently 27 first line SSNs in the Soviet inventory of the Akula, Sierra, and Victor III type. Moreover, "in 1985, about 20 percent of the entire 'active' Soviet submarine fleet was at least 30 years old; over ~~one-~~ half was more than 20 years of age."⁸⁵ With such a massive block obsolescence facing its submarine fleet (including ballistic missile submarines) there will eventually be a significant impact upon the Soviet submarine force structure.

In fact, the submarine fleet, which numbered 458 total units in 1985, "by 1995 can plausibly be expected to count altogether about 250 units," or almost a fifty percent reduction in ten years.⁸⁶ Of course, this number assumes about 60 SSBNs by 1995, a number that may become considerably smaller, in fact, if current arms control proposals become a reality.

The backbone of the modern Soviet SSBN fleet are the five Typhoons and five Delta IVs currently (1988) stationed in the Northern Fleet. At least part of the Delta IV fleet is rumored to be transferring to the

⁸⁵Jan Breemer, "The Future of the Soviet Submarine Fleet," Armed Forces, January 1988, p. 38.

⁸⁶Breemer, "The Future of the Soviet Submarine Fleet," p. 38.

Pacific fleet within the next few years, but the Typhoons will probably remain in the Northern fleet because of their capability to operate under ice.⁸⁷

The current START proposal of limiting warheads on ICBMs to 4,900 could severely limit SSBN production. A 4,900 warhead limit has been accepted by both sides, but the difference in positions is presently focused on the proper split of the 4,900 warheads between ICBMs and SLBMs. The United States is asking for a limit of 3,300 warheads on ICBMs with a preferred limit of 3,000. The Soviets, on the other hand, have countered with a recommendation of a limit of 3,300 SLBM warheads.⁸⁸ Assuming the U.S. position is eventually agreed upon, this would leave a total of 1900 SLBM warheads. As Table 5 indicates, with the current inventory of Typhoon and Delta IVs alone, the Soviets already have 1320 SLBM warheads. If a future Soviet SSBN force was eventually to be comprised of only Delta IVs and the Typhoon, then Table 6 shows that if the U.S. proposal of 1900 SLBM warheads is accepted then this could mean a SSBN force of seven Typhoons and seven Delta IVs. If the higher Soviet level of 3300 SLBM warheads is accepted, this could mean a force of 12 Typhoons and 14

⁸⁷Studeman, Statement before the House Armed Services Committee on Intelligence Issues, p. 32.

⁸⁸Steven Hildreth, Al Tinajero, and Amy Woolf, START: A Current Assessment of U.S. and Soviet Positions, CRS Report for Congress, 3 June 1988, p. 2.

TABLE 5

CURRENT TYPHOON AND DELTA IV WARHEAD TOTAL

<u>SSBN</u>	<u>Missile</u>	<u>Number of Tubes</u>	<u>Number of Warheads</u>	<u>Number of Boats</u>	<u>Total Warheads</u>
Typhoon	SS-N-20	20	10	5	1000
Delta IV	SS-N-23	16	4	5	<u>320</u>
Total:					1320

Note: The numbers of warheads per missile have been previously agreed upon in the START talks. The Arms Control Reporter, December 1987, p.6.11.d.71.

TABLE 6

POTENTIAL STRUCTURE OF FUTURE SOVIET SSBN
FLEET UNDER CURRENT START PROPOSALS

	<u>U.S. Limit</u> (1900 SLBM Warheads)	<u>Soviet Limit</u> (3300 SLBM Warheads)
Typhoon	7	12
Delta IV	7	14
Total	14	26
Warheads	1848	3296

Delta IVs. The Soviets obviously could build more boats if they decided to put all of their future warheads on Delta IVs (or they could theoretically place all warheads on ICBMs), but the point to be made here is that their SSBN force would still be considerably smaller than the 60 SSBNs permitted under the existing SALT agreements. In fact, it is possible that the Soviet SSBN force could be up to 77

percent smaller if the U.S. goal of 1,900 SLBM warheads is accepted.

A smaller number of SSBNs to protect could have a serious effect upon the naval aspects of Soviet military strategy in the event of a future conventional war. However, the Director of Naval Intelligence, Admiral Studeman, has stated quite clearly that at present the Soviets would use 75 percent of their attack submarine force to conduct sea control or sea denial operations to protect their SSBN force.⁸⁹ Furthermore, he explained that only 25 percent (or the full remainder of the attack submarine force) would be used for out of area operations in the Northern and Pacific fleets. Of the remaining 25 percent "the Soviets will probably dedicate a number of their most modern SSNs (Victor III, Sierra, Akula, and follow ons) to strategic ASW missions."⁹⁰

The Soviet Navy's Northern Fleet currently has 136 submarines of all types excluding the SSBNs. This total would include all of the older diesel submarines as well as the older Type I nuclear submarines such as the Echo--not exactly modern ships of the line. If only 25 percent of these boats are used for out of area operations then this would leave only 34 boats. Assuming that all of

⁸⁹Studeman, Statement before the House Armed Services Committee on Intelligence Issues, p. 4.

⁹⁰Studeman, Statement before the House Armed Services Committee on Intelligence Issues, p. 10.

their submarines were operational and one-third were on station while one-third were in port and the remaining one-third was en route, this would leave at most only 11 submarines to conduct other than pro-SSBN tasks, including SLOC interdiction. The 11 boats would have to be further divided so that some of them could conduct strategic ASW operations against Western SSBNs. It is difficult to determine precisely how many submarines the Soviets would dedicate to strategic ASW, but assuming that it would be at least one and not more than half of the available total, this would leave only six to ten boats to conduct SLOC interdiction in the Atlantic with even fewer in the Pacific.

(5) Exercises/Operations. Since 1984, which appeared to be a peak year, there has been a very slow but steady decline in the Soviet tempo of operations, and a reduction in the scope of their exercises. Since 1986, all major Soviet naval exercises have been conducted "in waters close to the Soviet mainland." This is a definite change in the pattern evident prior to 1985 when the Soviet Navy's exercises were generally on a much more geographically expansive scale and "demonstrated the (Soviet) Navy's growing capabilities to expand its combat operating areas in the Atlantic and Pacific."⁹¹

⁹¹Studeman, Statement before the House Armed Services Committee on Intelligence Issues, pp. 39-40.

Operationally, the average number of submarines deployed per day decreased from 46 to 25 between 1984 and 1987, while the average number of surface warships deployed per day decreased from 31 to 24 during the same period.⁹² The number of days that Soviet ships operated out of area was reduced by six percent between 1986 and 1987 and, for the first time in this decade, no Soviet ship made a Caribbean cruise during 1987. However, the Yankee SSBNs which discontinued their typical deployments off of the U.S. East coast, recently returned to their normal deployment pattern after almost a one year hiatus.⁹³

In both 1985 and 1987 there was a major deployment of Soviet Victor IIIs into the Atlantic off of the U.S. East coast. It is interesting to note that the number of Victor IIIs reportedly deployed was six, a number which correlates to the expected number of Soviet SSNs that will conduct SLOC interdiction in the event of a future war.⁹⁴ Such a small number does not seem significant unless it is recalled that the Germans sank 1,150,675 gross registered tons of shipping in American waters between

⁹²Michael Gordon, "Soviets Scale Back Naval Deployments and Large Exercises," New York Times, 17 July 1988, p. 1.

⁹³"Soviet Yankees Resume U.S. Patrol," Jane's Defense Weekly, 30 July 1988, p. 154.

⁹⁴"SLCMs in Range of USA in Soviet Exercises," Jane's Defense Weekly, 18 April 1987, p. 699.

January and April 1942, with an average of only six to eight U-boats.⁹⁵

C. SUMMATION

There is no doubt that at least the political aspects of Soviet military doctrine have changed. However, the critical question is if and how this change in the political aspects of military doctrine will affect Soviet military strategy, specifically the naval aspects of Soviet military strategy.

It is clear that the Soviets are serious when they discuss the reduction of nuclear force levels and the elimination of all offensive weapons. Gorbachev has envisioned a world in which the levels of weapons will be increasingly reduced until they are only reasonably sufficient for defensive purposes. Nuclear weapons are especially significant because, in a world in which a nuclear interchange would be catastrophic, they have lost their significance as a viable weapon of war.

The arms control issues which seem to be gaining momentum are also a reflection of Gorbachev's increased emphasis on political solutions. The Soviet proposals for the establishment of ASW-free zones is an indication that they will continue to concern themselves with the protection of their strategic nuclear forces at sea until nuclear

⁹⁵Breemer, "The Future of the Soviet Submarine Fleet," p. 40.

weapons are eliminated. This is especially true as the numbers of SSBNs are reduced due to the START proposals.

The START proposals are still not a signed treaty--but there is no reason to believe at this point that they will not soon be a signed and ratified reality that both the Soviet and the U.S. Navy will have to learn to live with. Despite the disagreements on the number of warheads that each side will be permitted to deploy on land and at sea, it is apparent that the resulting Soviet SSBN force will be significantly smaller; and as the Soviet SSBN fleet becomes smaller its protection will become even more critical. After the START agreements each Soviet SSBN that is lost could represent as much as 5 percent of their total SSBN force (instead of about 1.5 percent) and, if the target were a fully loaded Typhoon, a little over 10 percent of the Soviet Union's total number of sea based nuclear warheads. At this rate, the losses could build up very quickly. Considering the Soviet penchant for the mathematical correlation of forces, this is a fact that they cannot, and no doubt will not, ignore.

The hardware evidence does not correlate well with the Soviet rhetoric on their new military doctrine. The fact remains that the Soviet Navy has not made any significant reductions in the construction rate of warships. However, there is no reason to expect any reductions in their force structure at this point. Gorbachev is still apparently in

the process of convincing the military of the soundness of his new ideas, and he would probably rather convince than coerce.

Even if the entire military and senior CPSU leadership completely agreed with Gorbachev's initiatives tomorrow, it would be several years before there would be a corresponding change in Soviet naval hardware that properly reflected this agreement. This is the basic problem of dealing with changes in force structure. It literally takes years to build a modern naval warship and the ships that are being built today were based upon decisions that could have been made 15 to 20 years ago. There is a tremendous amount of bureaucratic inertia in a system as large as the Soviet's, and even once the decision to make changes is made, it will probably take a few years before the Soviet shipyards can respond and begin making actual changes.

There has been a very noticeable decrease in the Soviet Navy's operational tempo and a reduction in the scale of their exercises. However, the primary problem of analyzing operations and exercises is determining the cause and effect. It is very tempting to say that the recent reduction in the operational rate and exercises was caused by the economic restraints that Gorbachev has been emphasizing. Operating a modern navy is undeniably an expensive undertaking. But there are other possibilities to explain this reduction. It seems just as possible that the Soviet Navy is trying to

keep a low profile while Gorbachev pursues his political solutions. The Soviet Navy operating at an increased rate or flexing their muscles by exercising on a global scale would seem oddly incongruous with Gorbachev's cry for a reduction of military tensions.

In any case, this chapter has primarily focused on patterns. In spite of the flaws that are possible in any type of analysis, these Soviet actions do seem to fit a pattern. It is a pattern of "clues" that hint at a search for political solutions, prevention of war, elimination of nuclear weapons, and reduction in force levels. A pattern motivated by economic, military, and technological problems that the Soviets felt they could no longer afford to ignore. Finally, it is a pattern which has resulted in a definite shift in emphasis that could have long term effects on the future of the naval aspects of Soviet military strategy--especially the bastions.

VI. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

I know from experience that the leaders of the armed forces can be very persistent in claiming their share when it comes time to allocate funds. Every commander has all sorts of very convincing arguments why he should get more than anyone else. Unfortunately there's a tendency for people who run the armed forces to be greedy and self-seeking. They're always ready to throw in your face the slogan 'If you try to economize on the country's defenses today, you'll pay in blood when war breaks out tomorrow.' I'm not denying that these men have a huge responsibility, and I'm not impugning their moral qualities. But the fact remains that the living standard of the country suffers when the budget is overloaded with allocations to unproductive branches of consumption. And today, as yesterday, the most unproductive expenditures of all are those made on the armed forces.¹

A. FINDINGS

Table 7 indicates the evidentiary support uncovered in this research for the basic assumptions under Gorbachev and compares it to the evidence for the 1971 to 1985 Brezhnev period. There is still no evidence for using the SSBN as a unique withholding platform. However, even if the possibility did exist before, there have been a few changes since 1985 that could resolve this question once and for all. The Soviet have developed two new mobile ICBM systems, the rail-mobile SS-24 and the road-mobile SS-25. Mobile ICBMs present a very difficult targeting problem and can not only potentially survive a first strike, but could also be

¹N. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1970, p. 519.

TABLE 7

COMPARISON OF THE SUPPORTING EVIDENCE FOR
THE SIX BASIC ASSUMPTIONS

<u>Assumptions</u>	<u>Evidence: 1971-1985</u>	<u>Evidence: 1985-1988</u>
SSBN Withholding	None	None
SSBN Warfighting	Strong	Moderate
Sloc Interdiction	Moderate	Moderate
Soviet Conventional Navy	Strong	Strong
Land War/Conventional War in Europe	Moderate	Strong
Nuclear Escalation/ War Termination	None	None

withheld from a preemptive strike for political leverage. Withholding implies survivability, and the new mobile ICBM systems are certainly more survivable.

Furthermore, at the START talks the Soviets have proposed that no more than 3300 of the 4900 ballistic missile warheads be placed on submarines. Although the Soviet position is probably meant to limit the number of U.S. sea-based warheads, if taken at one extreme to mean literally 3300 sea-based warheads such a proposal could mean that 67 percent of the Soviet ballistic missile warheads would be on SLBMs. If this proposal was eventually accepted it seems very unlikely that the Soviets would withhold 67 percent of their ballistic missile force from a first strike, whether preemptive or retaliatory. On the other

hand, under the Soviet proposal all 4900 of their warheads could be based on ICBMs although this seems to be very unlikely. Realistically, the Soviets would probably prefer to maintain a balance between their SLBMs and ICBMs which is proportionally similar to the present balance. Obviously, these issues cannot be decided until there is an agreement between the two sides on the START proposals.

There is still strong evidence that the Soviets believe the SSBN to be a very important part of their navy. Admiral Chernavin still refers to the SSBN as "the main arm of the Navy," a statement that could have come straight from Gorshkov.² However, no Soviet military officer or academician under Gorbachev has stated that the SSBN can influence or effect the course and outcome of a war. This may be due to the fundamental change in Soviet rhetoric about a future war. Conventional war will eventually become a nuclear war, and "nuclear war cannot be won." If nuclear war cannot be won, then the SSBNs role is no longer one of helping to ensure victory but strictly to deter war by guaranteeing a retaliatory strike. This would be a slightly different mission for the SSBN than existed under Gorshkov. Now, its role appears to be cast primarily as a deterrent--a definite downgrade from a warfighting perspective.

²N. Chernavin, "The Ocean Watch for the Motherland," Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 28 July 1985, p. 3.

There simply has not been a sufficient amount of evidence since 1985 to indicate that the relative importance of the SLOC interdiction mission of the Soviet Navy has changed. It still appears to be an important mission but not a primary mission. The appearance of the Victor IIIs off of the U.S. East coast the previous two years could be an indication that this role is being upgraded, however, by themselves these exercises are insufficient evidence.

There is still strong evidence that the Soviet conventional navy would primarily be used to protect the SSBNs within their bastions. There are too few carriers in the current Soviet inventory to assume that they represent a new power projection role for the Soviet Navy. The fact that it is conventionally powered would seem to indicate that the new carrier is meant to expand Soviet air cover further out to sea instead of conducting power projection missions--but it is still too early to tell. The rest of the conventional navy, including the SSNs, are being built at a slower rate but at a higher quality.

There is no change in the Soviet perception of the importance of the Central European front. However, the Soviets seem to be even more convinced that a future war would at least start as a prolonged conventional war. The conventional war would inevitably become nuclear, but the Soviets are not fatalists. Despite the fact that the Soviets have repeatedly emphasized the inevitable escalation

of a war to the nuclear level, and despite the fact that they insist nuclear war cannot be won, the conventional phase has become more important. The fact that conventional weapons are becoming more accurate and lethal in their effects portends a future world in which conventional weapons are going to be a greater concern than nuclear weapons. By eliminating nuclear weapons this logic would demand that war could now be won, therefore, conventional warfare should not be ignored.

There is still no evidence that the Soviets would agree to war termination if their SSBNs are attrited. Furthermore, no Soviet author ever stated that the destruction of SSBNs in time of war might be considered an escalatory act that will necessarily lead to a nuclear exchange. This seems to be a concern mainly among certain groups of non-Soviet writers.

Thus, the evidence indicates that, under Gorbachev, the significance of the SSBN has decreased, and that more emphasis has been placed on fighting a conventional war. If the next war is more likely to be a prolonged conventional war, then it seems logical that the role of the SSBN will be deemphasized. It is also possible that the U.S. Navy's publicly declared Maritime Strategy which has specifically mentioned the SSBN as one of its primary targets has also led to this deemphasis on its role. There is, however, still strong evidence that the protection of

the SSBN in bastions is as important as it was up to 1985. In fact, as the numbers of SSBNs are reduced by future arms control proposals, their protection will become even more important.

B. CONCLUSIONS

The Maritime Strategy has been often criticized for having too many different meanings for too many different people. It is a strategy that gathered its principal intellectual roots at the turn of this century. It has been occasionally reduced to an argument between the maritime and continental schools of strategy; it has been criticized for being too expensive or too inherently escalatory. These arguments, however, overlook a most critical point: the Maritime Strategy is a warfighting strategy, and it gives the people who will be thinking about the war and actually fighting the war a common ground that they can use to anchor their ideas. It provides a critical structural framework that can be used to find answers to what is an extremely complex and important problem: the use of the U.S. Navy in a future war.

No one has ever claimed that the Maritime Strategy was meant to be the complete solution to the U.S. Navy's future problems. The many disagreements that have occurred are healthy and ultimately to the Navy's benefit. The U.S. Navy does not claim to have all of the answers; it was a bold step to present the strategy to the public for all to see

and criticize. The numerous opinions that have been written on the Maritime Strategy (and they are almost too numerous to count) indicate that the strategic planners in the U.S. and Europe are still thinking very seriously about the Navy's role in a future war. Up to a point the Navy can make use of their insight.

Finally, the Maritime Strategy must be considered an expression of the confidence of the U.S. Navy that it is more than capable of handling the Soviet Navy. It is a fundamental acknowledgement by the U.S. Navy that it is good enough to operate in what are generally perceived to be Soviet home waters whether the Soviets like it or not. Although this fact is seldom if ever mentioned by the more outspoken critics of the Maritime Strategy, after years of negativism about the abysmal military situation in Central Europe, such an outspoken expression of confidence is a relief, it is a sign of hope for both the United States and our Allies. It is also a message that the Soviets could not have missed and, although this cannot be proven, the openly aggressive nature of the Maritime Strategy may have played an important part in forcing the Soviets to reassess their military doctrine.

These are the main benefits of the Maritime Strategy as it has been developed in the 1980s. Other benefits are important, but secondary.

However, for better or for worse, the coming to power of Mikhail Gorbachev in the Soviet Union has had deep implications for the world, and the Maritime Strategy is no exception. If nothing else, Gorbachev has forced the U.S. Navy to reassess its strategy, not necessarily change it. It is quite possible that ten years from now it will become clear that despite all of the rhetoric, Gorbachev has not really changed anything, and all of the worry was about nothing. But, in the author's opinion, this seems to be extremely unlikely.

Gorbachev has made it abundantly clear that changes will be made, even if unprecedented measures must be taken to see them through. These changes unquestionably will affect the Soviet military; to a certain extent they already have. The Soviets have signed the INF treaty, and continue to show a very high interest in arms control, and they are currently pulling out of Afghanistan. But the critical question, the question this thesis has researched, is to what extent has Gorbachev really introduced changes into the Soviet military and what are the possible implications of these changes for the Maritime Strategy? Specifically, do these changes also affect the primary mission of the Soviet Navy: protecting its SSBNs in well guarded bastions?

The question is relevant because the bastion concept is one of the central assumptions of the Maritime Strategy. If the bastion concept is no longer the critical linkage

between the Maritime Strategy and the naval aspects of Soviet military strategy (which is directly influenced by the new Soviet military doctrine), then changes must be made. It is the primary conclusion of this research that the bastion concept will remain an important linkage to the Maritime Strategy, although it is becoming clearer that, if Gorbachev is successful, important changes will be made. It is simply too early to determine if these changes will alter the Soviet priority for protecting their SSBN force.

There is another option that must be discussed. Even if the Soviets do not decide to protect their SSBNs as thoroughly as the West expects, this does not have to fundamentally alter the basic strategical concepts promulgated in the Maritime Strategy. It may still be necessary to conduct a forward offensive because it remains the best strategical option. In either case, such a change would inevitably alter the operational and tactical aspects of the strategy if the Soviet Navy decided to be more aggressive.

The most difficult problem is discerning whether the new Soviet military doctrine is really new. There does indeed appear to have been a change in the political aspects of the doctrine. However, there still does not appear to be a significant change in the military-technical aspect of the doctrine. Colonel General Gareyev, repeating a theme that is appearing with great frequency, insists that "no state

can guarantee its security by military-technical means alone. The political moves of many countries are acquiring more and more importance."³ However, it is easy to say that the new political goal is the prevention of war and is therefore based upon the principle of reasonable sufficiency--but what does this say about the actual force structure? The war that the Soviets want to prevent is war with the West; they have never said that they will not continue to support wars of national liberation or other wars which may help them to achieve their goals.

The military still considers the military-technical aspect of Soviet military doctrine to be their area of responsibility, and as long as it remains this way they will be reluctant to sacrifice an offensively capable force structure. They will continue to argue that such a structure is necessary if an aggressor is to be firmly repelled. Furthermore, why should the Soviet military give up some of their valuable hardware now if many in the West are willing to believe that the "new thinking" on defensive doctrine signifies a lessening of the Soviet threat-even if no vital changes in force structure are made? Threat levels are a matter of perception, and the enemy's perception of one's true capabilities can be controlled to a certain

³M. Gareyev, "Five Goals of Current Military Doctrine," Soviet Military Review, No. 12, December 1987, p. 1.

extent. The Soviets have proven themselves to be masters of this game.

This is the beauty of having two aspects of Soviet military doctrine. One side can theoretically be changed without affecting the other--as long as it can be dialectically justified. Furthermore, the Soviet military continues to insist that the military-technical aspect of military doctrine must be a proper reflection of "the world situation" which remains "complex and strained." As Admiral Chernavin himself put it, "dreams are dreams and reality dictates its own laws."⁴ In other words, no changes can actually be made until the NATO countries agree. In effect then, from the Soviet military's perspective, the new Soviet doctrine is tantamount to saying nothing--at least nothing that is new.

However, the argument is clearly not over. Gorbachev and the Soviet military have each indicated that there are certain fundamental issues which continue to be of great concern, such as the stagnation of the Soviet economy, the changing nature of a future war, nuclear weapons, and finally the impact of modern technology on the future battlefield. The military's fundamental interests are not always going to correlate to Gorbachev's fundamental

⁴N. Chernavin, "70th Anniversary of the Soviet Army and Navy: Clear Channel," Komsomolskaya Pravda, 21 February 1988, p. 1.

interests. The debate continues, and it is possible that the military will come out on the losing end.

Gorbachev and the Soviet military are concerned about the basic nature of a future war. For years, most analysts and politicians in the West have insisted that a nuclear war would mean the complete devastation of the world as we know it today. It now appears, after almost 40 years of the threat of nuclear war hanging over the world, that the Soviets have actually accepted this idea. The Maritime Strategy has emphasized the Soviet reliance on maintaining a positive correlation of nuclear forces; in fact, it could easily be argued that the entire Soviet Navy is primarily serving the function of protecting this nuclear correlation, in both war and peace. And yet, now the Soviets are seriously discussing the complete elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000. There seems to be a contradiction.

It would be foolish at this point not to take all of Gorbachev's arms control proposals seriously. Like most politicians Gorbachev will undoubtedly ask for more than he thinks he can realistically obtain, but it appears that Gorbachev is quite serious about the elimination of all nuclear weapons. If this is true then there must have been a serious reassessment of the importance of the correlation of nuclear forces.

This means that the apparent contradiction in the Soviet attitude towards nuclear weapons can be explained. The changing Soviet outlook about the importance of the correlation of nuclear forces seems to have been primarily motivated by the increased concern for the effects of a nuclear war, as well as the significant impact that the technologically new precision guided munitions will have on the future battlefield. If weapons development has proceeded to the point so that, by the year 2000, tremendous improvements in accuracy and destructive capabilities make PGMs as useful as nuclear weapons, then present concern will be justified. The nuclear weapon would become unnecessary and antiquated, its use would simply become too dangerous.

However, until the nuclear forces are completely eliminated, their correlation will remain critical. In fact, the correlation of nuclear weapons would become more critical until they are sufficiently reduced so that they prove to be no threat to the Soviets. It is impossible to predict where such a level may be. It may be until the very last weapon is destroyed or at some intermediate level. This would depend upon the Soviet definition of unacceptable damage--a definition that they may not fully understand until the need truly arises.

The Soviets still realize that the goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons could be at least a decade away. This means that reasonable sufficiency and non-offensive defense

must adapt to the present military and political realities. Until nuclear weapons are completely eliminated these concepts must still consider the possibility of retaliation. Retaliation seems to be a very important Soviet concern, and the ultimate goal is to remove the need to retaliate by eliminating all offensive weapons.

If the goal of eliminating all offensive weapons is achieved then a tremendous economic burden will have been lifted from the shoulders of the Soviet Union. But such a goal can only be achieved if the United States and other NATO countries agree. This is why the Soviets continue to insist that the levels of reasonable sufficiency depend upon the United States and NATO.

The evidence indicates that the Soviets will continue to view the protection of the SSBN force as a primary role for the navy. Until nuclear weapons are eliminated they must be protected at all costs. The Soviets recently complained that a reduction of the numbers of SLBMs by the START treaty would result in as few as 15 to 20 SSBNs which would make trailing them more "cost effective".⁵ Thus, it is clear that as the START proposals inch their way closer to an actual treaty the Soviets have become increasingly concerned about the protection of their SSBN force. This concern is reinforced by the recent proposals for establishing ASW-free zones. Thus, the protection of the SSBN is well guarded

⁵Barnett, "Memorandum for the Record," p. 3.

bastions is likely to become an increasingly more important mission for the Soviet Navy until all nuclear weapons are eliminated.

Unfortunately, there is a flip side to the START reductions that could have a significant impact on the Maritime Strategy. If fewer funds are spent on the construction of SSBNs, then more money could be spent on building more of the newer generation SSNs such as the Akula, Sierra, and Victor III. Furthermore, fewer SSBNs to protect could mean that more assets can be released for other missions, such as SLOC interdiction.

It is apparent that the Soviets, especially Gorbachev, are very concerned about the decrease in industrial production and the general downward trend in economic growth. The military is certainly one area where savings can be made both in the short term and the long term, and some of the Soviet academicians have implied that this is one area where cuts should be made. One academician praised the period of 1956 to 1960, when Khrushchev (who is not mentioned by name) made cutbacks in the Soviet military, as a good example of what needs to be done. The Soviet writer insists that Khrushchev's decision,

...was prompted not so much by military and strategic as by technological and economic considerations. Nonetheless, in the political context of the time, this decision

worked towards assertion of the principles of reasonable sufficiency.⁶

Khrushchev, as indicated by the opening quote, wrestled with the very same problem that confronts Gorbachev today. The very fact that a Soviet writer would allude to Khrushchev's efforts in this area demonstrates the Soviet awareness of the importance as well as the precariousness of the situation.

However, the changes that are currently witnessed in the Soviet Union, including the changes in their military doctrine, reflect much, much more than a concern by the Soviet leadership for the Soviet economy. The Soviets are faced with a fundamental problem that is by no means unique to the Soviet Union: what changes will have to be made in order to ensure that the Soviet Union will remain a global superpower, or possibly the predominant superpower, in the 21st century? Perhaps it is only natural that as the end of one century approaches and the beginning of a new one looms just around the corner, all nations naturally undergo a reassessment of their current standing in the world, where they would like to be by the next century, and what will have to be done in order to guarantee that these goals are reached.

⁶Vladimir, Zubok, "The Principles of Reasonable Sufficiency in the Fifties Through the Seventies," APN Military Bulletin, No. 6, March 1988, p. 6.

The United States has not had a shortage of strategic thought prompted by this end-of-the-century-itch. Books like The Rise and Fall of Great Powers and 1999 and documents like Discriminate Deterrence indicate that it also realizes that the world has reached a watershed. Important changes are taking place, and the world may be a very different place in the 21st century. The successful country will be the one that has thought this through sufficiently in advance and is willing to make the inevitable sacrifices necessary to ensure it is able to lead the world.

The changes that are occurring in the Soviet Union are a fundamental acknowledgement that the world is also changing, and changing very rapidly. New thinking will be necessary if the Soviet Union is not to be left behind--and her current efforts indicate that the Soviet Union has no such intention. On the contrary, the Soviet Union is probably intent on forging ahead of the rest of the world. Only by setting the example for the other Socialist countries can the Soviets ever hope to reach the goal of global communism. It is a fundamental goal they have not lost sight of.

What is dangerous is a reliance on the idea that the Soviets are willing to sacrifice some of their long term global ambitions to effect a change in their economy today. They might be willing to make some sacrifices in the short term, by reducing military spending for example, in order to make long term gains into the next century. However, they

have shown no indications of actually cutting back and most likely will not cut back until the West agrees to cutbacks as well.

The critical questions then become: has there really been a fundamental change in the Soviet long-term ambitions, and what will be the implications for the Maritime Strategy in the 21st century if we make cutbacks now? This is why we must be cautious, and these questions must remain the central focus upon which we base our decisions.

C. SUMMARY

The principles of the Maritime Strategy were devised long before Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in the Soviet Union. The strategy, based upon many ideas that gathered momentum in the 1970s, assumed that the Soviets would use their conventional navy to protect their SSBN force in well guarded bastions.

The primary effect of Gorbachev's new policies so far has been the official adoption of a new military doctrine. The new doctrine was motivated by a combination of Soviet concerns about the state of the economy, the future of the nuclear weapon as a viable weapon of war, and the impact of technologically new weapons such as precision guided munitions on the future battlefield.

The Soviets have decided that the best course of action is to reduce their military spending without compromising their security. Such a task can only be accomplished by

inducing the West, particularly NATO, to also agree to cutbacks. This can be best accomplished by the use of arms control proposals.

One of the primary goals of Secretary Gorbachev is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000. Until nuclear weapons are eliminated the Soviets remain very concerned about having the ability to retaliate in the event of a nuclear war. Therefore, as these weapons are reduced the protection of the remaining SSBNs will become even more important.

Thus, the bastion concept will remain a critical linkage between the Maritime Strategy and the naval aspects of Soviet military strategy for the foreseeable future. However, the complete elimination of nuclear weapons will obviously give the Soviet Navy a fundamentally new and different primary mission. Whatever mission is chosen, it will undoubtedly have important implications for the Maritime Strategy. It is not too early to look ahead.

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
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